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Impact of the Uniform Commercial Code
On Colorado Law
By DELLAS W. LEE*
In 1936 a dissatisfied group of New York merchants launched
a movement to modernize the law of sales pertaining to interstate
and foreign trade, and within three years the New York Merchants'
Association had introduced into Congress a Federal Sales Act. If
the proposed act had been passed, the existence of two sets of laws,
one for interstate transactions and another for intrastate transactions
governed by the Uniform Sales Act, would no doubt have resulted in
considerable confusion and inconvenience. As an inducement to
postpone action on the Federal Sales Act, the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws appointed a committee
to consider the development of a statute to supersede the Uniform
Sales Act (USA). It soon became apparent, however, that many
other areas of commercial law also needed rewriting, and the idea
of a code covering not only sales transactions but the entire field of
commercial law, was conceived by William A. Schnader and proposed by him at the annual meeting of the National Conference of
Commissioners in 1940.' During the following twenty-five years,
the Uniform Commercial Code2 has been born, undergone three
complete revisions,' various amendments, and been adopted by
*Assistant Professor of Law, University of Denver College of Law.
1

UNIFORM

LAWS ANNOTATED -UNIFORM

COMMERCIAL

CODE VII.

In

1942 the

American Law Institute, the organization which has produced the various Restatements, was requested to co-sponsor the project. Although a Revised Sales Act, later
to become Article 2 of the Code, had already been developed by this time, work on
the Code did not get into full swing until 1944.
2All citations herein will be to the 1962 Official Text of the UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE, hereinafter sometimes referred to as the UCC or the Code.
3The methods used by the sponsors in drafting the Code were similar to the exhaustive
and meticulous procedures used by the American Law Institute in producing the
Restatements. Braucher, The Legislative History of the Uniform Commercial Code,
58 COLUM. L. REV. 798, 799 (1958).
COMMERCIAL CODE LXVI.

1 UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED-UNIFORM
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thirty-two states, the District of Columbia, and the Virgin Islands.'
Colorado is one of the most recent states to enact the Code.'
WHAT

IS THE CODE?

The Uniform Commercial Code contains 400 sections arranged
under ten articles, occupies 731 pages including official comments,
and is one of the largest single pieces of legislation ever to be
considered for enactment by any state. The Code pre-empts the entire
field of commercial law: it contains a broad, integrated system of
laws designed to govern all legal relationships encountered in the
flow of goods from the producer to the ultimate consumer.
The Uniform Commercial Code is not a "statute" in the ordinary sense; it is a "code." The official comments point this out by
describing the Code as a carefully integrated and "uniform codification of permanent character covering an entire 'field' of law ... "'
This does not mean that the Code contains all the law relative to all
conceivable commercial transactions in the absolute sense,7 and in
order to qualify as a code it need not. To be a true code in the civil
law sense it "must pre-empt, and not merely supplement, an operational body of law." The Uniform Commercial Code meets this
test.8 Statutes of the type common to Anglo-American jurisdictions
usually only supplement existing law and do not pre-empt the entire
field to which they are related. This approach is reversed by the
Code, which states that existing law is merely supplementary unless
specifically displaced9 which, to a very large degree, it is.
4

The adopting jurisdictions, in the order they enacted the Code, are: Pennsylvania
1953; Massachusetts 1957; Kentucky 1958; Connecticut 1958; New Hampshire 1959;
Rhode Island 1960; Wyoming 1961; Arkansas 1961; New Mexico 1961; Ohio 1961;
Oregon 1961; Oklahoma 1961; Illinois 1961; New Jersey 1961; Georgia 1962;
Alaska 1962; New York 1962; Michigan 1962; Indiana 1963; Tennessee 1963;
West Virginia 1963; Montana 1963; Maryland 1963; California 1963; Wisconsin
1963; Maine 1963; Nebraska 1963; Missouri 1963; District of Columbia 1963;
Virginia 1964; Virgin Islands 1965; Utah 1965; North Dakota 1965; and Colorado
1965. So far this year the Code has been introduced into the legislatures of eight
other states and is expected to be introduced into two more before the end of the year.
Schnader, 1965 LEGISLATIVE PROGRESS REPORT No. 2 ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (May 15, 1965). It now appears that the aspiration of the sponsors to
have the Code enacted in all states by 1967 is within the realm of possibility. If the
goal is reached the Code will become only the third uniform act to receive unanimous
adoption in the past seventy-eight years. Abrams, Introduction and New Jersey
History of the Uniform Commercial Code, 17 RUTGERS L. REV. 1 (1962).
5 The Code was considered by the Colorado Legislature as Senate Bill No. 104 and was
adopted on April 23, 1965, with an effective date of 12:01 a.m. July 1, 1966. The
section numbers of the Official Text have been retained but will be prefixed by 155
indicating the chapter the Code will occupy in the 1963 COLOlADo REVISED STATUTES
as amended.
6 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-104 Comment (emphasis added).
7 For example UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-318 Comment; § 8-202 Comment 3;
§ 9-310.
8 Hawkland, Uniform Commercial Code Methodology, 1961 U. ILL. L.F. 291, 309-10.
9 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-103.
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Adoption of a code of this nature poses interesting questions
as to the part the underlying policies and purposes" of the Code
should play in the solution of problems for which it does not specifically provide, and as to the effect that should be given to the
doctrine of stare decisis in solving problems which fall within it.
On the former question the draftsmen state that solutions in such
cases should be reached by a process of analogy and extrapolation
consistent with the underlying policies of the Code," which is similar
to the approach used in solving problems under civilian codes.'"
Because stare decisis is so deeply entrenched in American jurisprudence it is not likely to be ignored altogether in deciding cases under
the Code, but Dean William D. Hawkland has observed:
It may be hoped, however, that its application [the doctrine of
stare decisis] will be less vigorous here, and that courts will more
readily turn to the statutory text for their answers. Cases construing
the Code should be given high credit, but it should not be forgotten
that the Code itself is its own best evidence of what it means. If
cases construing it are determined to be wrong, courts should be
free to say so and to effectuate prompt rectification by going to the
Code itself,13rather than be resorting to the semi-covert technique of
distinction.
WHY HAVE A CODE?

The growing dissatisfaction among merchants and lawyers with
commercial law prior to the creation of the Code is easily understood
in the light of the historical development of the various uniform
statutes. For example, the Uniform Sales Act, based largely on the
English Sale of Goods Act of 1893, was promulgated in 1906 and
since the date of promulgation has been amended in only two sections.' The Negotiable Instruments Law was drafted by one man
in a little over one year and was promulgated in 1896. This act was
based substantially on the English Bills of Exchange Act adopted
by Parliament in 1882." In fact most of the uniform legislation in
the commercial law field was developed more than fifty years ago.
Obviously new patterns of activity have developed in the world of
commerce since then, and many of the old ones have become obsolete. The creation of a code provided the opportunity to make a
'0 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-102.
" UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-102
12 Hawkland, supra note 8, at 314-17.

Comment 1.

13 Hawkland, supra note 8, at 319.
14

VOLD, SALES 480 (2d ed. 1959).

15Malcolm, The Uniform Commercial Code, 39 ORE. L. REv. 318, 319 (1960).
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complete re-examination and revision of the entire field of commercial law during a single period of time and to bring it into harmony
with present practices and needs.1 6
Moreover, with the nation growing smaller through improved
methods of transportation and communication, and with an increasing volume of commerce crossing state lines, it would seem that a
good case can be made for the desirability of uniform legislation
throughout the nation, especially in the field of commercial law.
This was not achieved to an adequate degree under the uniform
laws, because not all states adopted them, and in those states where
they were adopted they did not always receive uniform interpretation. Where the uniform acts were not adopted, counterpart legislation came into existence in a piecemeal manner, as may be seen
from the development of the laws governing secured transactions.
Under these circumstances it was virtually impossible for a lawyer
to advise his clients on out-of-state matters without devoting an
inordinate amount of time to research the peculiarities of the relevant
law. There would seem to be only one condition precedent to the
solution of this problem, namely, the existence of a satisfactory
uniform law. The Code purports to be such a law.
Not the least justification for a code is the advantage that flows
from the entire body of commercial law being contained in a single
source. Once lawyers become acquainted with the unique structure
of the Code, not only will they find more answers than before, but
they will be able to find those answers faster1 7 and thereby have the
possibility of regaining their position in a field which has become
increasingly reserved for the specialist.
RESPONSE TO THE CODE

Although the Code is the product of a great amount of combined talent and the expenditure of a lot of money it has not
16 The uniform acts contained the seeds of their own obsolescence because there was no

17

adequate provision made by their sponsor to ensure that they would keep abreast of
current changes and needs. In recognition of the need for periodic review and "updating" the sponsors of the Code have formed the Permanent Editorial Board for the
Commercial Code. The Board, which was endowed by a gift from the Maurice and
Laura Falk Foundation, will review the Code not less than once every five years.
Whether legisUNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE X.
UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED latures that have already adopted the Code will accept the Board's recommended
amendments is, of course, another question, but the facility for eliminating obsolescence from the Code does exist.
Malcolm, supra note 15, at 321.
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escaped the criticism of experts in the field.'" Nor has it been
adopted without change, except in a few states. But in most states
the number of changes has not been great, and Colorado falls into
this category."9
This article is not intended to be another criticism, nor an exposition of the Code, of which there are several,2" but rather an attempt
to convey the flavor of change that will be made in Colorado law
by its adoption. An adequate appraisal of this kind could easily
occupy several volumes. To present the same material in forty pages
and at the same time do it justice is as hopeless a task as trying to
sketch the Grand Canyon by moonlight. Should one try for details?
One quickly discovers the folly of that. Under such circumstances
we are certain to miss the vast intricacies so essential to an appreciation of the subject. But on the other hand we cannot simply walk
away without comment, for what we behold has immense significance. To compensate for this predicament, the discussions of some
18

Some critical comments, listed in the order they relate to the various articles of the
Code, are:
UCC generally: Beutel, The Proposed Uniform (?) Commercial Code Should
Not Be Adopted, 61 YALE L.J. 334 (1952); Malcolm, The Uniform Commercial
Code, 39 ORE. L. REV. 318 (1960).
Article 2: Williston, The Law of Sales in the Proposed Uniform Commercial
Code, 63 HARV. L. REv. 561 (1950).
Article 3: Beutel, Comparison of the Proposed Commercial Code, Article 3, and
the Negotiable Instruments Law, 30 NEB. L. REV. 531 (1951) ; Beutel, The Proposed
Uniform Commercial Code as a Problem in Codification, 16 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB.
141 (1951) ; Kripke, Chattel Paper as a Negotiable Specialty Under the Uniform
Commercial Code, 59 YALE L.J. 1209 (1950) ; Note, The Fictitious Payee and the
UCC - The Demise of a Ghost, 18 U. CHI. L. REV. 281 (1951).
Article 4: Cf. Townsend, The Bank Collection Code of the American Bankers
Association, 8 TUL. L. REV. 21, 236, 376 (1934).

Article 5: Note, Letters of Credit Under the Proposed Uniform Commerciat
Code: An Opportunity Missed, 62 YALE L.J. 227 (1953).
Article 8: Guttman, Investment Securities Under the Uniform Commercial Code,
11 BUFF. L. REV. 1 (1961).
Article 9: Coogan and Gordon, The Effect of the Uniform Commercial Code
Upon Receivables Financing-Some Answers and Some Unsolved Problems, 76
HARV. L. REV. 1529 (1963) ; Uniform Commercial Code Article 9 Filing Procedures
for Railroad, Utility, and Other Corporate Debtors: Some Suggestions, 62 MICH.
L. REv. 865 (1964).
19 Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial Code. Rep. Nos. 1 & 2
(1962 & 1965).
20

ANDERSON'S

UNIFORM

BRAUCHER,

DOCUMENTS

COMMERCIAL
OF

TITLE

CODE
(1958);

2 VOLS.
CLARKE,

(1961,
BAILEY

reprinted 1962);
& YOUNG, BANK

DEPOSITS AND COLLECTIONS, (1963); COOGAN, HOGAN & VAGTS, SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (1963); HAWKLAND, A TRANSACTIONAL

GUIDE TO THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL

CODE 2 Vols.

(1964);

HAWK-

LAND, COMMERCIAL PAPER (1959); HAWKLAND, SALES & BULK SALES (1958);
WHITNEY, THE LAW OF MODERN COMMERCIAL PRACTICES, (2d ed. 1965). An
exhaustive collection of law review articles dealing with the UCC is contained in the
UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, where they are

conveniently categorized according to subject matter.
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of the important sections of the Code will be supplemented by
references to other sections which will also make significant changes,
with citations to their Colorado counterpart. In this way it is hoped
that the reader desiring to make further study will be assisted in
following up areas in which he has a special interest.
ARTICLE

1:

GENERAL PROVISIONS

Article 1 contains rules of construction 2 ' and interpretation,2"
numerous definitions, 3 and other rules24 which are of general application to the remainder of the Code. Although it contains only
seventeen sections and does not deal with any particular segment
of commercial law, it is a very important article because of the great
impact it has on all agreements covered by the Code.
Overriding all other rules of construction is the provision that
agreements are to be construed so as to give effect to the basic policies
and purposes of the Code, which are "to simplify, clarify and modernize the law governing commercial transactions; to permit the
continued expansion of commercial practices through custom, usage
and agreement of the parties [andi to make uniform the law among
the various jurisdictions."2 " A rule of narrower application provides
that, consistent with the specific provisions in each article, remedies
are to be liberally construed so as to put the parties as nearly as
possible in the position they would have been in if the agreement had
been fully performed. 6
Freedom of contract is preserved throughout the Code; that is,
the parties may vary the effect of most of its provisions. This is
rather obvious in view of the many sections which begin, "Unless
otherwise agreed... ," and it should be noted that freedom to vary
the effect of provisions is not limited to those sections containing
this or an equivalent phrase." However, a general limitation is
imposed on the freedom to contract to the extent that "obligations
of good faith, diligence, reasonableness and care prescribed by this
Act may not be disclaimed" by the parties. 8 But the parties are free
21 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§

1-102, -103, -104, -106.

2UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 1-205, -207, -208.
2 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 1-201, -204, -205.
2

' UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 1-105, -107, -202, -203, -206.

2UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-102(a).
2 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
27

§ 1-106.
1-102(4).

UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §

2UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 1-102, -201(19), -203.
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to set "the standards by which the performance of such obligations
is to be measured" so long as the standards "are not manifestly
unreasonable.''29 Other limitations on freedom to contract are contained in the Code but are applicable only to the specific articles in
which they appear. For example, a beneficiary under a letter of
credit may assign his right to the proceeds even though the credit
specifically states otherwise." Likewise, a contract subject to the provisions of Article 9 containing a clause prohibiting the assignment
of an account receivable or contract right is of no effect. Freedom to contract has been restricted in these instances because of
the more important economic need of the parties to be free to
alienate property interests of this type.32
Important miscellaneous provisions are also contained in this
article, e.g., that the parties may agree upon the applicable law to
govern their agreement where a specific article does not otherwise
provide,33 and that a party may waive his rights arising out of an
alleged breach of contract by a signed writing without the necessity
of consideration. 4 There is a Statute of Frauds with a monetary
minimum of $5000, applicable to all agreements not governed by
one of the specific Statutes of Frauds contained in a number of the
articles.3 Rules of application, interpretation, and definitions relating to course of dealing, usage of trade, " performance with reservation of rights,37 and acceleration and insecurity clauses 8 are also
found in this article.
Thus Article 1 consists mainly of a framework and guidelines
within which the remainder of the Code may function. On the
whole, the rules of construction, interpretation, definitions, and
miscellaneous provisions are new to the law in Colorado, but when
they become effective, in most instances there will be a clarification
of the law rather than a drastic change.
29 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-102(3).
30
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 5-116(2).
31

UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-318(4).

32 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 5-116 Comment 3; 9-318 Comment 4.
33 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-105.
34 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-107.

3 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 1-206, 2-201, 8-319, 9-203.
36 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-205.
37 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-207.

38 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-208.
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ARTICLE 2: SALES "

Article 2 contains virtually the entire law governing sales transactions. This makes an interesting contrast to the present situation
where it is estimated that more than forty percent of the law on this
subject can be found outside of the Uniform Sales Act.4" The article
is divided into seven parts, the most important of which pertain to
the formation of the sales contract (Part 2), construction of the
sales contract (Part 3), performance (Part 5), breach, repudiation,
and excuse (Part 6), and remedies of the parties (Part 7). Part 1
contains general rules of construction, and part 4 sets out rules governing passage of title and rights of creditors against good faith
3aSections of Article 2, not discussed below, which make significant changes in Colorado law, with citations to their counterparts in COLORADO REVISED STATUTES (1963)
and Colorado judicial decisions:
Uniform
Commercial
Code
§ 2-107
§ 2-302

Colorado
Counterpart

Subiect

Goods to be Severed From Realty
Unconscionable Contract or Clause

§ 121-1-76(9) (c)
See Boyes v.

Green Mtn.
3 Colo. App. 295,
33 Pac. 77 (1893)
§ 2-310
§ 2-312
§ 2-316
§ 2-318

Open Time for Payment or Running of Credit Authority to Ship Under Reservation
Warranty of Title and Against InfringementBuyer's Obligation Against Infringement
Exclusion or Modification of Warranties
Third Party Beneficiaries of Warranties
Express or Implied

Sale on Approval and Sale or Return
§ 2-326
§ 2-402(2) Rights of Seller's Creditors Against Sold Goods
§ 2-403(2) Power to Transfer - Good Faith Purchase of
Goods - Entrusting
§ 2-503(3) Manner of Seller's Tender of Delivery
§ 2-504
Shipment by Seller
Revocation of Acceptance in Whole or in Part
§ 2-608
§ 2-609
Right to Adequate Assurance of Performance
§ 2-615

Excuse by Failure of Presupposed Conditions

§ 2-616

Procedure on Notice Claiming Excuse

§ 2-702 (2)

Seller's Remedies on Discovery of
Buyer's Insolvency
Action for the Price
Buyer's Damages for Non-Delivery or Repudiation
Contractual Modification or Limitation of Remedy
Statute of Limitations in Contracts for Sale

§
§
§
§

2-709
2-713
2-719
2-725

40 CoLo. REv. STAT. § 121-1 (1963)
SALES & BULK SALES 5 (1958).

§§ 121-1-42, -47
§ 121-1-13
New
Senter v. Goodrich,
127 F. Supp. 705
(D. Colo. 1954);
see also Hochgertel
v. Canada Dry Corp.,
409 Pa. 616, 187 A.
2d 575 (1963)
§ 121-1-19(3)
§§ 59-1-14 and
121-1-26
§§ 121-1-23, 24, 25
§ 121-1-19(5)
§ 121-1-46
§ 121-1-69
New; cf.
§ 121-1-63(2)
Cofield v. Clark,
2 Colo. 101 (1873)
Cofield v. Clark,
2 Colo. 101 (1873)

§

121-1-53(1) (b)
§ 121-1-63(3)
§ 121-1-67(3)
New
§ 87-1-11

hereinafter referred to as USA;

HAWKLAND,
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purchasers. Specifically falling within the coverage of this article
are all "transactions in goods," i.e., sales contracts and contracts to
sell goods. The definition of goods includes "all things" movable
at the time they are identified to the contract, including growing
crops, timber, unborn young of animals, and certain things attached
to real estate.4 This will make little change in the current law.4
The most revolutionary aspects of Article 2 are to be found in
(1) the rules governing formation of the sales contract, (2) the
diminished significance attached to the passage of title in a sales
transaction, and (3) the approach one must take in solving problems
falling under Article 2. Discussion of the article will be limited to
a brief inquiry into these three subjects.
A. Formation of the Contract
One of the most obvious departures from present law is found
in the special rules which draw a distinction between sales contracts
made between merchants and those made between non-merchants.
This so-called "double standard" approach has been criticised," a
but the draftsmen have justified the distinction on the ground that
the standards under which merchants and laymen can be expected
to perform are different." A merchant is defined as
a person who deals in goods of the kind or otherwise by his occupation holds himself out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to
the practices or goods involved in the transaction or to whom such
knowledge or skill may be attributed by his employment of an
agent or broker or other intermediary who by his occupation holds
himself out as having such knowledge or skill.4.

The special treatment given merchants is well illustrated by the
rules governing formation of the sales contract, five of which have
been selected for discussion.
It is hornbook law that, with certain exceptions, an offeror retains
the right to revoke his offer even though it is apparently intended
to be irrevocable, unless the offer is supported by consideration.46
Under Article 2 a written offer signed by a merchant which purports
to be irrevocable will be enforced as such up to a period of three
months even though consideration has not been given by the offeree 7
The purpose of the section is "to give effect to the deliberate intention of a merchant to make a firm offer binding.''48 It will be noted
41 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§
42

2-102, 105.
CoLO REV. STAT. §§ 121-1-5, -6, -76 (1963).

4aWhiteside, Uniform Commercial Code165, 170 (1960).
44

UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §

2-104

Major Changes in Sales Law, 49 Ky. L.J.

Comment 1.

45 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-104.
46 1 CORBIN, CONTRACTS 131-36 (1950).
47 UNIFORM COMMERCAL CODE § 2-205.
48

UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

§ 2-205 Comment 2.
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that the rule applies only to irrevocable offers made by merchants.
Non-merchants are exempt, presumably because of the danger of
their being unduly injured by the consequence of making such an
offer inadvertently. But even the merchant has some safeguard
against being bound by unintended offers since the rule is limited
to written offers. Consideration will therefore be necessary if the
offer is oral, and for the offer to be valid beyond a three month
period it must be renewed or else be supported by consideration.
Where the offeror is not a merchant the Code makes no change in
prior law.
Equally well known is the rule that the inclusion of additional
terms in the acceptance of an offer, with minor exceptions, constitutes at most a counter offer and results in no contract. 9 Under
Article 2 an acceptance which contains terms in addition to those
set out in the offer is a valid acceptance unless explicitly conditioned
upon acceptance of additional terms. The additional terms are to
be considered as "proposals for addition to the contract" and, as
between merchants, become terms of the contract unless (1) the
offer expressly eliminates all additional terms, (2) they constitute
a material alteration, or (3) the offeror gives notice of objection.5"
Thus the presence of additional terms does not prevent the formation of a contract, but whether the terms become part of the contract
between merchants depends upon the degree to which they would
alter it, or upon the desires of the offeror. The provision is designed
to give legal validity to the common practice of parties including
additional terms or suggestions in the closing or confirming memoranda,51 and to validate the common use of form contracts which
usually contain additional terms but which, at least in the expectation of the parties, does result in a contract. Where the parties
are not merchants the additional terms contained in the memorandum
of acceptance do not become part of the contract, but a contract is
nevertheless consummated unless the acceptance is conditional.
Another departure from present law is to be found in the section
governing modification agreements which provides that "an agreement modifying a contract within this Article needs no consideration
to be binding."5 " Most states, including Colorado, 3 have refused
to uphold modification agreements, on the ground that a mere
promise of performance of an existing duty by one party is not
49 1 CORBIN, op. cit. supra note 46,
" UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §

at 266-68, 277-78.
2-207.
51 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-207 Comment 1.
52
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-209.
53 H.R. Paving Co. v. Asphalt Paving Co., 147 Colo. 506, 364 P.2d 185 (1961);
Leonard v. Hallett, 57 Colo. 274, 141 Pac. 481 (1914); Hall v. King, 2 Colo. 711
(1875) ; Marshall v. Old, 14 Colo. App. 32, 59 Pac. 217 (1899).
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consideration for a promise by the other party to modify the contract.
However, some states, while paying lip service to this rule, have
avoided its application. Professor Corbin has seriously doubted the
wisdom of applying the rule without weighing the moral and social
considerations involved. 4 The section codifies this approach and
the new provision will add flexibility to this area of the law by
permitting the courts to give effect to the intention of the parties
without the necessity of indulging in subterfuge. In addition the
Code contains some built-in protection against bad-faith modifications and false assertions of oral modification agreements. For
example the same section provides that a signed agreement excluding
the right of modification (or rescission) except by another signed
writing may not be modified in any other manner. Moreover, if the
modified contract involves more than $500, the provisions of the
Statute of Frauds5 5 must be satisfied. Also any alleged agreement
to modify the contract must not offend the requirement of good faith
which is imported into the performance or enforcement of all sales
contracts."
The controversial segment of law known as the Statute of
Frauds has been retained by Article 2, but it appears in a considerably different form and will make substantial changes in present
law.5 7 The Code provides that any contract for the sale of goods
over the price of $500" is not enforceable unless evidenced by a
writing which indicates existence of a contract, and which the party
against whom the contract is to be enforced has signed; even then
it is enforceable only to the extent of the quantity term stated. Thus
the only indispensable requisites are: (1) a writing evidencing a
contract, (2) a signature, and (3) the quantity term, and it does
not matter that the other terms are absent. An oral contract not
meeting the above requirements might still be enforceable if the
goods are specially manufactured, or if the party against whom the
contract is to be enforced admits the contract either in his pleadings
or testimony, or if there has been part performance. In transactions
between merchants a confirming memorandum will take the contract
outside of the statute if it would be sufficient to bind the sender,
unless a written objection is given within ten days after receipt of
the memorandum.59 The confirming memorandum and the admis54 1 CORBIN, op. cit. supra note 46, at 560-61; and see HAWKLAND, SALES AND BULK
SALES 11 (1958).
55 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-201.
56

UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 1-203, 2-103.
REV. STAT. § 121-1-4 (1963).
8 The value limit under the Colorado Act is $50.00. COLO. REV. STAT. § 121-1-4 (1963).
59
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-201(2).
5

5

7/COLO.
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sions provision are new to Colorado, and the part performance
provision has taken on a new look.6 0 As under pre-Code law, evidence
of compliance with the Statute of Frauds is not necessarily proof of
the existence of a contract between the parties or its terms. However,
this principle will be more operative in transactions governed by the
Code than formerly, thereby reducing the number of cases where
fraud may be perpetrated by a party who succeeds in convincing the
trier of fact of the existence of an alleged contract or of its alleged
terms where there is in fact no contract or the terms are not as alleged. This is achived by the provisions that in the case of admissions
or part performance, the contract is not enforceable beyond the quantity of the goods admitted, or for which payment and acceptance, or
receipt and acceptance, have been given.6 a Thus the Code provision
has been drafted to reduce the number of occasions when welchers
may avoid their contractual responsibility by raising the Statute of
Frauds - which often occurs under present law. At the same time it
generally prevents the claimant from enforcing the contract beyond
the degree to which there is evidence to warrant its enforcement.
The specially manufactured exception is substantially the same
as the USA provision, 6 except for the additional requirement that
the seller must have made "a substantial beginning of the manufacture or commitments for their procurement," i.e., he must have
changed his position.
B. Passage of Title and Approach to Problem Solving
At common law and under the Uniform Sales Act an inordinate
number of legal consequences have rested upon the location of title
to the goods involved in the dispute -for example, risk of loss,
rights of the seller to the price or damages, levy by creditors, income
and property tax, etc.6"
A hypothetical problem will illustrate the impact Article 2
will have on this area of sales law and also demonstrate the difference of approach one must follow in the solution of such problems
under the Code. Suppose S, a farmer, sells a stack of hay located
on his land to B for $200, which B pays with a promissory note to
become due in thirty days, with the understanding that B may not
take possession of the hay until the note has been paid. That night,
before removal and before payment of the note, the hay is struck by
0

6 Cf. COLO. REv. STAT. § 121-1-4 (1963).
6Oa UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 2-201 (3) (b) and (c).
61COLO. REV. STAT. § 121-1-4(2) (1963).
62 BOGERT, BRITTON & HAWKLAND, CASES ON SALES AND SECURITY,

1962).

245-46 (4th ed.
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lightning and burns. Who bears the loss? Under the Uniform Sales
Act the answer depends upon the resolution of another question:
who has title at the time of the loss? If the title has passed to B
before the fire, he bears the risk of loss.63 Under the Uniform Sales
Act, passage of title depends upon the intention of the parties.64 Did
the parties intend title to pass when the promissory note was given,
when B would take possession of the hay, or when the promissory
note was paid? Since the parties have not expressly stated their
intention on this point, and probably never had any, the statute
requires a determination by looking to the rules of presumption:
Where there is an unconditional contract to sell specific goods, in
a deliverable state, the property in the goods passes to the buyer
when the contract is made and it is immaterial whether the time of
65
payment, or the time of delivery, or both, be postponed.
Accordingly B bears the loss. The solution seems certain enough
in this example, but the rules of presumption have led to conflicting
results.66 By varying the facts of our hypothetical so that what has
been sold is turkeys and not hay, the question of whether title has
passed could depend upon whether the turkeys were destroyed by

freezing or by fire.67 This would seem to be ridiculous when the basic
result - loss of the turkeys - is the same in both cases.
The USA's circuitous approach used to solve risk of loss and
other problems by first determining the location of title has been
described by Karle Llewellyn as "lump-concept thinking."6 The

Code abandons this approach by shifting its focus to the "narrow
issue,"" and from this point special rules determine who bears the
risk of loss in any given set of circumstances without regard to the
location of title." Only where a particular fact pattern does not fall
within one of the special sections does location of title become
material.7
63

COLO. REV. STAT. § 121-1-22 (1963).

64 COLO.REV. STAT. § 121-1-18 (1963).
65
COLO. REV. STAT. § 121-1-19 (1963).
66Compare Radloff v. Bragmus, 214 Minn. 130, 7 N.W.2d

491 (1943) (title to
turkeys passed even though quantity and quality not determined) with Day v. Gravel,
72 Minn. 759, 75 N.W. 1 (1898) (no title to logs passed; logs neither delivered
nor marked) and with Rail v. Little Falls Lumber Co., 47 Minn. 422, 50 N.W. 471
(1891) (no title to logs passed; they had to be specifically ascertained) and with
Lingham v. Eggleston, 27 Mich. 324 (1873) (no title passed because quantity and
quality of logs not determined).

67 HAWKLAND, SALES AND BULK SALES 80-82 (1958).

68 LLEWELLYN,

CASES AND MATERIALS ON SALES, 565
BRITTON & HAWKLAND, op. cit. Supra note 62, at 246.

69Ibid.
70 E.g., UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 2-509, 2-510.
71 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-401.

(1930).

See also BOGERT,
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In our hypothetical the narrow issue is, who bears the risk of
loss at the time of the fire where there has been no breach of the
contract. Since the turkeys were neither bailed nor to be shipped
by the seller, subsection 2-509(3) would govern: "In any case not
within subsection (1) and (2), the risk of loss passes to the buyer
on his receipt of the goods if the seller is a merchant; otherwise the
risk passes to the buyer on tender of delivery." Accordingly, if S
is a merchant72 he bears the loss; if not we must determine whether
there has been a "tender of delivery.""3 Assuming that the facts
would require some notification to B, which may be disputed, no
tender of delivery has been made so the loss would fall on S. Thus
the problem is solved without the necessity of resorting to the presumptions for determining the "intention" of the parties on the passage of title in a case where there was really no intention at all, and
without requiring the court to wade through a mass of conflicting
cases. As Karle Llewellyn would say, the Code has met the policy
questions involved in the "narrow issue" head-on."
It will be noted that the outcome of the problem under the Code
(regardless of whether B is a merchant or not) is opposite to that
under the Uniform Sales Act. This is because Section 2-509(3) is
based on the policy that where the seller is a merchant, risk of loss
should follow possession of the goods. If the goods are to be delivered at the seller's place of business or another situs, the seller bars
the risk until the buyer takes possession, even though the price has
been paid. Reason for the rule is found in the theory that under
such circumstances the merchant is more likely to have insurance on
the goods than is the buyer who has not yet taken possession.7" In
the case of a non-merchant, even though the risk of loss remains on
him only until a "tender of delivery" is made, this provision will
also tend to place the risk of loss on the party in possession, since
a buyer from a non-merchant can generally be expected to take
possession of the goods soon after such tender.
Article 2 probably makes more radical changes in present law
than any other article, except Article 9. Upon becoming effective it
will repeal the Uniform Sales Act 7 6 and all case law which is specifically dealt with by the article.
72

73

UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-104.

"Tender of delivery requires that the seller put and hold conforming goods at the
buyer's disposition and give the buyer any notification reasonably necessary to enable
him to take delivery."

UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-503(1).

74 LLEWELLYN, op. cit. supra note

68, at 569.
2-509 Comment 3.
§ 121-1-1 to -79 (1963).

75 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §
76

COLO. REV. STAT.
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3:

COMMERCIAL PAPER

77

Except for a few instances78 it is probable that the law pertaining
to negotiable paper in Colorado is contained in the Negotiable
Instruments Act," and any document not meeting its requirements
is non-negotiable.8 0 Assuming this to be correct, the first striking
difference between Article 3 and the NIL is that Article 3 covers
a much narrower area. It specifically excludes money, documents
of title, and investment securities from its operation. 8 ' Accordingly,
only commercial paper, i.e., drafts, checks, certificates of deposit,
82
and notes are governed by this article. 1
By restricting Article 3 to commercial paper, the draftsmen
were able to develop a more stringent set of rules,"8 and to make the
coverage more intense. An example of the increased intensity is
7 Sections of Article 3, not discussed below, which make significant changes in Colorado law, with citations to their Colorado counterparts in COLORADO REVISED
STATUTES (1963) and Colorado judicial decisions:
Uniform
Commercial
Code

Subject

§ 3-206
§ 3-303(a)
§ 3-406

Effect of Restrictive Indorsement
Taking for Value
Negligence Contributing to Alteration or
Unauthorized Signature

§ 3-407

Alteration
Contract of Accommodation Party
Warranties on Presentment and Transfer
When Presentment, Notice of Dishonor,
and Protest Necessary or Permissible
Unexcused Delay - Discharge
Time of Presentment
How Presentment Made
Rights of Party to Whom Presentment is Made

§ 3-415
§ 3-417
§ 3-501(3)
§ 3-502(1) (b)
§ 3-503(2)
§ 3-504(3)
§ 3-505

Colorado
Counterpart

§ 95-1-47
§ 95-1-26
Statton v. Stone,
15 Colo. App. 236,
61 Pac. 481 (1900)
§ 95-1-124
§§ 95-1-28, -29, -64
88 95-1-65, -66, -69
§ 95-2-45
§ 95-3-3
§ 95-4-4
§ 95-1-78
§ 95-1-74

Portions of the law governing the negotiability of bills of lading, warehouse receipts, and stock are found in the Uniform Sales Act, the Uniform Warehouse
Receipts Act, and the Uniform Stock Transfer Act.
7 COLO. REV. STAT. Ch. 95 (1963)
(substantially the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law, hereafter sometimes referred to as the NIL).
80 In former years there was considerable discussion as to whether bonds are covered
by the NIL. Many jurisdictions have decided that they are. Enoch v. Brandon, 249
N.Y. 263, 164 N.E. 45 (1928); Israels, Investment Securities as Negotiable Paper:
Article 8 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 13 Bus. LAW 676 (1958). And see
Paxton v. Miller, 102 Ind. App. 511, 200 N.E. 87 (1936); Gayle v. Greasy Creek
Coal & Land Co., 249 Ky. 251, 60 S.W.2d 599 (1933); Tucker v. Brown,
20 Wash. 2d 740, 150 P.2d 604 (1944) ; BRITTON, BILLS & NOTES 47-52 (2d ed.
1961). There appears to be no case on this point in Colorado, but it is quite likely
that this jurisdiction would hold the same way. In fact this conclusion seems almost
inescapable in view of the specific reference to "public or corporate securities" in
COLO. REV. STAT. § 95-1-65 (1963). And see Enoch v. Brandon, supra.
81 Documents of title and investment securities are covered by Articles 7 and 8,
respectively, and when an instrument is in the course of bank collection Article 3
is subject to the provisions of Article 4. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-103.
82UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-104(2).
83 See rules on formal requisites, §§ 3-104 to -111, discussed infra, page 83.
78
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found in the more detailed attention given to the underlying contract
between the drawer and drawee as well as in the development of
many gap-filling rules.8 4 The physical aspects of Article 3 also make
an interesting comparison when matched against the NIL. The
NIL contains 196 sections whereas Article 3 contains only seventynine, and eleven of these are devoted to matters not covered by the
NIL. The NIL consists of approximately 1,300 lines whereas its
counterpart in the Code occupies about 885 lines.5
Article 3 probably makes fewer changes in prior law than any
other major article, and yet Professor Beutel has said that it contains
such a new and strange vocabulary that anyone familiar with the
NIL must forget most of what he knows and restudy the entire
article in detail in order to comprehend its meaning. 6 During the
first seventy years of operation judicial interpretation led to about
seventy-seven divisions of authority with respect to various sections
of the NIL. In order to remove from the courts the temptation to construe identical language like previous opinions interpreting the NIL,
the draftsmen chose to create an entirely new act rather than to patch
up the old one.87 The result was a complete revision and reorganization with the elimination of redundancy, verbosity, and obsolete
sections.
The article has eight parts, the major ones being Part 1, Form
and Interpretation, Part 2, Transfer and Negotiation, Part 3, Rights
of A Holder, Part 4, Liability of Parties, Part 5, Presentment, Notice
of Dishonor, and Protest, and Part 6, Discharge. Part 7,consists of
one section dealing with advice of an international sight draft, and
Part 8 contains miscellaneous provisions.
Many examples of the complete revision of the NIL made by
Article 3 can be found in the part dealing with formal requisites.8"
In viewing the changes it would be well to keep in mind one of the
major advantages flowing from the attribute of negotiability being
conferred upon instruments used to finance a sale - the obligation
to pay money is separated from the risk of nonperformance of the
underlying contract. A financing institution may be willing to accept
the risk of the maker's liquidity, but if it were required to bear the
consequence of nonperformance of the underlying contract, the flow
84

See UNIFORM

COMMERCIAL

CODE

§§ 3-413

to -417;

HAWKLAND,

COMMERCIAL

PAPER, 3, 21-60 (1959).

85 Leary, Commercial Paper: Some Aspects of Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial
Code, 48 KY. L.J. 198, 201 (1960).
88 Beutel, Comparison of the Proposed Commercial Code, Article 3, and the Negotiable
Instruments Law, 30 NEB. L. REv. 531, 533 (1951).
87 Leary, supra note 85, at 200.
88
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-101 to -122.
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of commerce would be impeded and the cost of credit would be
increased."9 The changes relating to formal requisites do not impinge
upon this reason for negotiability as will be seen from the following
examination of some of these changes.
Section 3-104 states that for a writing to be negotiable within
the article it must be signed and contain an unconditional promise
or order to pay a sum certain in money to order or to bearer on demand or at a definite time. Then follow seven sections defining and
particularizing what will or will not constitute compliance with the
individual formal requisites.
The provision governing unconditional promises makes two
basic changes: It defines the formal requisite with greater particularity than the NIL,9 and provides for two exceptions to the rule
that a promise or order to pay from a particular fund is conditional.
The exceptions are that governments or government agencies may
draw checks or make other commercial paper payable from a particular fund or proceeds of particular taxes, and that payment may
be made from the assets of a partnership or other unincorporated
association, trust, or estate without offending the unconditional
promise requirement.91 Although both exceptions violate the language of the NIL, they are consistent with sound business practice
and do not offend the major purpose of negotiability.
The requirement that the instrument be payable "at a fixed or
determinable future time"92 has been reduced to "at a definite
time.'"'" T~is change was made because the phraseology of the NIL
had been relied upon, almost exclusively to facilitate borrowing on
future inheritances by the use of post-obituary notes, and which
presently serves no useful commercial purpose.9 4
Under the Code an instrument payable at a definite time does
not become indefinite as a result of the presence of an acceleration
clause, regardless of its type. Although the NIL specifically validates a clause accelerating the debt on default of an installment of
principal or interest," there has been considerable question whether
optional or automatic acceleration clauses which are conditional or
unrestricted violate the "on or before a fixed or determinable future
time" requirement. For example, some courts have manifested hos89

Leary, supra note 85, at 212.

90COLO. REV. STAT. § 95-1-3 (1963).
91 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-105.
9
2 COLO. REV. STAT. § 95-1-4(1)(c) (1963).
93 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-104.
)4 UNIFOR , COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-109 Comment 1.
95 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-109.
6COLO. REV. STAT. § 95-1-2(1)(a) (1963).
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tility toward the clause which permits the holder to accelerate
payment any time "he deems himself insecure.-9 7 The validity of

such clauses under the Code is to be determined by the good faith
of the holder rather than by a time requirement."
The last sentence of Section 3-204(1) reverses the rule that a
negotiable instrument payable to bearer on its face may be negotiated
by delivery only, notwithstanding a special indorsement 9 This
change harmonizes negotiable instrument law with other areas of
Colorado commercial law'10 by permitting the last indorser to determine the method of subsequent negotiations. The change enables
an owner of bearer paper, if he desires, to direct payment and obtain
evidence of satisfaction of his obligation to the transferee in the
form of the transferee's indorsement. But the special indorsee may
make it payable to bearer again by indorsing the instrument in
11
blank.'
Article 3 resolves a point of conflict in some jurisdictions by
providing that a payee may be a holder in due course when he otherwise qualifies."°2 This appears to overturn Colorado law."0 3 There
is no specific provision in the NIL on this point, but since the words
"negotiated to him" appear in the test for a holder in due course'0 4
this has been taken to imply that a payee is not included because
he obtains the instrument other than by "negotiation." Support for
this view is based on the notion that since the payee is the immediate
party he would have knowledge of the maker's defenses. This overlooks the fact that on many occasions the instrument is obtained by
a third party and then forwarded to the payee who has little or no
knowledge of the details surrounding its acquisition. The Code
recognizes this possibility.
Sections 3-115, 3-305, and 3-407 reverse the NIL provision
which reads, "Where an incomplete instrument has not been delivered it will not, if completed and negotiated, without authority, be
a valid contract in the hands of any holder, as against any person
whose signature was placed thereon before delivery."10'

Under this

section an unauthorized completion followed by an unauthorized
97 Leary, supra note 85, at 210-11.
98

UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 1-208, 3-109, Comment 4.

0 COLO. REV. STAT. § 95-1-40 (1963).
I0 E.g., Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act, COLO. REV. STAT. § 147-3-2 (1963) ; and
see the Uniform Bills of Lading Act § 29, which Colorado has not enacted.
101 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-204 Comment.
1O2UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-302(2).
03

1 Ayres v. Walker, 54 Colo. 571, 131 Pac. 384 (1913).

However, the case does not

deal with the question of whether the payee would have "otherwise qualified" as
10 4
10

a holder in due course.

COLO. REv. STAT. § 95-1-52(1) *(1963).
COLO. REV. STAT. § 95-1-15 (1963).
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delivery of an instrument gives a maker or indorser a real defense.
However, an unauthorized delivery, or an unauthorized completion
after delivery, occurring independently, would give rise to a personal
defense only."0 6 To permit a maker or indorser to claim a real defense
merely because both incidents occur together would seem illogical.' 7
Accordingly, unauthorized delivery and completion of an instrument
is not listed in the Code as a valid defense against a holder in due
course,' 0 8 and would therefore be only a personal defense.
In addition to the new phraseology, most of the changes Article
3 will make in Colorado law take the form of gap-filling rules,
clarifications, exceptions to the general rule, deletions of obsolete
rules, and in some cases, reversals.
Article 3, upon becoming effective, will repeal the Negotiable
Instruments Law.'
ARTICLE 4: BANK DEPOSITS AND COLLECTIONS1 0

Because of the great volume of items"' being processed by
banks in this country each day - estimated at 25,000,000 or more"'
- and because many of these items must cross state lines, the creation
of a uniform, comprehensive banking statute would seem to be
extremely helpful, if not absolutely necessary, to the efficient flow
of banking commerce. This is the major justification for Article 4."'
06

COLO. REv. STAT. § 95-1-14, -16 (1963).
107 HAWKLAND, op. cit. supra note 84, at 77.
108 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-305.
1

09
1
COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 95-1-1 to 95-3-6 (1963).
110 Sections of Article 4, not discussed below, which make significant changes in Colorado law, with citations to their counterparts in COLORADO REVISED STATUTES
(1963) and Colorado judicial decisions:

Uniform
Commercial
Code
§ 4-201(1)
§ 4-204
§ 4-205
§ 4-207
§ 4-303
§ 4-403
§ 4-407
§ 4-501 to -504

Subject
Presumption and Duration of
Agency Status
Methods of Sending and PresentingDirect to Payor Bank
Supplying Missing Indorsement
Warranties of Customer and Collecting
Bank
Notice-Stop Orders-Legal ProcessSetoff--Order of Payment
Stop Payment
Payor Bank's Right to Subrogation on
Improper Payment
Collection of Documentary Drafts

Colorado
Counterpart
§§ 14-18-3,-5
§ 14-8-7
§ 95-1-49
§§ 95-1-65, -66
§ 14-3-3
§ 14-3-8
New
New

11 "Item" is defined as "any instrument for the payment of money even though it is
not negotiable but does not include money." UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-

104(g).
112 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

§ 4-103 Comment 3.

113 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-101 Comment.
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The validity of this theory is supported by the obvious movement
toward uniformity in this field during the past forty years. In 1929
the American Bankers Association proposed a uniform code 4 on
bank collections which was ultimately enacted by twenty-two states.115
Colorado, the most recent of these, adopted the ABA Code in modified form in 1957 as part of the comprehensive Colorado Banking
Code."' The Model Deferred Posting Statute.. is a more recent
uniform act of the American Bankers Association which Colorado
has adopted in part.118
Article 4 is the first comprehensive uniform banking practices
and collections statute, and is designed to supersede the ABA Code,
the Model Deferred Posting Statute, and the various non-uniform
laws in many states. The article adopts many of the rules and
policies of these statutes as well as codifying many court decisions
and banking practices which have not previously been covered by
statute." 9 And as would be expected, it has been both praised and
criticised. °
Article 4 is divided into five parts. Part 1 contains rules of construction and definitions which are applicable throughout the article.
Part 2 contains fourteen sections on the collection process: sending
and presenting items, provisional and final payment by payor banks,
etc. Part 3 deals with deferred posting, late returns of items, and
the responsibility of the payor bank when it receives notice, stoporders, and the like. Part 4 sets out the rights and duties in the
payor bank-customer relationship. Part 5 governs collections of
documentary drafts.
The vexing conflicts question concerning which law will govern
the liability of a bank handling an item for presentment, payment,
or collection is resolved in favor of a rule which is essentially tort
by nature: the law of the place where the bank is located.'' This
was considered preferable to other alternatives because of the ambulatory nature of an item caught up in the collection process and the
necessity of a bank being aware of the law by which its liability
114The ABA Bank Collection Code (found in II MARTINDALE HUBBELL LAW DIRECTORY PART III (1932))
is not one of the uniform acts drafted by the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. The only uniform act on
this subject drafted by the body is the Uniform Bank Collection Act, which has not
been enacted by any state.
1 15
Wertz, Article 4: Bank Deposits and Collections, 21 MONT. L. REV. 42 (1959).
116 COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-8-1 to -15 (1963).
117 The Model Deferred Posting Statute (found in III MARTINDALE HUBBELL LAW
DIRECTORY PART VI (1952)).
118 CoLo. REV. STAT. § 14-8-4 (1963).
119 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-101 Comment.
120 Cf. Wallace, Comments on the Proposed Uniform Collection Code, 16 VA. L. REv.

792 (1930); Townsend, The Bank Collection Code of the American Bankers Association, 8 TUL. L. REV. 21, 236, 376 (1934).
121 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-102(2).
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would be determined. 22 This rule will fill a gap in the present law.
The last sentence of Section 4-102(2) will be inapplicable because
of the prohibition against branch banking in the state. 23
Section 4-103 permits the parties to vary the provisions of
Article 4 except that the requirement of good faith and ordinary
care by the bank may not be varied nor can damages flowing therefrom be limited. However, the parties are free to determine the
standards by which this responsibility is to be measured, providing
the standards are not manifestly unreasonable. The same section
provides that Federal Reserve Regulations, operating letters, clearing
house rules, and the like, shall have the effect of an agreement between the parties whether assented to or not, and that compliance
therewith constitutes the exercise of ordinary care. These provisions
have been severely criticised because they permit banks to take unfair
advantage of depositors by the use of form contracts and the like
through the unequal bargaining power of the parties. 1 2 Early drafts
of the article containing rigid rules for the protection of depositors
were abandoned, however, in favor of the present version which
was considered essential to the future growth of banking procedures. 25 It would seem that arguments on this matter are moot
so far as Colorado is concerned since the above provisions are almost
identical to present law."' But the Code does go a little further in
attempting to accommodate future growth in banking practices by
authorizing the development of new banking methods which are
consistent with the article, providing they are reasonable under the
circumstances." 7
Resolution of disputes between the payee of an item and the
payor, or drawer, or creditors of the drawer, often calls for a determination of whether the item has been finally paid and if so, at
what time. This has been a difficult question in some jurisdictions,
and no state, prior to the Code, has enacted what could be considered
a comprehensive rule covering the matter."5 Article 4 provides that
final payment will occur when (a) the item is paid in cash, or
(b) a final settlement"5 for the item is made, or (c) posting of the
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4102 (2) Comment 2.
123 COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-3-1 (1963).
124 Beutel, The Proposed Uniform (?) Commercial Code Should Not be Adopted, 61
YALE L.J. 334 (1952).
125 CLARKE, BAILEY & YOUNG, BANK DEPOSITS AND COLLECTIONS 29 (1963); Brome,
Bank Deposits and Collections, 16 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 308 (1951).
126 COLO. REv. STAT. § 14-8-2'(1963).
7
2 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-103(4); see Comment 5.
1'

128 CLARKE, BAILEY & YOUNG, Op. cit. supra note 125, at 75.

129 "Settle" is defined as payment "in cash, by clearing house settlement, in a charge
or credit or by remittance, or otherwise as instructed. A settlement may be either
provisional or final;" UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-104(j).
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item is completed, or (d) the time for revocation of a provisional
settlement has passed without revocation. 3 ' Final payment through
final settlement and expiration of the time for revocation are new
to Colorado, and the rule on posting would make the law more
precise than it now appears"' by providing that the process of posting must be complete before final payment is made.
The system of deferred posting - the process of posting items
to customer accounts the day following their receipt - gives the
bank time to cope with large volumes of items on a "production
line" basis." 2 The Code provides that settlements before midnight
on the date an item is received under this practice may be revoked
by the payor bank up to the "midnight deadline"'3 3 unless final
payment has occurred before then. To recover any payment previously made the bank must either return the item or send written
notice of dishonor before the midnight deadline." ' This provision
is consistent with present law." 5
On the whole, Article 4 represents very little departure from
the relevant law in Colorado. Even where changes will be made
they are primarily in the nature of clarifications and gap-filling rules.
Upon becoming operative the Code will repeal portions of
Article 3136 and all of Article 8". of the Colorado Banking Code of
1957. The rest of the Colorado Banking Code should be examined
generally in light of Article 4.
ARTICLE

5:

LETTERS OF CREDIT

A letter of credit is
an engagement by a bank or finance company or other issuer which

is made at the request of its customer or some other person who
owes a debt which will arise in the future to a third person, which
is made to that third person. The engagement is that if certain
things are done, either by way of presentation of pieces of paper
or simply by the making of a demand for payment of a draft or
acceptance, payment or acceptance will take place. 1 s
The primary characteristic of letter of credit financing is that it
130 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-213 (1).

131 COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-8-8 (1963).
132 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-301 Comment 1.

133

''Midnight deadline' with respect to a bank is midnight on its next banking day on
which it receives the relevant item or notice or from which the time for taking
action commences to run, whichever is later;" UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-

104(h).
134 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-301.

135 COLO. REv. STAT. § 14-8-12 (1963).
6

13 COLO. REV. STAT. § § 14-3-3, -7, -10, -12 (1963).
13

COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-8 (1963).
138 Mentschicoff, How to Handle Letters of Credit, 19 Bus. LAw. 107 (1963).
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results in the substitution of the unknown or doubtful financial
standing of a buyer, with the known and more reliable financial
position of a third party, usually a bank.'39 Approximately ninety
per cent of all international sales transactions are financed by the
use of commercial letters of credit, and their use in domestic transactions is becoming more frequent each year. 4 It has been estimated
that only about one hundred banks in the United States issue letters
of credit, and that twenty-five of these do seventy-five per cent of
the business which in New York alone has reached several million
dollars a year.'
Colorado has no statutory or case law regulating letters of credit
transactions, but Colorado merchants use letters of credit and their
transactions are governed by fairly definite standards or rules. A

large Denver bank receives applications for commercial letters of
credit for the financing of foreign transactions on the average of

two per week. Applications for domestic letters of credit are less
frequent but some are being used." 42
Usually
Customs and
will become
incorporated

a letter of credit will make reference to the Uniform
Practices for Commercial Documentary Credits4 3 which
part of the terms of the letter of credit if successfully
by the parties. The Uniform Customs are the product

of an attempt by the world commercial community to establish procedures and standards by which letter of credit financing should
be governed, but they do not have the force of law. Article 5, which

is intended to govern domestic and foreign credits,'

4

was drafted

to give legal effect to the basic principles found in the Uniform

Customs, but Article 5 is by no means a codification of that longer
139

BOGERT,

BRIrrON &

HAWKLAND,

CASES

ON SALES

AND SEcuRITY

341

(4th ed.

1962).
140Letters of Credit Under the Proposed Uniform Commercial Code: An Opportunity
Missed, 62 YALE L.J. 227 (1953).
141 BOGERT, BRrrroN & HAWKLAND, op. cit. supra note 139, at 340.
142 Typically the Denver banks do not issue foreign letters of credit, but arrange to have
them issued by a corresponding bank on the east or west coast. They follow this
practice because the "prime" coastal bank has a greater number of foreign correspondents and it is better equipped to handle all aspects of letter of credit financing,
including the examination of requisite documentation for errors. Interview with vicepresident, First National Bank of Denver, January, 1965.
143 International Chamber of Commerce Brochure No. 151 (1951).
144 Of course Article 5 can regulate international transactions only to the degree permitted by the rules of conflict of laws. On this point Section 1-105 provides, "Except
as provided hereafter in this section, when a transaction bears a reasonable relation
to this state and also to another state or nation the parties may agree that the law
either of this state or of such other state or nation shall govern their rights and
duties. Failing such agreement this Act applies to transactions bearing an appropriate
relation to this state."
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and more comprehensive document.' 5 Article 5 does not purport
to contain an exhaustive enumeration of all laws applicable to letter
of credit transactions,' 6 and in some instances usages of trade may
govern the transactions,' thereby creating the possibility that courts
may apply rules or concepts that are found in the Uniform Customs
or in general banking usage when Article 5 or the parties have not
expressly dealt with the matter.
A letter of credit or "credit" is defined by the Code as being
"an engagement by a bank or other person made at the request of
a customer ... that the issuer will honor drafts or other demands for
payment upon compliance with the conditions specified in the
' In banking parlance and under the
credit."148
Code the person requesting the letter of credit is the "customer"; the bank agreeing to give
the credit is the "issuing bank," and the person receiving payment
under the credit is the "beneficiary."14' 9 The issuing bank may notify
the seller directly that the letter of credit is available or it may do
so through a correspondent bank which will act either as an "advising
bank" or as a "confirming bank." The difference is that the advising
bank is merely responsible for the accuracy of its own statements,
whereas the confirming bank becomes directly obligated on an agreement that the credit will be honored, either by the issuer, the confirming bank, or a third bank.' 50
The letter received by the beneficiary advising him of its issuance whether from the issuing or confirming bank is the letter of
credit. It will usually contain a statement that it is irrevocable, in
which case it may not be modified without the consent of the beneficiary once he has received it."'
There are several advantages to both buyer and seller under
letter of credit transactions which cannot be obtained under any
other method of financing a sale. The cost of the credit to the buyer
is low because the issuer is secured from the moment the goods are
shipped until they are sold. The documents of title and other docuChadsey, Practical Effect of the Uniform Commercial Code on Documentary Letter
of Credit Transactions, 102 U. PA. L. REV. 618, 619 (1954). Commentators frequently say that Article 5 merely codifies some of the existing letter of credit practices without much change. Chadsey, supra 618, 620. This view is substantially true
so far as it goes, but it does appear that the draftsmen took the opportunity to
strengthen the position of banks as to their potential liability on nearly all fronts.
It is especially apparent that issuing banks have been unduly insulated from liability.
Comment, supra note 140, at 262.
146 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 5-102 Comment.
147
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 5-109; 1-205 (4).
148 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 5-103.
145

149 Ibid.
150 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 5-103, -107.
151

UNIFORM( COMMERCIAL CODE §

5-106.
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ments must be sent directly to the issuing bank which will usually
relinquish the documents of title to the buyer in return for a trust
receipt. This not only protects the issuer but benefits the buyer too,
since he is not required to part with his working capital - the goods
being paid for with the proceeds of their resale. The seller is benefited by the substantial elimination of the risk that the goods will
not be paid for. He is given assurance of almost immediate payment
for his goods by discounting his draft at his local bank, because a
draft backed by a letter of credit is nearly as good as money. Finally,
the seller is able to use the buyer's line of credit to finance his own
purchase or manufacture of the goods."5 2
As a prerequisite to being honored the letter of credit will state
certain terms and conditions with regard to documentation which
must be met by the beneficiary. Typically the credit will designate
the nature of the draft to be submitted and other accompanying documents: invoices, weight returns, negotiable dock delivery order, bills
of lading, insurance papers, and the like. If these conditions are met
and the documents appear to be regular on their face the issuing or
confirming bank must honor the draft or demand for payment
regardless of whether the goods conform to the underlying contract.
This is consistent with the primary purpose of letter of credit financing which is to assure the seller of prompt payment against documents.'53 Accordingly the letter of credit, which is essentially a contract between the issuer and beneficiary, is considered to be independent of the underlying contract between the beneficiary and the
customer.'
Even if an innocent third party is involved, such as a
negotiating bank, the issuer must honor the draft or demand for
payment even though a defect in the documents, such as forgery,
in fact exists."' The risk of the beneficiary's bad faith is placed on
the customer who was the party who trusted him " and not on the
issuer. " ' In either of these cases the issuer is entitled to immediate
reimbursement by the customer." 8
Occasionally the documentation may have an obvious defect
such as the absence of a full set of bills of lading or the failure on
the part of the beneficiary to pre-pay the freight as required by the
credit." 9 In such cases the issuer or customer may be under no obli152 Comment, supra note 140, at 231-33.
153 Maurice O'Meara Co. v. National Park Bank of New York, 239 N.Y. 386, 146 N.E.
636 (1925) ; UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 5-114.
154 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 5-114 Comment 1.
155 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 5-114(2).
156 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 5-114

Comment

2.

157 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 5-109.

158UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

§

5-114(3).

159 E.g., Dixon, Irmaos & CIA v. Chase National Bank, 144 F.2d 759 (2d Cir. 1944).
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gation to accept the draft or make reimbursement.16 ° Article 5 provides that banks seeking to obtain acceptance, negotiation, or reimbursement may obtain the desired result by giving an indemnity.' " '
Frequently a supplier-beneficiary will want to use the buyer's
line of credit for the purpose of financing the supplier's purchase of
the goods from the manufacturer or another supplier. A device
known as the "back-to-back" letter of credit has been developed to
accommodate this type of transaction. A second irrevocable credit
containing an agreement of payment equal to the cost of the goods
to the original beneficiary is sent by the issuing bank to the manufacturer or supplier further up the line. However, this is done only
after the issuing bank has obtained an assignment of the beneficiary's
interest under the original credit of an amount equal to that stated
in the back-to-back credit; the beneficiary will not merely assign this
amount directly to the manufacturer or supplier because some doubt
has arisen as to the validity of such a transaction.'6 2 Article 5 eliminates this uncertainty by providing that the beneficiary may assign
the proceeds of the credit and that the issuer must honor the assignment from the time it receives notification of the assignment coupled
with a reasonable identification of the credit and a request that the
issuer pay the assignee. Moreover, proceeds may be assigned even
though the credit states that it is nontransferable or nonassignable. " '
Article 5 will not repeal any existing Colorado law.
ARTICLE

6:

BULK TRANSFERS..

Shortly before the turn of the century the sale of goods in bulk
by merchants became a common method of defeating the claims of
creditors. Fraudulent conveyances laws of that time provided no
effective remedy for the evil since they were concerned with the
160 In fact the court found a banking custom in the Dixon case, supra note 159, which

required the issuer to pay the draft upon submission of an indemnification agreement to the issuer and found the bank liable for failure to honor the demand for
payment.
161 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 5-113.
162 HONNOLD,

CASES

AND MATERIALS

ON SALES AND

SALES FINANCING

189 (2d

ed.

1962).
163 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 5-116.

164 Sections of Article 6, not discussed below, which make significant changes in Colorado law, with citations to their counterparts in COLORADO REVISED STATUTES

(1963)

and Colorado judicial decisions:
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§ 6-111
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intent of the seller to hinder or defraud his creditors, whether the
buyer had notice of the scheme, or whether the consideration received
for the goods was adequate. Thus a debtor could defeat his creditors
through a bulk sale to a bona fide purchaser for adequate consideration. The National Association of Credit Men drafted the first bulk
loophole and today all
sales act for the purpose of plugging 16this
5
states have a bulk sales act in some form.
Since their advent, bulk sales statutes have taken on many
variations, but they all have one thing in common: if the designated
class and quantity of goods are sold by the operator of an appropriate enterprise in a transaction outside the ordinary course of
business, failure of the seller or buyer to comply with the notice-tocreditors provisions will render the transfer invalid as against the
seller's creditors. This makes possible the anomalous proposition
that an owner of unencumbered property may convey a title to his
goods which is inferior to the title he possesses. The policy underlying this result would seem to be that commercial expediency, if
not justice, requires "security of contracts for the seller's creditors
at the expense of security of acquisitions for the buyer."1 6 If the
innocent buyer wants to avoid this consequence, let him comply with
the Bulk Sales Act.
Before the enactment of Article 6 by many states, the most
common form of the act was that adopted by New York.1 "7 In 1915
this form was enacted by Colorado 6 and remained on the books
until repealed in 1961 by the present version, 6 which will be superseded by Article 6 of the Code."'
The heart of Article 6 is in the provision that unless the transferee gives notice to the creditors of the transferor at least ten days
before he "takes possession of the goods or pays for them whichever
happens first" the transfer is ineffective against the creditors of the
transferor."' Although it is not expressly stated the consequence
for failure to give proper notice - ineffectiveness of the transfer as
against the transferor's creditors - appears to be the same as under
the present Colorado provision which makes the transferee "a receiver and to be held accountable to such creditor for all the stock
in trade . . ." that has come into his possession by virtue of the
65

1

66

1

BOGERT,

BRITTON &

HAWKLAND,

CASES ON

SALES AND SEcuRIY 224 (4th

ed.

1962) ; VOLD, SALES 409 (2d ed. 1959).
VOLD, op. cit. supra note 165, at 410-11.

Bulk Sales Act, Personal Property Law § 44.
168 Colo. Sess. Laws 1915, ch. 92, p. 251.
169 Colo. Sess. Laws 1961, ch. 86, p. 282. Listed as CoLo. REV. STAT.
167 New York

'(1963).
170 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

171UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

§§ 6-101 to-111.
§ 6-105.

§§

18-1-1, -9
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transfer. 1' 2 Accordingly, the transferee does not become personally
liable for the debts but merely holds the goods for the creditor.'
Section 6-102(1) defines a bulk transfer as "any transfer in bulk
and not in the ordinary course of the transferor's business of a major
part of the materials, supplies, merchandise, or other inventory of an
enterprise subject to this Article." Section 6-102(2) extends the list
of goods to include "equipment" but reduces the quantitative limitation of subsection (1) from a "major part" to a mere "substantial
part," and even then it must be made in connection with a bulk transfer of inventory.'74 These provisions change Colorado law in several
respects. The quantitative limitation on transfers other than equipment will be increased from "any part" to a "major part." This
change will eliminate routine sales which might otherwise be thought
to fall within the act, and it will remove any doubt as to what is
meant by the self-contradictory phrase "sale or transfer in bulk of any
part ... ."'" The class of goods covered by Article 6 appears to be
quite similar to present law except the article broadens the class a
little by including materials, supplies, merchandise, inventory, and
equipment, as compared to "stock in trade or stock in trade and
fixtures." A further change comes from the requirement that there
must be a sale of a "substantial part of the equipment" before such
sale is within the act, whereas present law places no minimum
amount on the transfer of fixtures." 6 Extension of the bulk sales
law to sales of a substantial part of the equipment is new to Colorado
to the extent that equipment is not fixtures.
The enterprises to which the article is applicable are "those
whose principal business is the sale of merchandise from stock,
including those who manufacture what they sell.'"'17 It should be
noted that the only manufacturers included in this provision are those
who principally sell merchandise from stock.7 8 This innovation is
based on the recognition that suppliers or financers might advance
credit on the faith of the stock in trade of a manufacturer as well as
Manufacturers
on the faith of the stock in trade of a merchandiser.'
Act, and they
included
in
Colorado's
Bulk
Sales
are not specifically
8
have not been included by judicial decision.
17

§ 18-1-8 (1963).
Waterman v. Perrotta, 144 Colo. 117, 120, 355 P.2d 313 (1960).
174 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 6-102(2).
175 COLO. REv. STAT. § 18-1-1 (1963).
2 COLO. RaV. STAT.

173

176

Ibid.

177UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 6-102 (3).
178 HAWKLAND, SALES AND BULK SALES 167 (1958).

179
Miller, Bulk Sales Law: Business Included, 1954 WASH. U.L.Q. 1, 47 (1954).
180 Compare Englewood State Bank v. Tegtman, 85 Colo. 340, 275 Pac. 935 (1929).
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Article 6 imposes on the transferee the responsibility of obtaining a schedule of the transferor's creditors, but the responsibility
for its completeness and accuracy rests on the transferor.' This
section changes Colorado law by permitting the omission of names
of persons the transferor has reason to believe might become creditors before the transfer, 8 ' and by requiring the inclusion of the
names of persons asserting claims against the transferor even though
such claims are disputed.'83 Omission from the schedule of the names
of persons it is believed might become creditors before the transfer
will reduce the protection to such persons because it has the effect
of denying them notice of the intended transfer.' There is no provision in the article which makes the transferor guilty of perjury for
swearing a false affidavit as to the accuracy and completeness of the
list of creditors as under the present act,' 85 but the penalty will still
exist since it is included in a companion bill to the Uniform Commercial Code.' 86
Article 6 provides for a "short form" notice in those cases
where all debts of the transferor will be paid as they fall due. 8 7
This is based on the theory that honest and solvent transactions ought
to be facilitated. 88 Section 6-107 changes the law by eliminating
numerous facts from the notice in appropriate cases, 8" by permitting
personal delivery of the notice as an alternative to registered or certified mail, " ' and by eliminating the requirement of posting of notice
of transfer at the transferor's place of business and publication of the
notice in the newspaper. "'
Article 6 makes a significant innovation by extending the application of the bulk sales law to sales by auction. In most states
prior to enactment of the Code, bulk sales by auction were not subject to the statute because of the impracticability of requiring the
transferee to give the requisite notice, i.e., the buyer is not known
until the sale has been made, which is when the hammer falls. Unless the creditor happened to see an advertisement of the intended
sale his rights might be defeated. 9 ' The code has overcome this difficulty by placing on the auctioneer the duty to inform creditors.
181 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
82

§ 6-104.

§ 18-1-3 (1963).
183 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 6-104.
184 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 6-107(3),
18 COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-9 (1963).
1

COLO. REV. STAT.

-109.

188 Colo. Sess. Laws 1965, ch. 140, § 1.
187 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 6-107(1).

§ 6-107 Comment 2.
18-1-2 (1963).
88
1 COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-4 (1963).
181 COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 18-1-5, -6 (1963).
92
1 BOGERT, BRITTON & HAWKLAND, op. cit. supra note 165, at 240-41.
188 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
89

1
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§

VOL.

DENVER LAW CENTER JOURNAL

XLII

If he fails in this duty the sale will not be ineffective as to the
transferee, but if the auctioneer knows the sale was one in bulk
he will be personally liable to the creditors to the extent of the proceeds received from the sale.193
Section 6-106 of the Official Text is excluded from the Colorado
version of the Code apparently on the ground that Colorado law has
not in the past required the transferee to pay the proceeds of the
transfer directly to the creditors of the transferor. This pracice was
followed in several states prior to the drafting of the Code. 9 Presumably the sponsors of the Code in Colorado have taken the view
that the required notice to creditors gives them adequate protection.
This deletion should not seriously hamper uniformity since the draftsmen of the Code have made the section optional.
Upon becoming operative, Article 6 will repeal the Colorado
Bulk Sales Law. 9 '
ARTICLE 7: DOCUMENTS OF TITLE.. 6

Perhaps the greatest attestation to the need for Article 7 is
the piecemeal manner in which the uniform acts have covered this
field of law, and the failure of these acts to receive adequate accep193 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 6-108.
194

HAWKLAND, op. cit. supra note 178, at 170.

195 COLO. REV. STAT.

§§ 18-1-1 to -9 (1963).

196 Sections of Article 7, not discussed below, which make significant changes in Colo-

rado law, with citations to their counterparts in COLORADnO REVISED STATUTES
(1963) and Colorado judicial decisions:
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Carriers Liability
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§ 7-503
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tance by the states. Relative to this subject Professor Robert Braucher
has observed:
Documents of title have been the subject of comprehensive uniform
laws. The Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act (UWRA), promulgated by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
Laws in 1906, has been enacted in every state. The Uniform Sales
Act (USA), promulgated in 1906 and enacted in 34 states, deals
with negotiation and transfer of documents of title in Sections 27
through 40. Bills of Lading are the subject of the Uniform Bills
of Lading Act (UBLA), which was promulgated in 1909 and has
been enacted in 31 states; it conforms pretty well to the UWRA and
USA.197
Article 7 constitutes a consolidation and revision of the UBLA,
the UWRA,"' and those sections of the USA dealing with documents of title. The criminal provisions which appeared in the UBLA
and UWRA are omitted from the Code on the ground that they are
not properly subjects of commercial law and are generally duplicated
in the criminal law of the states dealing with fraud. However, these
provisions have been enacted by Colorado in a companion bill to
the Uniform Commercial Code. 9" Of course this article does not
purport to supersede federal statutes regulating carriers and warehousemen °° nor the various Colorado statutes regulating carriers, 0 '
locker plants,"' grain,"' and other provisions governing warehouses
in special cases."0
Colorado adopted the UWRA in 191120 and the USA in
The UBLA has not been enacted. The meager statutory
provisions related to bills of lading which Colorado does have,
outside of those in the USA,' °7 were enacted in 1883. 08
1941.06

Article 7 is divided into six parts, the major ones being Part
1, General Provisions; Part 2, Warehouse Receipts: Special Pro197

BRAUCHER, DOCUMENTS OF TITLE 3 (1958).

198 Since COLO. REV. STAT. ch. 147 (1963)

is substantially the same as the UNIFORM
WAREHOUSE REcEIPTs ACT, the Colorado act will be referred to herein as the UWRA.
19 Colo. Sess. Laws 1965, ch. 140, §§ 1-6.
200 Federal Bills of Lading Act, 39 Stat. 538-45 (1916),
as amended, 49 U.S.C. §§ 81124 (1946) ; Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 49 Stat. 1207 (1936), as amended, 46
U.S.C. §§ 1300-315 (1946); Interstate Commerce Act and Carmack Amendment,
34 Stat. 593 (1906), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 20 (1946); U.S. Warehouse Act,
39 Stat. 486 (1916), as amended, 7 U.S.C. §§ 241-73'(1946).
201 COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 115-1-1 to 115-13-6 (1963).
02
2
COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 7-12-1 to-10 (1963).

§§ 7-14-1 to -19 (1963).
REV. STAT. §§ 7-5-5, 30-3-24, 66-13-1, 86-1-4, and 86-1-6 to -8 (1963).
20 5
COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 147-1-1 to -5-3 (1963).
206 COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 121-1-1 to -79 (1963).
203 COLO. REV. STAT.

2

04

COLO.

REV.
selling bills
the UWRA,
208 COLO. REV.

W7

CoLo.

STAT. § 121-7-40 (1963) governs the rights of persons buying and
of lading and warehouse receipts; where these provisions conflict with
the latter act controls.
STAT. §§ 86-1-4 to -14 '(1963). There have been no amendments.
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visions; Part 3, Warehouse Receipts and Bills of Lading: General
Obligations, and Part 5, Warehouse Receipts and Bills of Lading:
Negotiation and Transfer. Part 6 contains three miscellaneous provisions pertaining to warehouse receipts and bills of lading.
The most common types of documents of title are warehouse
receipts and bills of lading, but the definition in the Code also includes: a "dock warrant, dock receipt, . . . order for delivery of
goods, and ...any other document which in the regular course of
business or financing is treated as adequately evidencing that the
person in possession of it is entitled to receive, hold and dispose of
the document and goods it covers."2 9 Warehouse receipts must contain certain formal requisites to qualify;21 ° bills of lading need only
evidence "the receipt of goods for shipment.''2 All documents of
title "must purport to be issued by or addressed to a bailee and purport to cover goods in the bailee's possession which are either
identified or are fungible portions of an identified mass. "212
The Code provides that a warehouseman or carrier will be liable
to a bona fide purchaser of a warehouse receipt or bill of lading
issued by an agent who misdescribes or does not receive the goods
described in the document. But to recover, the purchaser must have
relied on the description. The principal may escape liability, however, if a notation 212 is made on the document that the bailee does
not know "whether any part or all of the goods in fact were received or conform to the description," and if this is true.2 1 4 At common law the principal was not liable on documents issued without
receipt of the goods. Section 23 of the UBLA overturned common
law with a provision similar to the one in the Code, 15 but the
UWRA, as originally promulgated, did not. In 1922 the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws amended the UWRA to bring it in
line with the UBLA on this point," 6 and this amendment was adopted
by Colorado.2 1 7 Thus present law is consistent with the Code provision governing warehouse receipts, but no similar statutory provision or case governing bills of lading has been found. The Code
would therefore remove the uncertainty on this point by filling a gap
in present law.
(emphasis added).
7-202. These are substantially similar to the present
law. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 147-1-2 (1963).
211 BRAUCHER, op. cit. supra note 197, at 12.
21 2
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-201(15).
212 The notation must be conspicuous in the case of all documents of title except bills
of lading. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 7-203.
214 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 7-203, -301.
209 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-201(15)
210 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §

215 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 7-203.
216 BRAUCHER, Op. cit.
217 COLO. REV. STAT. §

supra note 197, at 22-23.
147-2-13 (1963).
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The duty of reasonable care is imposed on warehousemen and
carriers in handling goods for which a document has been issued.
This duty may not be disclaimed. However, damages arising from
breach of this duty may be limited by an agreement stipulating "a
specific liability per article or item, or value per unit of weight" in
the case of a warehouseman, 1 8 and a provision "that the carrier's
liability shall not exceed a value stated in the document" in the case
of a carrier."' These provisions settle the controversy which had
arisen under the uniform acts... as to whether a limitation of a
bailee's liability to stated amounts constituted a violation of his duty
to exercise reasonable care in transporting and storing the bailor's
goods. Colorado resolved this question for carriers in 1910221 and
for warehousemen in 1947222 by providing in each case that the
limitation of a bailee's liability does not constitute a violation of this
duty. Thus, the law of Colorado on this point has merely been rewritten and consolidated. However, the Code does make an innovation by providing that a limitation clause would have no effect where
the goods are converted to the use of the warehouseman or carrier.
The Code provides two methods of enforcing a warehouseman's
and carrier's lien which may be loosely described as a "summary"
and a "complex" procedure. Under the summary method the lienor
may sell the goods at either a public or private sale "at any time or
place" and "on any terms" so long as they are "commercially reasonable" and the owner or parties of interest have been notified.
Minimum requirements of the notice are stipulated and "commercial
reasonableness" is elaborated upon. 223 The complex procedure for enforcement requires a demand for payment of the lien not less than
ten days after receipt of the notice by the owner; a conspicuous
statement in the notice that if the lien is not paid the goods will be
advertised for sale; two weekly advertisements of the intended sale
which must be printed more than 15 days after the advertisement;
and a public sale at the nearest suitable place to where the goods
are stored. 2 The lienor may bid at the sale under either method
if the sale is public, and after satisfaction of the lien the balance
218 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL

CODE

219 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

§ 7-204.

§

7-309.

3; UWRA §§ 3, 21.
221 COLO. REV. STAT. § 115-12-3(2) ; Denver & R.G.R.R. v. Teufel, 64 Colo. 515, 172
Pac. 1060 (1918).
22 COLO. REV. STAT. § 147-2-14 (1963).
223 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 7-2 10.
224 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 7-308.
220 UBLA

§

DENVER LAW CENTER JOURNAL

VOL. XLII

must be paid over to the person who would have been entitled to
the goods.2' 5
Where the goods are owned by a non-merchant, a warehouseman may enforce his lien only by the more complex procedure which
was primarily intended to apply to private owners who store household goods."6 But a carrier may use either procedure regardless of
the classification of the owner.
The existing procedure for enforcing a warehouseman's lien in
Colorado is substantially similar to the Code's complex procedure." '
Article 7 will greatly simplify the procedure where the enforcement
is against goods owned by a merchant, in addition to consolidating
and rewriting existing law. Colorado's provision for the enforcement
of a carrier's lien is also somewhat similar to the complex procedure
except that it requires the appointment of an appraiser, and appears
to require considerably more time. 8
Part 5 of Article 7 replaces substantially similar laws relating
to negotiation and transfer governing bills of lading 2 . and warehouse receipts. 2
Article 7 will fill many gaps in the law, bring the law governing
bills of lading more in line with the rules governing warehouse
receipts,22 ' and generally result in a consolidation and rewriting of
the law in this field.
Upon becoming effective Article 7 will repeal the Issue of
Warehouse Receipts law,22 the sections of the Uniform Sales Act
covering negotiable documents, 2 2 and the statutes relating to violation of the duty imposed on carriers." 4 The provisions relating to unclaimed freight 2.5 and warehouseman liens 2 6 should be examined in
light of the Code.
2
22

UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 7-210(6), 7-308(5).
6 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 7-2 10 Comment 1.

227 COLO. REV. STAT. § 147-2-26'(1963).
§§ 86-1-4, -6 to -10 (1963). This is also an alternative procedure
for the enforcement of the warehouseman's lien and was in existence thirty-eight years
before the UWRA was enacted.
9
2 COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 121-1-25 to -40 (1963).
28 COLO. REV. STAT.

2 30

COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 147-2-26; 147-3-1 to -12

(1963); Bishkoff, Documents of

Title, A Comparison of the Uniform Commercial Code and Other Uniform Acts, with
Emphasis on Michigan Law, 59 MICH. L. REV. 711, 725-27 (1961).
231 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 7-402, -403.
232 COLO. REV. STAT. ch. 147 (1963).
2 33
COLO. REV. STAT. ch. 121 (1963).
234

COLO. REv. STAT. § 115-12-3 (1963).

5

3 COLO. REV. STAT. § 115-13-2 (1963).
236 CoLo. REV. STAT. §§ 86-1-4, -6 to -14 (1963).

It appears these provisions will be
repealed by the Code in view of § 10-102 and §§ 7-209 & 7-307.
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8: INVESTMENT SECURITIES

7

Article 8 is most expressively described as a negotiable instruments law for investment securities, and is the first single piece of
legislation to contain all the law relative to this type of instrument.
Prior to this article, bearer bonds were governed by the NIL,"'8 and
stock certificates were covered by the Uniform Stock Transfer Act.239
Registered bonds as well as many other types of investment securities
were not covered by any uniform act. Although investment securities
are negotiable instruments under pre-Code law24 as well as under
with
the Code,2 4 1 there are good reasons why they should be dealt
24
under an article entirely separate from commercial paper. 1
Article 8 makes the greatest changes in the law relative to (1)
the negotiability and (2) the registration of transfers of investment
securities. These changes are manifested primarily in the extension
of the attributes of negotiability, with the valuable cut-off protection
to bona fide purchasers, to securities not granted negotiability under
the pre-Code law, and by the greater ease and facility with which
registration of transfers may take place under the Code. The following comment will deal mainly with these two aspects of the article.
In view of the great volume of securities traded in the nation
each day it is obvious that the attribute of negotiability is an extremely valuable, if not indispensable, characteristic of securities.
Stock is made negotiable by the USTA;343 however, many questions
have arisen with regard to the negotiability of other types of securities not governed by this act. For example, a registered bond may
not be negotiable because it is not "payable to order or to bearer."'4 4
Similarly, an income bond which states that interest will be payable
237 Sections of Article 8, not discussed below, which make significant changes in the law,
with citations to their counterparts in COLORADO REVISED STATUTES (1963):

Uniform
Commercial
Code
§ 8-105
§ 8-206(1) (b)
§ 8-302
§ 8-304(2)
§ 8-306,-308(4)
§ 8-311

Subject
Presumptions
Completion or Alteration of Instrument
Bona Fide Purchaser
Notice to Purchaser of Adverse Claims
Warranty
Effect of Unauthorized Indorsement

238 CoLo. REV. STAT.
239

Colorado
Counterpart
COLO. R. Civ. P. 8
§ 95-1-15
§ 95-1-52
§ 95-1-56
§ 95-1-66
§ 95-1-23

§§ 95-1-1, 95-4-7 (1963). See note 86, supra.

COLO. REV. STAT. § 31-11 (1963).

240 Israels, Investment Securities as Negotiable Paper: Article 8 of the Uniform Com241
242

24
2

mercial Code, 13 Bus. LAw 676 (1958).
§ 8-105.

UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

HAWKLAND, COMMERCIAL PAPER (1959).

COLO. REv. STAT. § 31-11-7 (1963).

4 COLO. Rav. STAT.

§ 95-1-1 (1963).
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only if earned will be non-negotiable because it does not provide
for payment of "a sum certain in money."2 ' Moreover, the common
practice of making reference in a bond or indenture to the trust indenture under which it is issued has resulted in non-negotiability
because of the possibility that the security does not thereby "contain
an unconditional promise or order to pay."246 To avoid such consequences Article 8 abandons the formal requisite test governing commercial paper in favor of a functional one. An investment security
is first defined as "an instrument which is issued in bearer or registered form; and is of a type commonly dealt in upon securities exchanges or markets or commonly recognized . . . as a medium for
investment.
241 and then endowed with the attribute of negotiability. 48
In implementing the policy of negotiability the rights of a purchaser are considered from two points of view: (1) as against the
issuer, 249 and (2) as against an adverse claimant.250 For example,
except in the case of lack of genuineness of the investment security, 51
the issuer has almost no defenses "against a purchaser for value who
has taken without notice of the particular defense. ' 25 2 A purchaser
who is not guilty of fraud or illegality obtains all rights in the security that the transferor had or had authority to convey, and if he
is a bona fide purchaser he "also acquires the security free of any
adverse claim." An " 'adverse claim' includes a claim that a transfer
was or would be wrongful or that a particular adverse person is the
owner of or has an interest in the security.'"'25 A bona fide purchaser
is defined as "a purchaser for value ....
24 Present law does not
dichotomize the rights of a purchaser in this manner, and the USTA
does not give the purchaser any protection at all against defenses of
the issuer, although some jurisdictions have granted protection
through case law. 55
245 COLO. Rav. STAT. § 95-1-1 (1963)

; Israels, supra note 257, at 676.

246 COLO. REV. STAT. § 95-1-1 (1963) ; Enoch v. Brandon, 249 N.Y. 263, 164 N.E. 45
(1928).
247 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 8-102. It will be noted that instruments which meet
the definition of "securities" under some acts, such as the Securities Act of 1933 or
the state blue-sky laws, will not necessarily meet the test of a security under the Code.
248 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 8-105 (1).
249 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 8-201. See part 2, article 8, generally.
250 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE. See Part 3, Article 8, generally.
251 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 8-201(3).
252

UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 8-202(4).

253 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 8-301.
254 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 8-302.
255 Hudson Trust Co. v. American Linseed Co., 232 N.Y. 350, 134 N.E. 178 (1922);
Manhattan Life Ins. Co. v. 42d Street & G.S.F.R.R., 139 N.Y. 146, 34 N.E. 776
(1893).
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As against the issuer the purchaser is charged with notice only
of those matters incorporated by reference which do not conflict with
the stated terms of the security. "6 For a purchaser to be charged
with notice of adverse claims, the security must be endorsed "for
collection" or "for surrender" if it is in bearer or registered form,
or it must contain an unambiguous statement that it is the property
of someone other than the transferor if it is in bearer form.2"7 In the
case of matured or stale securities the Code again recognizes the
economic differences between investment securities and commercial
paper. The purchaser is charged with no notice until the lapse of six
months to two years, respectively, for adverse claims or defenses or
defects raised by the issuer, after the time set for presentment, surrender, payment, and the like."'
Article 8 will make the most sweeping changes through the
speed and simplicity with which it permits registration of transfers.
At common law the prevailing theory held that a transfer of the legal
title to securities could not be made until appropriate notation
(registration) had been made in the transfer books of the issuer,
which is quite contrary to the modern view that a complete transfer
of title can be made by the delivery of a properly endorsed certificate
to a buyer.2"5 Nevertheless this common law view led to the holding
that the issuing corporation is a guardian or trustee of its shareholders' interests, and therefore bound to exercise proper diligence in
protecting them against unauthorized transfers. 6 ° To avoid liability
under this doctrine, issuers and transfer agents began taking elaborate steps, such as requesting excessive documentation relative to
the authority of the transferor to make the transfer with a resulting
increase in cost and time for the transfer. This was particularly true
in the case of transfers made by fiduciaries, but in time the practice
also extended to other types of transfers as well. 26'
The Code eliminates the necessity of excessive documentation
by relieving the issuer or transfer agent from liability in the case of a
wrongful transfer if it was made in compliance with certain minimal
procedures. The issuer is therefore not relieved of all responsibility
to police the transfer, but the procedures are simple and certain, and
adequate inducements exist to facilitate its speed. Section 8-401
256 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 8-202(1).
257 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 8-304.
258 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

§ 8-203, -305.

2 Uniform Stock Transfer Act § 1 and note to § 16.
260 Lowery v. Commercial and Farmers Trust Company, 15 Fed. Cas. 1040, 1047 (1848);
Guttman, Investment Securities Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 11 BUFFALO

L. REV. 1, 3-4 (1961) ; Israels, supra note 240, at 682-83.
6 Briggs, Article 8: Investment Securities, 21 MONT. L. REV. 64, 81 (1951).
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provides that the issuer is under a duty to register the transfer of a
security in registered form upon presentment and demand (1) if
properly endorsed and accompanied by reasonable assurances of the
validity of the endorsements where requested, 6 ' (2) if the issuer is
under no duty to inquire into adverse claims or has made such inquiries where required, 6 ' and (3) if the transfer is rightful in fact
or to a bona fide purchaser. " If these conditions exist the issuer
will not be liable if the registration is in fact unauthorized. "5 Moreover, if the issuer requests documentation beyond that reasonably
necessary to assure it of the effectiveness of the endorsements, the issuer or transfer agent will be charged with notice of all matters contained in such documents relative to the transfer, "6 and if the presenter so desires he may refuse the demand and sue for damages arising from the unreasonable delay or refusal to register. "7
The USTA does not regulate the registration of transfers or the
conduct of the transfer agent relative thereto. "8 However, the Uniform Fiduciary Stock Transfer Act "9 (UFSTA) is devoted almost
entirely to the subject of registration and was designed for the
purpose of removing the "clog" on fiduciary transfers.' Although
the provisions of the Code appear to be as favorable to issuers as
those in the UFSTA, which could therefore feasibly be repealed,
Colorado will retain it,"' so that its provisions will govern whenever
there is a conflict with counterpart provisions of the Code.'
Implementation of Article 8 will repeal the statute relating to
ownership and transfer of stock (USTA) ,273 and the Negotiable In.
struments Law insofar as it applies to securities. 4 The Colorado
statutory sections relating to gifts to minors,7 5 and the one defining
262

2 3 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

§§ 8-308, -402.
§ 8-403.

264 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

§

8-302.

UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

§

8-404.

UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

6

265

266 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 8-402(4).
26'7

UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 8-401(2), and

§

-402 Comment 6.

Only two sections purport to govern the relationship of the issuer and the owner
and these govern the right of the corporation to treat the registered owner as the real
owner for various purposes, and the right of the owner to order the issue of a new
certificate in the event of loss or destruction of the old one. CoLo. Rav. STAT. §§
31-11-3, -16 (1963).
269 COLO. REV. STAT. § 57-6 (1963).
270 Briggs, supra note 261, at 79-82.
"' Legislative Council of The Colorado General Assembly, Report to The Colorado
General Assembly; Uniform Commercial Code, Colo. Legis. Council Pub. No. 90
268

(Nov. 1964).
272 11 HAWKLAND, TRANSACTIONAL

note 632 (1964).
273 COLO. REV. STAT.

§§

GUIDE TO THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 898,

31-11-1 to-22 (1963).

274 COLO. REV. STAT. ch. 95 (1963).
5

27 COLO. REV. STAT.

§

125-3-2(13)

(1963).
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securities in the Securities Licensing and Practice Act 7' should be
considered in the light of the Code.
27 7

ARTICLE 9: SECURED TRANSACTIONS

It is generally recognized that prior to the Code chattel security
law in most states was a chamber of horrors. Frequently as many as
five or six statutes governed devices by which a debt could be secured, depending upon the nature of the transaction.2 7 8 Each statute
stipulated its own formal requisites and each device had its peculiar
functional and conceptual limitations. This led to considerable confusion and difficulty. For example, it was common for a written
chattel mortgage to require elaborate, but precise, descriptions of
the mortgaged property, and formal acknowledgements were usually
essential. Too general a description of the property or an inadvertant
omission of an acknowledgement would result in the invalidity of
the instrument as to third parties. A chattel mortgage used to secure
a loan on shifting stock would often be held invalid as to third
parties because at common law it was not intended to perform this
function. An inventory lien should have been taken instead, or perhaps the transaction was not even legally possible. The trust receipt,
before the Uniform Trust Receipt Act, required three parties and
had to be in writing; the conditional sale contract required an actual
sale. Usually there were separate filing or validation systems for each
device. Because of these and other similar weaknesses, secured
financing had become unduly hazardous and costly.
Only four statutes govern most secured transactions: the Chattel Mortgages Act;... the Inventory Mortgages Act;.8 ° the Assignment of Accounts Receivable Act;. 81 and the Certificate of Title
Act. 8 ' Conditional sale contracts and trust receipts are recognized by
name, but inasmuch as all devices (other than inventory mortgages,
mortgages on motor vehicles, and assignments of accounts receiv27

COLo. REV. STAT. § 125-1-12(12) '(1963).
For a more exhaustive comparison of Article 9 with Colorado law see Storke, Article
9 of the Uniform Commercial Code and Colorado Security Law, 37 U. COLo. L. REV.
(1965).
28 The most common devices were the chattel mortgage, the conditional sale contract,
the factor's lien, the assignment of an account receivable, the field warehousing operation, and the trust receipt.
279 COLO. REV. STAT. § 21-1 (1963).
2
80 COLO. REV. STAT. § 21-2 (1963).
This device is similar to the factor's lien in other
states, although not so restricted.
28
1 COLO. REV. STAT. § 11-2 (1963).
282 CoLo. REV. STAT. § 13-6 (1963). Mortgages on motor vehicles which are not inventory are governed by this act. Since adoption of the Code will not repeal this statute
it will not be discussed along with the others mentioned. Mortgages on automobiles
which are inventory are governed by the Inventory Mortgages Act, COLo. REV. STAT.
§ 21-2'(1963).
6
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able) are subject to the provisions of the Chattel Mortgages Act,2 8'
there are really only three statutory security devices in Colorado: a
chattel mortgage, an inventory mortgage, and an assignment of accounts receivable. Because of this comparatively small number of
security devices and because of recent legislative action Colorado has
a surprisingly modern secured financing law when compared to the
pre-Code law of other jurisdictions. Nevertheless Article 9 will
further simplify the law, provide additional flexibility in the field,
and fill many gaps not previously covered by statute.
Just as Article 2 approaches sales law with a new perspective,
by greatly minimizing the significance of the location of title, Article
9 makes a drastic shift in its focus on secured transactions. It provides a single integrated structure within which the immense variety
of secured transactions may be accommodated with a minimum of
complexity and cost. It recognizes only one security device, namely,
the security agreement.2 84 This is effective according to its terms
except where the article provides otherwise.28 5 Terminology is simplified but somewhat different from traditional language. Parties
to the security 2agreement are designated as the "debtor" 2 8 and the
"secured party" who, by virtue of the agreement, create a "security
interest" in the "collateral"2 in favor of the secured party. Collateral is divided into several categories... and rules vary depending
upon the nature of the collateral and the economic interest involved
in the transaction.2 " For example, a seller of consumer goods on the
installment plan has a perfected security interest against creditors
of the buyer without filing,2"' whereas he does not if the collateral
is inventory.29 The priority right of a seller who takes a purchase
money security interest in inventory is governed by different rules 92
than is the right of a seller who claims priority in equipment in
which he holds a non-purchase money security interest. 94 An understanding of the consequences flowing from the nature of collateral
and the type of economic interests involved in any particular fact
situation is the key to understanding the basic structure and operation
of Article 9.
283

COLO. REV. STAT. § 21-1-16 (1963).

284 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-105 (1) (h).
285 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-201.

286 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-105 (1) (d).
287 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-105 (1)(i).
288 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-105 (1)(C).

289 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 9-105, -106, -109.
290 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-107.

291 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 9-307 (2), -302 (1) (d).
292 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-302.
293 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-312(3).
294

UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-312(5).
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The formal requisites for the creation of a security interest are
minimal. Where land is not involved a security interest in all types
of collateral may be had in two ways: (1) by an oral agreement if
the secured party takes possession of the collateral, or (2) by (i) a
written agreement, (ii) containing a description of the collateral,
and (iii) the signature of the debtor.29 Under either method, unless
these formal requisites are met, the security interest is not enforceable
against third parties or the debtor.
For a secured party to obtain maximum protection for his security interests it must be "perfected." Perfection is not defined in the
Code, but its meaning becomes clear in context, and is about the
same as the meaning given to it in the Bankruptcy Act.2"' There are
several prerequisites to perfection: (1) creation of the security interest; (2) attachment of the security interest to the collateral;
and (3) completion of the final steps for perfection. 97 A security
interest attaches when (1) the parties make an agreement that it attach; (2) the secured party gives value; and (3) the debtor has
rights in the collateral.29 With certain exceptions, the final steps for
perfection are taken when the secured party either takes possession
of the collateral,29 9 or files a financing statement."' Section 9-302
excepts certain types of security interests in certain types of collateral,
e.g., a purchase money security interest in consumer goods,3 1 which
may become perfected merely by attachment. There is no set order
in which the prerequisites to perfection must occur; for instance, although the security interest may not have attached because the debtor
has not obtained rights in the collateral (as in the case of afteracquired property) or because value may not yet have been given,
the secured party may nevertheless file his financing statement. Then,
once the debtor acquires rights in the collateral or the secured party
gives value, the security interest attaches immediately and becomes
perfected from that moment unless the parties have agreed other0
wise.' 2
Given the possibility of conflicting security interests in the
same collateral, it becomes obvious that perfection must be a relative term. For example, even if two secured parties have complied
with all necessary prerequisites for the perfection of their security
295 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
296

§

297 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

§ 9-303.
§ 9-204.
§ 9-305.

Bankruptcy Act

§

9-203.

60(a)2, 64 Stat. 25 (1950), 11

298 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
299 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

300 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-402.
301 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

§

302 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

§

9-302 (1).

9-303.

U.S.C.

96(a)(2) (1958).
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interest they both cannot have priority."' 3 The approach to priorities
is discussed on page 111.
Partly because of recent Colorado legislation, the formal requisites for the creation of a chattel mortgage which is valid between
the parties are few and quite similar to those of the Code. Creation
may occur in two ways: (1) by an oral agreement, if the mortgagee
takes possession of the property; or (2) by (i) a written agreement,
(ii) containing a description of the property, (iii) designation of
its location, and (iv) the signature of the parties."' The second
method varies from the Code to the extent that a statement of the
location and the signature of the mortgagee are required."' An inventory mortgage may be created in only one way-the same as the
second method for creating a chattel mortgage." For an assignment
of accounts receivable all that is required is the "execution and delivery by the assignor to the assignee of an instrument in writing as"307
Descriptions of the property mortgaged
signing such accounts ....
under the Chattel Mortgages Act and the Inventory Mortgages Act
may be in specific or general terms and its identity may be shown by
extrinsic evidence. G The description requirement is no more stringent for an assignment of an accounts receivable. 0 9 Thus Colorado
law is very similar to the Code on this point, in that a description
which "reasonably identifies" the collateral is sufficient under the
Code. 10 An acknowledgement is not a formal requisite under the
Code nor under any of the three Colorado statutes just mentioned.
A security agreement has no functional limitations; it may be
used in all types of secured transactions. 11 The statutory secured
financing devices in Colorado do have functional limitations. For
example, suppose a chattel mortgage under the Chattel Mortgages
Act is taken on personal property held for sale with the agreement
that the mortgagee may make use of the proceeds as he sees fit to buy new inventory, to pay off the debt, to pay his employees, or
to pay for his vacation or anything else. Even though the parties
303 HELLEESTEIN & HELLERSTEIN,

3 04

CHATTEL MORTGAGES IN COLORADO,

16 (1963);

compare People for the use of New Mexico Lumber Mfg. Co. v. United States
Harbison v. Tufts,
Fidelity and Guaranty Co., 98 Colo. 41, 52 P.2d 1146 (1935) ; cf.
1 Colo. App. 140, 27 Pac. 1014 (1891).
CoLo REV. STAT. § 21-1-1, -3 (1963). Under Colorado law an unrecorded chattel
mortgage is valid between the parties. Robinson v. Wright, 90 Colo. 417, 9 P.2d
618 (1932).

305 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-203.
3

06COLO. REV. STAT. § 21-2-1 (1963).
0 COLO. REV. STAT. § 11-2-4 (1963).
308COLO.REV. STAT. §§ 21-1-3, -2-1 (1963).
3

309COLO. REV. STAT. § 11-2-4 (1963).
310 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-110.
311 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-101 Comment.
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might comply with the Chattel Mortgages Act to the letter, the
mortgagee would have no protection against the mortgagor's creditors in bankruptcy. Colorado law does go a long way, but it does not
permit this degree of unrestricted use of the proceeds where a chattel
mortgage is used.312 However, the mortgagee would have been given
the desired protection if he had complied with the Inventory Mortgages Act, which was designed to validate this type of transaction.31
Or suppose an inventory mortgagor complies with the Inventory
Mortgages Act and inserts in the mortgage a clause purporting to
extend the mortgagee's claim to the accounts receivable or proceeds
from the sale of the property. Later the mortgagor goes bankrupt.
Would the inventory mortgagee be protected against the bankrupt's
creditors? No, because the inventory mortgage is not sufficiently flexible to accommodate this transaction. The mortgagee should have
filed a notice of assignment of accounts receivable and then taken
an assignment of the future accounts receivable in compliance with
the Assignment of Accounts Receivable Act,314 in addition to taking
the inventory mortgage. The Code eliminates the risk of choosing
the wrong instrument or statute or not enough instruments or
statutes. 15
Methods of perfecting a security interest under the Code are
similar to those in the Colorado statutes, but the Code makes several
refinements which will be new to Colorado. Under present law, to
validate security devices against the claims of third parties, a chattel
mortgagee must file or record the original or a copy of his mortgage;"'6 an inventory mortgagee must file a mortgage statement ;317
and an accounts receivable assignee must file a notice of assignment. " Under the Code the appropriate instrument for filing in
all cases is a financing statement."' Consistent with the pledge
theory, a chattel mortgagee may also protect himself against third
parties by taking possession of the collateral.2 ° Similarly, this
method of perfection is available under the Code, as mentioned
earlier, where the collateral lends itself to physical possession. In
312 Exchange National Bank v. Haugh, 258 F.2d 785 (10th Cir. 1958) ; HELLERSTEIN
3 13

3 14

& HELLERSTEIN, CHATTEL MORTGAGES IN COLORADO 13, 31 (6th ed. 1963).
COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 21-2-1, -5; cf. § 11-2-4(5) (1963).

§§ 21-2-2, -4 (1963).
Since the Code does not repeal the Certificate of Title Act, COLO. REV. STAT.
§§ 13-6-1 to -43 (1963), there remains the possibility of choosing the wrong security
device if the collateral is a motor vehicle which is not inventory.
3
16
LO. REV. STAT. § 21-1-4 (1963).
COLO. REV. STAT.

315

317 COLO. REV. STAT.
3 18

319

3

CoLo. REV. STAT.

§
§

21-2-2 (1963).
11-2-4 (1963).
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20 CoLo. REV. STAT.

§

§

9-402.

21-1-1 (1963).
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the case of some types of collateral, such as negotiable instruments,
this is the only permissible method. 2' Perfection by attachment of
the security interest will be new to Colorado. It should be noted
however, that the degree of protection given a secured party by this
method of perfection is limited in nature. A purchase money security
interest in consumer goods, for example, is perfected upon attachment to the goods; nevertheless, a bona fide purchaser buying from
the debtor for his own family or for household purposes will cut
off the interest of the secured party. But this unfiled interest would
have been protected against the creditors of the debtor in or out of
bankruptcy. The secured party could have protected himself even
against the bona fide purchaser from the debtor if he has filed a
financing statement before the purchase.322
The floating lien on shifting stock is expressly validated by
Article 9 through the interrelation of several sections, the most
important of which pertain to: (i) a generalized notice filing system, 32 3 (ii)

the after acquired property clause,32

(iii)

the future

advances clause,325 (iv) the right in the debtor to dispose of the
collateral without being required to account to the secured party
for the proceeds or to substitute new collateral therefor, 2 ' and
(v) the continuation of the security interest in the proceeds after
disposition of the collateral. 27
The Code provides broadly that collateral, "whenever acquired,"
may secure obligations covered by the security agreement. Two
exceptions exist: crops which come into existence more than one
year after the security agreement, and consumer goods "given as
additional security unless the debtor acquires rights in them within
ten days after the secured party gives value.

32

1

Present law would

32 9
be changed only by the addition of the consumer goods exception.

Obligations of a security agreement may include future advances
whether or not the advances are made pursuant to commitment.3
Neither the contemplated amounts of advances nor the times for
making them need be stated. Indeed, the advances need not be made
at all. This changes the present law which validates optional future
321 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-305.
322 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
3

§§

9-302, -307.

§§

9-402, -403.
9-204.
5 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-204.
326 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-205.
2 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

324 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §
32

327 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
328 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

§ 9-306.
§ 9-204(4).

2

3 COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 21-1-2, -2-1 (1963).
330 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-204(5).
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advance agreements, but requires the statement of the "specific sum
as the maximum amount to be secured thereby; the date prior to
which said advances shall be completed, and the date on which the
last installment of the indebtedness secured thereby shall mature."33 '
Whereas present law gives a security interest taken for future
advances the same priority date as the original advance, 3 2 priority
dates under the Code depend on such matters as the nature of the
collateral, the type of security interest involved in the particular
transaction, and notice.'
The security agreement may give the debtor unrestricted freedom to deal with the collateral and the proceeds obtained from its
disposition.334 This is consistent with the liberty that may be given
to inventory mortgagors, 3 5 and accounts receivable assignors,336 but
as seen earlier there is some restriction placed on the chattel mortgagor in Colorado.3 '
38
A perfected security interest will continue in the proceeds
received from the sale or other disposition of the collateral, and will
remain perfected if the financing statement covering the original
collateral also covers the proceeds; if not, the seured party has ten
days in which to perfect his interest in the proceeds." 9 This principle
is almost untouched by the present Colorado law with a single
exception - a mortgage on crops under the Chattel Mortgages
40
Act.'
Article 9 provides comprehensive rules which govern the relative priorities of secured parties claiming conflicting security interests
in the same collateral.' 4 ' For example, suppose C-1 takes a mortgage
on all the present and after-acquired inventory of a mortgagor, and
complies with the Inventory Mortgages Act. Later, C-2 sells goods
to the mortgagor to enable him to replenish his inventory, and takes
a mortgage on the goods as security. The mortgagor then goes
bankrupt and C-1 claims the new inventory under his after-acquired
331 COLO. REV. STAT.

§

332COLO. REV. STAT.

§ 21-1-6 (1963).

21-1-6 (1963).

COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 9-204(5), -312(3),(4),(5); Lee, Perfection
and Priorities Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 17 Wyo. L.J. 1, 11-12, 42-43
(1962).

333 See UNIFORM

334 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

33 CoLo. REV. STAT.

§

§

9-205.

21-2-5 (1963).

336 COLO. REV. STAT. § 11-2-4 (1963).

337 Exchange National Bank v. Haugh, 258 F.2d 785 (10th Cir. 1958).
338' 'Proceeds' includes whatever is received when collateral or proceeds is sold, ex-

changed, collected or otherwise disposed of. The term also includes the account
arising when the right to payment is earned under a contract right. Money, checks
and the like are 'cash proceeds'. All other proceeds are 'non-cash proceeds'."
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-306(1).
339 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-306(3).
34 0
COLO. REV. STAT. § 21-1-2 '(1963).
341

UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 9-310 to -316.
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property clause. Who takes priority? Let us look at the question
first in light of the Code. It provides that a purchase money security
interest in inventory will take priority over a conflicting security
interest in the same collateral if the purchase money security interest
is perfected when the debtor takes possession and adequate notice
is given to any claimant having a perfected security interest in the
same collateral before the debtor takes possession. 4 2 Thus there
is a clear possibility that C-2's security interest may not take priority
to C-1 if C-2 fails to perfect and give notice in the manner required.
If the collateral in the hypothetical had been non-inventory, C-2
would be given priority only if he perfected his security interest
before the debtor takes possession or within ten days thereafter.34
Again there is a clear possibility that C-2's claim may be inferior to
that of C-1. The possibility of C-1 having priority in either of the
above transactions changes Colorado law, which provides that an
after-acquired property clause may grasp only the interest that the
mortgagor acquired, even though the subsequent mortgagee has not
complied with the Inventory Mortgages Act."' Thus the Code will
give more protection to the holder of an after-acquired property
clause than does present law. Justification for this consequence is
based on the fact that an inventory financer frequently makes future
advances against after-acquired inventory pursuant to the terms of
the security agreement, and if he is not notified of the subsequent
security interest he might make further advances to a fraudulent
debtor only to discover the collateral is already encumbered. 3" In the
face of this possibility it would seem that proper notification by the
subsequent lender is not too much to expect, since he is made aware
of the possibility of an after-acquired property clause and future
advance provision through a search of the filing registry. " Since
the practice of making future advances on collateral other than
inventory is unusual, a notification is not required, but perfection
of the security interest is." 7 The reason why the prior secured party
takes priority under any circumstances in this latter case is presumably because of the possibility of future advances being made on
3 42

UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-312 (3).
343 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-312(4).
344 Indian Creek Co. v. Home Bank, 80 Colo. 96, 249 Pac. 499, 502 (1926) ; Robinson
v. Wright, 90 Colo. 417, 9 P.2d 618 (1932); HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, op. Cit.

supra note 312, at 36.
§ 9-312(3) Comment 3.
346 Note that a financing statement does not set out the terms of the security agreement,
345 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

but it does tip off the searcher to the existence of the possibility. Then, although the
financer could determine the contents of the security agreement if he desires (UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-208) it really is not necessary. All he needs to do to
protect himself is to perfect his interest and send the required notice note before
the debtor takes possession.
347 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-312 Comment 3.
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non-inventory collateral. Although C-1 will not have personal notice
in a case like this he will be able to search the registry and take
other precautions before making additional advances. However,
there would be a period of ten days during which he might not
discover the conflicting security interest because of the grace period
given to C-2.
Demands on the secured party for information relative to the
terms of the security agreement must come from the debtor."4 8
Presently in Colorado information pertaining to inventory mortgages
may be demanded by a person contemplating taking a security
interest in property of the mortgagor or by anyone purchasing the
property other than in the ordinary course of business.34 Information
regarding assignments of accounts receivable may be obtained only
by persons who have a written authorization from the assignor. 5 °
No similar provision is made for chattel mortgages, presumably
because they are on public file. 51
The Code fully encompasses default and foreclosure matters.
This will make the greatest change by filling gaps and providing
certainty in the law, which is presently contained almost entirely in
judicial decisions. 52
Adoption of the Code repeals the Chattel Mortgages Act, "
the Inventory Mortgages Act,354 and the Assignment of Accounts
Receivable Act.3"5 The following statutes and provisions should be
examined in light of the Code: The Personal Property Installment
Sales Act, 3 6 the Certificate of Title Act, " ' the lien statutes, " and
the sale of livestock statute. "
§ 9-208.
COLO. REV. STAT. § 21-2-8(14) (1963).
35
0 COLO. REV. STAT. § 11-2-7 (1963).
35 1
COLO. REV. STAT. § 21-1-11 (1963).
348 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
34 9

352 See Personal Property Installment Sales Act, COLO. REV. STAT. § 121-2-7 (1963);
Retail Motor Vehicle Installment Sales Act COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-16-6 (1963).
Following are references to sections which will make changes in this area: UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-504(1) (permits secured party, after default, to sell, lease,
or otherwise disposes of collateral.)- Pullen v. Thompson, 138 Colo. 281, 331
P.2d 1102 (1958) (which allows only a sale, unless an agreement provides otherwise); UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-504(3) (The Code requires reasonable
notification of the prospective sale to debtors and other secured parties.)- Aultman
& Taylor Co. v. Forest, 23 Colo. App. 558, 130 Pac. 1086 (1913) (where at least
15 days notice was required); UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-505(2): Acceptance of the Collateral as Discharge of Obligation - UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
§ 9-506 (A secured party with a subordinate interest may redeem a chattel before
foreclosure sale) Sweeney v. Poston, 110 Colo. 139, 132 P.2d 443 (1942) (where
the right is also recognized, but no provision is made for junior liens).
3 53
COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 21-1-1 to -20. (1963).
3 54
COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 21-2-1 to -13. (1963).
355
COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 11-2-1 to -9 (1963).
358 COLO. REv. STAT. §§121-2-1 to -10 (1963).
357
COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 13-6-1 to -43 (1963).
358 COLO. REV. STAT. ch. 86 (1963).
359 COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-10-6 (1963).
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CONCLUSION

This study has dealt primarily with the changes the Code will
make in the law and, of course, this tends to emphasize the differences between the Code and present law rather than the similarities,
which are far more numerous. Nevertheless, the Code does make
a great many substantial changes. Fortunately, however, most of
these changes arise from the modernization of the law for the
purpose of accommodating new business practices and needs, the
reonciliation of conflicting decisions for the sake of uniformity, and
as a result of the integration of the of the various segments of commercial law into a unified code. There is little doubt that most
changes of this nature represent a vast improvement over pre-Code
law and make adoption of the Code desirable.
However, the changes that will result from the introduction of
new policies into some aspects of commercial law, as distinguished
from what might be termed "structural changes" cannot be appraised
so easily. For example, Articles 430 and 5361 have been criticized for
unduly favoring the position of banks.362 Granted there have been
many comments lauding the over-all functionability and desirability
of the Code in jurisdictions that have had it during the past several
years,363 but perhaps it is not too unrealistic to suggest that most of
these comments have come from people having or representing
interests which policies of the Code tend to favor. To a large degree,
valid assessment of matters of this nature will have to be reserved
until the Code has stood the test of time and use on a larger scale
than heretofore.

360 Beutel, The Proposed Uniform (?) Commercial Code Should Not Be Adopted, 61
YALE L.J. 334 (1952) ; Brome, Bank Deposits and Collections, 16 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROB. 308 (1951).

361 Letters of Credit Under the Proposed Uniform Commercial Code: An Opportunity
Missed, 62 YALE L.J. 227 (1953).
362 In Colorado this particular question is perhaps moot so far as Article 4 is concerned
because, as pointed out earlier, it is substantially the same as present law and will
not make many changes.
363 COMMERCIAL CODE COMMITTEE NATIONAL CONFERENCE COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE

LAWS, THE

UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE IN PENNSYLVANIA

1964 AND IN MASSACHUSETTS 1958-1964, EXPERIENCE-

1954-

NOT THEORY (1964).
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Foreign Water in Colorado-The City's Right
to Recapture and Re-Use Its Transmountain
Diversion
INTRODUCTION

The celebrated growth in population of the western states following World War II scarcely requires elaboration.! It is reflected
in Colorado particularly in the strip of cities and counties of the
eastern slope running from Boulder in the north to Pueblo in the
south,2 and continues apace through the 1960s.3
This expansion has increased to the point of severity the
demands upon a water supply which has been historically meager4
and which had already prompted cities to finance transmountain diversions from the state's western slope watershed to meet present and
anticipated requirements.5 Impressive as they are in quantity, these
1In

the decade 1950-60, by United States census, the population of Arizona increased
by 73.7% to 1,302,161; California by 48.5% to 15,717,204; Colorado by 32.4% to
1,753,947; New Mexico by 39.6% to 951,023. COLORADO YEAR BOOK 1959-1961,
at 280 (1962).
2 In the decade 1950-60, Boulder County grew by 53.7% to a popoulation of 74,254;
Denver by 18.8% to 493,887 (and to a metropolitan population of 929,383, twentysixth in size in the nation); El Paso County (Colorado Springs, Fort Carson, Air
Force Academy) by 92.9% to 143,742; Pueblo County by 31.6% to 118,707. Id. at
282, 284.
3E.g., Colorado Springs' Size Doubles in Four Years.
Colorado Springs-This city, seventh-fastest growing metropolis of its size
in the United States, has doubled its size [acreage] in the past four years
... officials reported ....
The city . . . during 1964 [brought its size by
annexation) to 21,506 acres. This compares with . . . 10,874 acres in Jan.
1, 1961 . . . . Latest estimates by city planners peg the Colorado Springs

population at 90,000, which is 20,000 more than the 1960 census figure of
70,194 . . . . The Denver Post, Jan. 1, 1965, p. 27, col. 1 '(final ed.).
4 The Colorado mean annual precipitation is 17 inches, but is considerably less at many
lower elevations on both eastern and western slopes: In the Denver, Greely, and
Ft. Morgan area, 10-15 inches; Colorado Springs, Pueblo, and Canon City, 10-15
inches; Lamar, La Junta, and Arkansas Valley, 10-15 inches; San Luis Valley, less
than 10 inches; but in Ft. Collins, Lyons, Boulder, and Golden, 15-20 inches; and
Akron, Julesburg, and Wray, 15-20 inches. Distribution of Precipitation in Colorado
(Colorado Statae Planning Division, Denver) (July 1957). Cf. Arkansas mean annual
precipitation, 48 inches; Louisiana, 55; the New England States, 42; Wisconsin, 31.
MILLER,

GERAGHTY

N

COLLINS,

WATER

ATLAS

OF THE UNITED

STATES plate 3

(1963).
An average of about ninety million acre-feet of water falls annually as precipitation in Colorado, but a large part is lost by evapotranspiration, and only about
sixteen milion acre-feet appears as runoff in the major streams. S. Comm. on Interior
and Insular Affairs, Mineral and Water Resources in Colorado, REPORT OF THE
UNITED
MINING

STATES GEOLOGICAL SURVEY IN COLLABORATION
INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT BOARD, 88TH CONG.,

WITH THE COLORADO
2D SEss. 233 (Comm.

Print 1964), hereafter cited as REPORT OF THE U.S.G.S.

5See, e.g., Lewis, Transmountain Water Diversions, 14 DICTA 185 (1937). For a
summary of Federal projects under construction, authorized, and those completed, and
water tunnels through the Colorado mountains, see COLORADO YEAR BOOK 19621964 at 519-29 (State Planning Div., Denver 1965). The prospect of any immediate
116
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transmountain diversions are already heavily committed; their
capacity to maintain the foreseeable growth in population and industry is limited. Inevitably then, a city would seek to recapture and
re-use at least some of the water from its transmountain diversion,
considering such use vital to its sustained and competitive growth.
The city would propose, after sewage treatment, to hold captive
the water (or recapture it) before abandonment into a natural
stream, convey it to city storage or pumping works, and use it for
non-potable purposes such as cooling of the municipal steam plant,
watering public parks and golf courses, street sprinkling, and flushing. It also could seek to sell or lease to nearby private users such as
golf clubs, estates, or colleges with extensive lawns and plantings,
and corporate water districts outside the city boundaries but within
the metropolitan area which would take either by direct line or by
exchange sale.6 The city would hope by this recapture and re-use
relief through federal desalinization programs is remote. But desalinization is indeed
an ongoing plan, as demonstrated by the following:
Advances Seen in Desalting Program.
Washington-Interior Secretary Stewart L. Udall said . . . he anticipates
within the next four years a big economic breakthrough in the accelerated
water desalting program now moving toward unprecedented intensity ....
The water program is now costing about twelve million dollars a year
out of a departmental budget of about $1.17 billion. AP report, Rocky
Mountain News, Jan. 1, 1965, p. 8, col. 1 (city ed.).
Late in the 1965 session, Congress approved a notable expansion and acceleration
of the Secretary of Interior's saline water-conversion development program, authorizing an additional $15 million for fiscal 1967 and authorizing as much as $185 million through 1972. 79 Stat. 509. (U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEWS, p. 2412 (Sept.
5, 1965)). And on Oct. 4, 1965, the White House announced an agreement with
Mexico to explore the possibilities of erecting a nuclear-powered desalting plant to
serve neighboring arid regions of both nations. AP report, The Denver Post, Oct. 4,
1965, p. 11, col. 1 (home ed.).
6The identification of the water would be by volume-intake measurement, to distinguish it within the corpus of sewage effluent from water appropriated from the
local watershed. That is, by measuring the inflow of transmountain water to its
system, the city maintains a continuous current record of that volume under its
control as contrasted to the remaining water which comes from local sources. The
amount recorded as present in the system from transmountain sources is that amount
which could be put to reuse.
Water measurement is made by numerous devices, among them the sharpedged orifice; the nozzle with pressure gauge; the venturi meter, which is widely used
to measure large flows in pipelines and lends itself to the installation of automatic
continuous recording devices; the weir, used often to measure the flow from wells and
in ditches and small streams; and proportional meters, which measure large flows
by metering a small known fraction thereof. Rates of flow by pump capacity and
plant output are often expressed in terms of gallons-per-minute and million gallonsper-day. The flow of streams, however, is measured in "second-feet," i.e., cubic feet
per second. Usual hydrological arithmetic equates an output of one cubic foot per
second for 24 hours with about 646,300 gallons per day. HIRSCH, MANUAL FOR
WATER PLANT OPERATORS at 238-50, 251-57 (1945). See also STEEL, WATER
SUPPLY AND SEWERAGE at 16-17, 601-03 (4th ed. 1960).
Fresh-water use (exclusive of hydroelectric power use) in Colorado in 1960
was about 9700 mgd (million gallons per day) or 10.8 million acre-feet per year.
Of this, 7100 mgd of surface water and 1800 mgd of ground water was used for
irrigation; 320 mgd of surface water (of which 200 mgd was for public-utility
fuel-electric power and 35 mgd of ground water was used for industry; 250 mgd
of surface water and 41 mgd of ground water for public supply. Hydroelectric power
use was about 3200 mgd. REPORT OF THE U.S.G.S. supra note 4, at 234.
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to recoup a portion at least of its outlay for the original purchase
or establishment of appropriation rights to the water, the construcion and maintenance of transmountain diversion works, the cost of
treating used water in sewage works, and the administrative costs
of serving as supplier to its system area.
The water to be re-used has heretofore been discharged into
natural streams, swelling their volume and redounding to the benefit
of downstream appropriators. These appropriators have shown no
sentiment for assuming any proportionate burden of the expense
of this imported water. Indeed, they can be expected vigorously to
challenge the city's right to dispose of the water by any means other
than simple discharge into the public watercourses.
The purpose of this note is to examine the city's right in Colorado to recapture its transmountain water, upon its own premises,
following purification from sewage, and re-use it for municipal
purposes or for sale to beneficial users in the metropolitan area.
The point of departure is the settled body of water law in Colorado, that: the water of natural streams is the property of the public,
is dedicated to the use of the people of the state, and is subject to
use by appropriation;' the right to divert water is based upon the
taking and putting to a beneficial use, and the use may be subject
to a constitutional order of preferences;8 a decreed water right is
valuable property, and its use may be changed and its point of
diversion relocated;9 a municipal corporation is not precluded from
art. 16, § 5:
Water of streams public property.-The water of every natural stream,
not heretofore appropriated, within the state of Colorado is hereby declared
to be the property of the public, and the same is dedicated to the use of
the people of the state, subject to appropriation as hereinafter provided.
And see generally the two articles by Burke, The Origin, Growth and Function of
The Law of Water Use, 10 Wyo. L.J. 95; Western Water Law, 10 Wyo. L.J. 180
(1956).
8 COLO. CONST. art. 16, § 6:
Diverting unappropriated water-priority preferred uses.-The right to
divert the unappropriated waters of any natural stream to beneficial uses
shall never be denied. Priority of appropriation shall give the better right
as between those using the waters for the same purpose; but when the
waters of any natural stream are not sufficient for the service of all those
desiring the use of the same, those using the water for domestic purposes
shall have the preference over those claiming for any other purposes, and
those using the water for agricultural purposes shall have the preference
over those using the same for manufacturing purposes.
The appropriation law of the western states is sui generis. For an historical perspective of its development independent of, or by modification of, the old commonlaw Riparian Doctrine, see Wiel, Fifty Years of Water Law, 50 HARV. L. R3"v. 252
(1936); 3 FARNHAM, THE LAW OF WATER AND WATER RIGHTS, § 649 at 2017
(1904); HUTCHINS, SELECTED PROBLEMS IN THE LAW OF WATER RIGHTS IN THE
WEST, U.S. Dept. of Agri., Misc. Pub. 418 (Washington, D.C. 1942) at 30-73.
9Farmers Highline Canal & Reservoir Co. v. City of Golden, 129 Colo. 575, 579, 272
P.2d 629, 631 (1954). Cf. Boulder & White Rock Ditch & Reservoir Co. v. City
of Boulder, 402 P.2d 71, 74 (Colo. 1965).
7 CoLo. CONST.
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purchasing water rights previously used for agricultural purposes and
devoting them to municipal uses;1" a municipal corporation does not
have any different status from that of an individual or any other
party to a proceeding pertaining to rights for irrigation or for
rights to water for purposes other than irrigation;' the policy of
the law is to enforce an economical use of the waters of the natural
streams; 2 diversion of appropriated water from one stream across
the watershed to the basin of another is permissible under the appropriation doctrine; 3 a city may acquire by transmountain diversion
an amount of water to meet its future needs for a normal increase
of population within a reasonable time;14 the owners of a water right
may conduct the waters legally appropriated and stored into and
along any of the natural streams of the state and may take the same
out again at any point with due regard to prior and subsequent
rights of others to the other waters in such natural streams," but
whenever any person diverts water from one stream through another
stream, he takes it out again subject to deduction for seepage and
evaporation. 6
Unfortunately, a situation obtains which encumbers an attempt
to assess water law and apply it to modern municipal and industrial
problems. The judicial decisions and the statutes of water adminis10 Farmers Highline Canal & Reservoir Co. v. City of Golden, supra note 9.
11 City and County of Denver v. Northern Colo. Water Conservancy Dist., 130 Colo.
375 388, 276 P.2d 992, 999 (1954).
12 New Mercer Ditch Co. v. Armstrong, 21 Colo. 357, 366, 40 Pac. 989, 992 (1895).
13 Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443, 449-50 (1882). See also Lewis, Transmountain Water Diversions, 14 DICTA 185, 188 (1937).
14 City and County of Denver v. Sheriff, 105 Colo. 193, 202, 96 P.2d 836, 842 (1939).
Regarding Denver as a supplier: The Denver Water Board presently provides nearly
200,000 acre-feet annually to some 700,000 persons, of whom 25% are suburbanites.
Consumption is expected to increase in ten years to 310,000 acre-feet for one million
persons, and to 430,000 acre-feet by 1985 for 1.4 million persons, 50% of whom will
be non-Denver residents. Denver has spent, between 1955 and 1965, $130 million for
water resources. Statement of R. S. Shannon, Jr., President, Denver Water Board. The
Denver Post, No. 25, 1965, P. 60, col. 3 (final ed.).
15 COLO. REV. STAT. § 148-5-2 (1963); Twin Lakes Reservoir & Canal Co. v. Sill, 104
Colo. 215, 219, 89 P.2d 1012, 1014 (1939). And see Trelease, Reclamation Water
Rights, 32 ROCKY Mr. L. REV. 464, 471-72 (1960).
16 COLO. REV. STAT. § 148-6-1 (1963). All the principles just enumerated rest on the
past federal deference to the state's water law and customs. But for an assessment
of the alarm which has been raised in recent years that the federal government seeks
a reversal of the national policy, to the effect that ownership of water rights rests
in the federal government independent of state law, subject to its exclusive regulation and even termination of present appropriation rights, see National District
Attorney's Association, Western Water Law Symposium 1963 passim; Trelease,
supra note 15, at 481-85; Federal-State Water Rights, Hearings Before the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, United States Senate, on Problems Arising from
Relationships Between the States and the Federal Government with Respect to the
Development and Control of Water Resources, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., June 15-16,
1961.
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tration are grounded to a substantial degree in agricultural and
mining use. Thus the policy decisions that must be made upon the
demands of urban use are largely unrelated to those of an agrarian
economy."
I.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL

INQUIRY

The re-use contemplated by the city is of its wasted or flowback transmountain water- i.e., of imported or "foreign" water. 9
There can be no re-use or sale by the city of sewage-treated water
from its local watershed, under the bar of Pulaski Irrigating Ditch
Co. v. City of Trinidad." There the City of Trinidad, diverting
water from the (local) Las Animas River, purified its sewage in
settling pits adjoining the river. A certain amount of the watercontent of the sewage seeped back into the river and became part
of the stream's supply to appropriators below. When Trinidad built
modern purification plants and proposed to sell the purified water
Some of our present difficulties in water administration stem from this
early emphasis on irrigation, because the early laws were not drafted to deal
with the large industrial and municipal water uses of today ....
Since that
time, this basic law has been patched, added to and tinkered with in attempts to make it more workable, but it has never been thoroughly revised
to meet modern conditions of water use. Danielson, Water Administration
In Colorado, Higher-ority or Priority?, 30 ROCKY MT. L. REv. 293, 294-95
(1958).
In view of the comparatively recent rapid growth of the cities and towns
in Colorado, there have not been many decisions . . . involving municipal
water rights. We must therefore look to the irrigation decisions as the
source of much of our municipal water law on the subject of appropriation
[A] water right is created by diversion and use. This statement was
first formulated in relation to irrigation. The same rule applies in regard
to an appropriation by a municipality. Lindsey, Legal Problems in City
Water Supply, 22 ROCKY MT. L REv. 356, 363 (1950).
18 Compare Hutchins' definition of waste water with that of Kinney a generation
earlier:
Waste waters are principally those waters which, after having been diverted
from sources of supply for use, have escaped from conduits or structures in
course of distribution or from irrigated lands after application to the soil
....
[S]ome water is purposely released from control by the project management, because of the inability of consumers to make complete use of all
waters diverted. These waters are also referred to as waste, but in the
usual case they are returned to the stream from which diverted, or to some
other surface stream, by means of artificial channels controlled by the project, and therefore become available for use by downstream diverters.
HUTCHINS, op. cit. supra note 8, at 23-24.
Waste water may be defined to be such water as escapes from the works or
appliances of appropriators without being used; or such water as escapes
from an appropriator's land after he has made all the beneficial use thereof that is possible and which cannot be returned into the natural stream
from which it was originally taken. 2 KINNEY, IRRIGATION AND WATER
17

RIGHTS § 661 at 1150-51 (2d ed. 1912).

19The term "foreign waters" is applied to waters taken from one watershed for use
in a different drainage basin. These waters are foreign, in that they are not naturally
a part of the water supply of the area in which used. HUTCHINS, op. cit. supra note
8, at 375.
2070 Colo. 565, 203 Pac. 681 (1922). Accord, Wyoming Hereford Ranch v. Hammond Packing Co., 33 Wyo. 14, 236 Pac. 764, 773 (1925).
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to its co-defendant, the lower appropriators sought an injunction
against the sale. The injunction was denied, but the supreme court
reversed, holding that when sewage water is purified it is again
the thing which was diverted originally, that a title by such use is
not gained and when the use has been completed the right of user
terminates, that such water is not "developed" water after purification, and if there is a surplus remaining after use it must be
"returned to the stream whence it came."21 The court cited no cases.
The Pulaski case points up what is perhaps the strongest argument
against the right of the city to recapture its water. The Colorado
Constitution provides that "The water of every natural stream, not
heretofore appropriated . . . is hereby declared to be the property
of the public, and the same is dedicated to the use of the people of
the state, subject to appropriation ..
'2
An appropriator has,
then, only a usufructuary right, not a right of ownership. 3 If an
appropriator has only the right to use water until it has accomplished
the purpose for which it was appropriated, it can logically be argued
that it remains the property of the public during the entire time of
use, and must be returned to the public as soon as the purpose is
accomplished. A re-use would in effect be a second appropriation.
On the other hand, the Pulaski case involved water from the local
watershed, water that was subject to the adjudicated priorities of the
protesting downstream appropriators. The city today would seek
immediately to distinguish the fact that but for its transmountain
diversion the water would never appear in the stream and lower
users of the discharge could hold no rights or expectations in water
which was developed and imported by the city alone.24
The city's proposed re-use of its imported water may well be
21

Id., 70 Colo. at 568, 203 Pac. at 682.

§ 5, supra note 7.
E.g., Pulaski Irrigating Ditch Co. v. City of Trinidad, supra note 21, at 568, 203
Pac. at 682; Fort Morgan Reservoir & Irr. Co. v. McCune, 71 Colo. 256, 262, 206
Pac. 393, 395 (1922).
24 " 'Developed' water . . . is not water already in the stream and saved from loss, but
is new water added to the stream by the efforts of man . . . . Developed water is
water which would not have augmented the stream flow under natural conditions."
HUTCHINS, op. cit. supra note 8, at 362. But cf. Kinney's much narrower definition: " 'Developed water' is such subterranean or underground water as is discovered
and brought to the surface by the exploitation of man." 2 KINNEY, op. cit. supra note
18, § 1205 at 2186; State ex rel Mungas v. District Court, 102 Mont. 533, 538, 59
P.2d 71, 73 (1936) (water diverted from a running stream and conveyed elsewhere
cannot be called developed water). It is perhaps an arguable inference that the
Pulaski court contemplated the distinction between local water and foreign or
developed water as being the decisive factor in its holding, from its statement,
To turn this water back into the river will not increase the river's flow
above what it would have been had the water not been diverted, and it is
not therefore developed water. (Emphasis supplied).
70 Colo. at 569, 203 Pac. at 683.
2 CoLo. CONST. art. 16
23
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opposed on other principles, principles which, it must again be
noted, arose usually from decisions in agricultural disputes. The
owner of a priority has no right, if it works to the detriment of
junior appropriators, to increase the amount or extend the time of
his diversion in order to put the water to double use, by irrigation
of other lands in addition to those for which it was appropriated,
nor has he the right to lend, rent, or sell the excess water after
irrigation of the land for which it was appropriated if it works a
similar detriment."5 The appropriator may be held strictly limited to
the extent of former actual usage when he seeks to change the place
of use.2 When collected water in an irrigator's drainage canal is
discharged into a natural watercourse, it becomes a part of that
stream and is subject to public appropriation and use." Junior appropriators have a vested right in the continuance of conditions as they
25 Enlarged Southside Irr. Ditch Co. v. John's Flood Ditch Co., 116 Colo. 580, 586,
183 P.2d 552, 554 (1947), a case which also involved waters from the Las Animas
River; Fort Lyon Canal Co. v. Rocky Ford Co., 79 Colo. 511, 515, 246 Pac. 781
(1926) (by implication). Cf. White v. Farmers' Highline Canal & Reservoir Co.,
22 Colo. 191, 195-96, 43 Pac. 1028, 1030, 31 L.R.A. 828 (1896) (appropriator
more than doubled his diversion from a ditch, on the strength of his preceding contract with the ditch company's grantors; that enlargement was stopped, on the principle that any private contract regarding sale of water rights must bow to the state
system of regulation). See Galiger v. McNulty, 80 Mont. 339, 356-57, 260 Pac.
401, 405 (1927) (mining operators diverted from an alien watershed, then attempted
to sell rights to downstream irrigator who was to take flume discharge and unused
volume).
26 Farmers Highline Canal and Reservoir Co. v. City of Golden, 129 Colo. 575, 584-85,
272 P.2d 629, 634 (1954). There the city purchased the right of a former irrigator
who had not put his entire decree to a beneficial use; the city sought to change the
point of diversion and to assert its right to enlarge the use for city needs to the extent
of the entire decree. The court rejected the attempt, holding, 129 Colo. at 584-85,
272 P.2d at 634, that regardless of the amount decreed, by changing the point of
diversion the city was restricted to former actual usage. The water involved was
local, in which the protestants held appropriation rights. Cf. Hall v. Blackman, 22
Idaho 556, 558-59, 126 Pac. 1047, 1048 (1912) (upstream appropriator perpetually
enjoined from carrying part of his appropriation beyond the land formerly irrigated,
because in so doing he deprived a junior of the use of seepage, waste, and percolating
waters which the latter formerly received from the use of the waters on land to
which they were decreed) ; Hutchinson v. Stricklin, 146 Ore. 285, 300, 28 P.2d 225,
230 (1933) '(an appropriator for power purposes, a non-consumptive use, had no
right to contract with irrigators to change the character of use to irrigation, a consuming use, to the effect of depriving the lower appropriator of water to which he was
entitled by appropriation) ; Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Co. v. Shurtliff, 49 Utah
569, 579, 164 Pac. 856, 860 (1917) (landowner may not appropriate water for one
purpose and then apply it or any part of it to another purpose).
27 Quirico v. Hickory Jackson Ditch Co., 130 Colo. 481, 488, 276 P.2d 746, 750
(1954) ; Water Supply & Storage Co. v. Larimer & Weld Reservoir Co., 25 Colo. 87,
94, 53 Pac. 386, 388 (1898). Cf. Rock Creek Ditch and Flume Co. v. Miller, 93
Mont. 248, 260, 17 P.2d 1074, 1079-80 (1933) (even fugitive waters originally
introduced from another watershed which have, by percolation, reached a natural
channel as waste water constitute part of that watercourse). Other jurisdictions
supporting this principle specify the intent to abandon or the loss of dominion by
discharging. Jones v. Warmsprings Irr. Dist., 162 Ore. 186, 91 P.2d 542 (1939)
(discharge without intent to reserve or recapture works an abandonment) ; Hagerman
Irr. Co. v. East Grand Plains Drainage Dist., 25 N.M. 649, 187 Pac. 555 (1920)
(the creator of an artificial flow of water is owner thereof so long as it is confined
to his property, but not after the creator has lost his dominion over it by deposit in
a natural stream).

1965

FOREIGN WATER

existed on the stream at the time they made their appropriations, 8
including the general method of use of water therefrom. 9 Yet, again
there must be pointed out what may be called a material distinction
in these cases. With hardly an exception, they show that the disputes
between appropriators concerned water from the local stream and
its watershed, and that the disputants were all actual holders of
appropriation rights in the source. It is this distinction which the
city would hold out in its contention for right to re-use, disclaiming
any concern for transmountain water wilfully abandoned but setting
up that since the rights in the water belong to the city alone, those
below are no proper complainants because when there are no rights
existing there can be no rights injured.
It would seem, then, that the protestants to recapture and re-use
stand more firmly upon the constitutional argument based upon
Section 5 of Article XVI, 0 viz., that water appropriated from a
natural stream in Colorado, whether or not from the watershed in
which it is used, cannot, under the same appropriation, be recaptured
or re-used or transferred to others for re-use after it has once been
put to beneficial use by the appropriator thereof. The thrust of the
argument is that transfer of the water by its appropriator (i.e., the
city) across a divide and into a watershed to which its presence
is foreign nevertheless confers upon all appropriators therein the
right and expectation of receiving the total discharge as part of the
local supply which is "the property of the public." This reasoning
entails the application of the Pulaski rule without reservation or
distinction based on the foreign origin of the water, and would in
effect allow users below the city a bonus of water imported entirely
through the efforts of the city. This argument was made before
the State Engineer of Colorado in 1965, by protestants to a contract
for exchange sale of water by the City of Colorado Springs to a
v. Manassa Land & Irr. Co., 379 P.2d 405, 407 (Colo. 1963) ; Enlarged
Southside Irr. Ditch Co. v. John's Flood Ditch Co., 120 Colo. 423, 429, 210 P.2d
982, 985 (1949) ; Faden v. Hubbell, 93 Colo. 358, 369, 28 P.2d 247, 251 (1933).

28DeHerrera

2Monte Vista Canal Co. v. Centennial Irr. Ditch Co., 24 Colo. App. 496, 503, 135
Pac. 981, 984 (1913). California holds that whenever water in a natural stream
or watercourse is not reasonably required for beneficial use by owners of paramount
rights, whether the water is foreign or part of the natural flow, such owners cannot
prevent use of the waters by other persons, and it must be regarded as surplus water
subject to appropriation. True indeed, the appropriator may prevent waste of the
water by selling it to a willing purchaser, but he cannot compel anyone to purchase
his unneeded surplus water. Stevinson Water Dist. v. Roduner, 36 Cal.2d 264,
270-71, 223 P.2d 209, 213 (1950) (when the irrigator contracted to take all the
excess foreign water sent down the creek to him, and interdisposed irrigators took
therefrom what they estimated was excess, the court refused to order compensation
to be paid by the latter unless the one who contracted for the water was accepting
the excess with an actual need and intent to put it to use).
30 Supra note 7.
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private suburban water company."5 The argument was rejected by
the State Engineer.32
II.

SOME STATUTORY RAMIFICATIONS

The city also faces the negative implications, or commands, of
certain statutes. The first to be encountered contains a puzzling
closing sentence.
139-79-1. Leasing of water - no rights vested. - In the event any
municipal appropriator of water having a population in excess of
two hundred thousand people shall hereafter lease water not needed
by it for immediate use, no rights shall become vested to a continued leasing or to a continuance of the conditions concerning any
return waters arising therefrom, so as to defeat or impair the right
to terminate the leases, or change the place of use. Any leasing shall
31 The City of Colorado Springs contracted to sell to the South Suburban Water Company, a water company within its metropolitan area, amounts up to 600 acre-feet in
any calendar year. The water so sold was denominated as strictly from the city's
imported Blue River water, following sewage treatment, and was to be delivered,
by exchange methods, as solely "successive use water." The water company sought
by the agreement to supplement its appropriations on the local Cheyenne Creek.
Cheyenne Creek is tributary to Fountain Creek, which drains the Colorado Springs
area, and in which owners downstream from Colorado Springs held appropriation
rights senior to the water company. The exchange method agreed upon between the
city and water company provided that the water company would take water from
Cheyenne Creek, out of its order of priority, notify the city of the amount taken, and
the city would charge the water company's account for the Blue River water which
it had discharged into Fountain Creek. The effect was a substitution of imported
Blue River water into Fountain Creek to replace the amount taken by the water
company out of order of priority. The downstream appropriators, noting that Colorado Springs had always discharged its once-used Blue River water into Fountain
Creek adding to its natural volume, and that the city had no facilities for retaining
physical control of the water after sewage treatment, protested that the substituted
water was not new water available to the water company for that purpose but rather
was water that already belonged to the stream and was subject to existing stream
priorities. The protestants argued chiefly that water appropriated from a natural
stream in Colorado, whether imported or not, cannot under the same appropriation
be recaptured, re-used, or transferred to others for re-use after it has once been put
to beneficial use by the appropriator; that the very discharge of the treated water
into Fountain Creek indicated exhaustion of the beneficial use by the city, and so
the public water again is part of that dedicated to the people of Colorado under
article 16, § 5, Colorado Constitution; and that a second or partial use of water
cannot be transferred to a new user by sale, loan, or exchange, while the water right
is retained in the transferor, to the injury of those who need the water for beneficial
uses on the stream of discharge. Brief of Protestants, In the Matter of the Hearing
Before the State Engineer Regarding Storage of Water by the South Suburban Water
Company in Water District No. 10, Irrigation Division No. 2, Colorado State Engineer's Office, State Services Annex Bldg., Denver (April 21, 1965).
32 The State Engineer of Colorado expressly distinguished foreign from local water and
gave as his ruling that when an importer of water increases the amount of water in
the stream of beneficial use he is entitled to use the new water to the best of his
ability, and that other appropriators on the stream to which the water has been
imported, having exerted no effort in said importation, are not entitled to participate
in any benefits arising therefrom. The ruling expressly referred to the fact that in
the original federal decree which allowed use of Blue River water to Colorado
Springs, Decree of the United States District Court, District of Colorado, United
States v. Northern Colo. Water Conservancy Dist., Civil Nos. 2782 (incorporating
Nos. 5016, 5017), Oct. 12, 1955, the city was under a duty to measure regularly the
quantities of return flow from its municipal uses of the transmountain water and to
report regularly to the Secretary of the Interior of the United States what steps, by
legal action or otherwise, the city has taken to utilize such return flow by exchange
or otherwise so as to reduce or minimize the demands of the city upon Blue River
water. Ruling of the State Engineer, In the Matter of the Hearing Before the State
Engineer, supra note 31, at 2-4.
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not injuriously affect rights theretofore vested in other appropriators. Nothing contained in this section shall authorize an appropriator to recapture
water for a second use after it has once been
3
used by it.
The statute protects Denver, in its lease of water to outside
consumers, from the latter acquiring vested rights in such leases. It
came under examination by the supreme court in City and County of
Denver v. Sheriff34 in 1939 and City of Englewood v. City of Denver 3" in 1951, and though the court found no issue involving that
final sentence and made no interpretation of it, an examination of
the cases is germane to the subject here.
In City and County of Denver v. Sheriff, the city appealed from
a general (transmountain) water adjudication decree which (a) subjected the city's new western slope water to a restrictive condition
that Denver's use of the imported water was to be merely supplemental and contingent upon prior use of its earlier (eastern slope) appropriations, and (b) denied the city any appropriation whatever
based upon general irrigation purposes. The trial court (a western
slope jurisdiction) was quite candid in stating that its decree was
intended to guard "against the City of Denver going into the business
of selling water or disposing of a part or all of her present [eastern
slope] water rights and substituting the [imported] water acquired
...

in this proceeding for her present water supply." 6 The supreme

court modified the decree, striking down the restrictive condition,
(a) supra, on the principle that the eastern slope appropriations,
being a property right in absolute unconditional decrees, could not
be so restricted, nor so dealt with by a court alien to eastern slope
jurisdiction, and that the supreme court had previously stated in
Denver v. Brown, 65 Colo. 216, 138 Pac. 44 (1914), that the city
could lease its eastern slope water to irrigators under certain conditions." The court, in examining Section 139-79-1 (then known as
Chapter 163, Section 398, Colorado Statutes Annotated 1935), held
that under the section there is a difference between use of water for
municipal purposes and use of water for irrigating and that cities
having a population of 200,000 or more may by prudent management appropriate an adequate supply for a reasonable time in the
future."8 It made no reference, however, to the final sentence of the
33 COLO. REV. STAT. § 139-79-1 (1963) (emphasis supplied).
34 105 Colo. 193, 96 P.2d 836 (1939).
35 123 Colo. 290, 229 P.2d 667 (1951).
36 City and County of Denver v. Sheriff, supra note 34, 105 Colo. at 201, 96 P.2d at
840, 841.
37 Id. at 201, 96 P.2d at 840.
38 Id. at 202, 96 P.2d at 841-42.
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section." There was no issue requiring it, for the dispute concerned
a decree, not recapture or re-use. The court did sustain the trial court
in its denial of the city's appropriation based on beneficial use for
irrigation purposes outside of the Denver Municipal Water System
area; the court made clear that the city was not prohibited from
leasing water not needed for immediate use, under the decision of
Denver v. Brown, supra, but it just as clearly held that the need of
water to satisfy beneficial use necessarily must apply to the system
40
area.
The supreme court was similarly silent in its later consideration
of Section 139-79-1 in City of Englewood v. City of Denver.4 Englewood, whose residents had been purchasing water from Denver, (a)
petitioned against Denver's increasing the rates to Englewood, on
the ground that Denver was operating as a public utility and so was
fully subject to the jurisdiction of the state public utilities commission, and (b) sought a finding that Denver was contractually bound
to furnish water to Englewood consumers at the rates prevailing in
Denver itself. The trial court entered declaratory judgment of dismissal. The supreme court affirmed, holding that Denver's prime
purpose was to supply water to its residents, an act of a "municipal
utility" rather than a "public utility"; that the act of supplying water
to users beyond the territorial limits of the city [Denver] did not
impress the business with a public interest because the outside users
had no right to demand the service;' that so operating on a utility
basis, Denver could collect charges and make such conditions as it
wished, all without liability of any vested right for a continued sale
or lease of water, and that Denver "holds such water as is not needed
by it for immediate use in its proprietary capacity, in which it has a
well defined property right .... ."' There was no intimation as to
the final sentence of Section 139-79-1.
The sentence patently means the seller or lessor of water-i.e.,
the city as appropriator-and not the purchaser or lessee. The wording "Nothing ...shall authorize an appropriator to recapture water
for a second use after it has once been used by it" contains no positive prohibition to recapture, but rather a negative implication,
"Nothing . . .shall authorize .... " Possibly the legislators meant
39

The section was worded at the time, "Provided, further, that nothing herein contained
shall authorize an appropriator to recapture water for a second use after it has once
been used by it." COLO. STAT. ANN. ch. 163, § 398 (1935).
40 105 Colo. at 210, 96 P.2d at 844.
41 123 Colo. 290, 229 P.2d 667 (1951).
42
id., 123 Colo. at 298, 229 P.2d at 671-72.
43
Id., 123 Colo. at 300-01, 229 P.2d at 673.
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in drafting the statute in 193144 that the city, in leasing or selling
to outsiders, could not retake that volume from the stream into which
the outside purchaser or lessee would discharge it after use. In any
event, that final sentence of Section 139-79-1, with its serious negative implications, must eventually be interpreted by the courts as
cities proceed with, or expand, their methods of re-use of appropriations.
There is another statute which, if germane, must be satisfied by
the city.
148-2-6 ....
Water claimed and appropriated for domestic purposes
shall not be employed or used for irrigation or for application to
land or plants in any manner to any extent whatever. The provisions
of this section shall not prohibit any city or town or corporation
organized solely for the purpose of supplying water to the inhabitants of such city or town from supplying water thereto for sprin45
kling streets and extinguishing fires or for household purposes.
The apparent strictness of this injunction has been vitiated by the
supreme court, e.g., in City and County of Denver v. Sheriff46 wherein it said:
The term "municipal uses" never has been used in connection
with water adjudication proceedings before, to our knowledge. This
term necessarily includes agricultural purposes within the city area.
. . . We said [in Denver v. Brown, 56 Colo. 216, 138 Pac. 44

(1914)] "Irrigation means the application of water for the purpose of nourishing plants. We think the application of water to
grow trees upon streets and to irrigate trees, shrubs, grasses, and
other plant life usually grown in parks constitutes the use of water
for irrigation just as much as the application of water to grow
crops upon farms ....
"
Counsel for defendants in error say in their brief . . . "There
is no desire on the part of the defendants in error . . . to deny the

City of Denver its right to use the appropriated water for all municipal purposes, including the irrigation of its parks, lawns, and
shrubbery.' 47
Upon this the city presumably could contend that it may also, inter
alia, water golf courses ("parks").48
44

Colo. Sess. Laws 1931, ch. 172, p. 811, § 1.

4 Coto. REV. STAT. § 148-2-6 (1963).
46 105 Colo. 193, 96 P.2d 836 (1939).

47Id.,
48

105 Colo. at 209-10, 96 P.2d at 844.
Indeed, the city might consider it reasonable also to argue its right to sell its nonpotable, sewage-treated water for use in areas within its system even though outside
its corporate limits. The court did specify in Denver v. Sheriff, 105 Colo. at 210,
96 P.2d at 844, "The need of water to satisfy beneficial use . . . necessarily must
apply to the system area." So, it could be contended, if a city's water system runs
outside its actual municipal limits, water may be leased or sold throughout the
system both inside and outside the city limits. See Van Tassel Real Estate & Livestock Co. v. City of Cheyenne, 49 Wyo. 333, 365-66, 54 P.2d 906, 916, cert. denied,
299 U.S. 574 (1936) (the municipality having prior appropriation of waters for
municipal use is entitled to dispose of surplus water to places-in this case a military reservation- closely adjacent to the city which, so far as "municipal use" of
water is concerned, may be considered as parts of the city).
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III. THE CITY AS AN APPROPRIATOR
The city is not prevented from arguing from the perspective
of common sense and justice. Recalling that it owns the rights in
the transmountain water, has imported it at substantially its own
direct expense, will or can hold it on its premises, means to apply
it or grant its application to a beneficial use, and is acting in good
faith to prevent wastage and unnecessary expense, the city finds
certain strong grounds upon which to base its argument. Note, however, that none is as close to the specific point of re-use of sewage
water as is the Pulaski case. 9
When an appropriator has actually diverted water from a stream
under his priority, the water he has taken is (as against would-be
appropriators thereof) no longer a right but a possession, not an
interest in real estate as it had been, but personal property."
Water once lawfully in an appropriator's possession may, in
the absence of an intent to abandon, be prevented from escaping,
or may be recaptured while escaping, and such waters are not the
subject of appropriation,5' and this even though there has been ac49 70 Colo. 565, 203 Pac. 681 (1922), supra note 20 and accompanying text.
50

1

Tongue Creek Orchard Co. v. Town of Orchard City, 131 Colo. 177, 183, 280 P.2d
426, 428-29 (1955)
(by implication) Brighton Ditch Co. v. City of Englewood,
124 Colo. 366, 373, 237 P.2d 116, 120 (1951); Madison v. McNeal, 171 Wash.
669, 674, 19 P.2d 97, 98 (1933); Riggs Oil Co. v. Gray, 46 Wyo. 504, 512-13, 30
P.2d 145, 147 (1934); 2 KINNEY, IRRIGATION AND WATER RIGHTS, § 661 at 1153,
§ 773 at 1340 (2d ed. 1912); 1 WIEL, WATER RIGHTS IN THE WESTERN STATES,
§ 35 at 33 '(3rd ed. 1911). See Knapp v. Water Dist., 131 Colo. 42, 52-53, 279 P.2d
420 (1955).

' McKelvey v. North Sterling Irr. Dist., 66 Colo. 11, 14-15, 179 Pac. 872, 874 (1919)
Colthorp v. Mountain Home Irr. Dist., 66 Idaho 172, 182, 157 P.2d 1005, 1007
1945) (though upwards of 75% of the water decreed to the upper ranch had
wasted, following irrigation, into the creek and had been made use of for 40 years
by the complaining lower ranch, the upper could not be required to continue the
waste of water, nor prevented from recapturing it on its land for a beneficial use) ;
Cleaver v. Judd, 393 P.2d 193, 195 (Ore. 1964) (an irrigation district as a municipal corporate entity is regarded as an owner for the purpose of the principle that
an owner may recapture waste and seepage water before it leaves his land) ; Barker
v. Sonner, 135 Ore. 75, 79, 294 Pac. 1053, 1054 (1931) (waste water is not waste
water so long as it remains upon the land of the original appropriator) ; McNaughton v. Eaton, 121 Utah 394, 404, 242 P.2d 570, 574 (1952) (as long as original
appropriator has possession and control, he may recapture and use the waters for
further beneficial uses) ; Lasson v. Sealey, 120 Utah 679, 687-89, 238 P.2d 418, 42122 (1951) (even built a check-dam, under statutory limitations). And see Trelease,
Reclamation Water Rights, 32 ROCKY MT. L. REv. 464, 470-72 (1960); Breitenstein,
Some Elements of Colorado Water Law, 22 RoCKY MT. L. REV. 343, 350-51 (1950).
Care must be taken, however, to distinguish such as the MKelvey case, supra, in
which water broke through its ditch and ran down a dry draw, from the well known
Colorado rule that water which percolates underground from a reservoir or ditch,
and would naturally reach the stream if not interfered with, is considered a part of
the stream, not subject to retaking under the appropriation which first captured it.
E.g., Fort Morgan Reservoir & Irr. Co. v. McCune, 71 Colo. 256, 261, 206 Pac. 393,
395 (1922); Rio Grande Reservoir & Ditch Co. v. Wagon Wheel Gap Improvement Co., 68 Colo. 437, 443-44, 191 Pac. 129, 130-31 (1920) ; Trowell Land & Irr.
Co. v. Bijou Irr. Dist., 65 Colo. 202, 214, 176 Pac. 292, 296 (1918); Comstock v.
Ramsay, 55 Colo. 244, 255-56, 133 Pac. 1107, 1111 (1913).
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quiescence in another's use of the waste water.5" There is expansive
language that an appropriator, after his right as a ditch supplier has
ripened, if there has been no abandonment since the decree of appropriation, may apply the water to other land than that upon which
the first application was made, or sell it to others who may apply
it to other lands; the water decreed for irrigation is not confined to
the land upon which such a right ripened, and may be applied to
new or additional lands without putting the appropriation to a
double use or duty.53
Among the cases-predominantly agricultural as they are, but
upon which reliance must be made for judicial guidelines-those involving foreign waste waters are noticeably rare. There are, though,
at least three Colorado cases concentrating on such waters: San Luis
Valley Irr. Dist. v. Prairie Ditch Co. and Rio Grande Drainage
Dist.," Coryell v. Robinson,5 and Brighton Ditch Co. v. City of Englewood." In San Luis Valley one defendant, Rio Grande Drainage
District, constructed a drainage canal which discharged its waste
water across a watershed into the Rio Grande River; the other defendant, Prairie Ditch Company, which had not participated in the
construction of the drainage canal, tapped the canal sometime later
and then procured a decree of No. 1 priority to forty second-feet
therefrom, upon the district court's finding that but for the drainage
canal the water would never have entered the Rio Grande River-i.e.,
the canal was discharging foreign water into the river. An attack by
the San Luis Valley Irrigation District against the Prairie Ditch
appropriation was rejected. The supreme court affirmed, holding
that since the water was not a part of the river and never could constitute a source of supply thereto, the claimants in the river could
not complain that a new taker (Prairie Ditch) had injured them with
its diversion.57 The implication is clear that such outside waters are
52Burkart v. Meiberg, 37 Colo. 187, 190, 86 Pac. 98, 99 (1906) (surface overflow
from irrigated lands onto claimant's land was suddenly, and validly, cut off by the
appropriator, who caught the water in a ditch on his side of the property line);
Fairplay Hydraulic Mining Co. v. Weston, 29 Colo. 125, 128, 67 Pac. 160, 161
(1901) (mining company which permitted irrigator to enter and divert placer waste
from the company's flume was under no obligation to maintain either a flow clean
enough for irrigation or the flow itself).
53 New-Brantner Extension Ditch Co. v. Kramer, 66 Colo. 429, 436-37, 182 Pac. 17, 20
(1919). The language of this case seems deceptively and contrarily broad. It was
uttered with reference to a mutual ditch with numerous owners who at times used only
part of their irrigation water-or none at all. The court decided, then, that such unused
water may flow down to others on the ditch, permitting the irrigation of a larger
number of acres than that upon which the right ripened, without putting the water
to a double duty. The court has not examined the holding since.
54 84 Colo. 99, 268 Pac. 533 (1928).
55 118 Colo. 225, 194 P.2d 342 (1948).
56 124 Colo. 366, 237 P.2d 116 (1951).
57 84 Colo. at 106, 268 Pac. at 535.
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introduced independently of the local watershed and its appropriators and are subject to recapture and, if abandoned, appropriation
by the first taker (in this case, Prairie Ditch).
But in Coryell v. Robinson twenty years later (1948) the court
apparently flew in the face of the implied authority of San Luis
Valley by deciding that the first taker was qualified to do so only
if he had contributed the new water by his own efforts. Again, the
diversion was transwatershed, although remaining in the same general basin (Gunnison River). An irrigator, Coryell, had purchased
with the tract the right to take five-eighths of the waste water from
the remaining lands of his grantor, who apparently was one McKinnon. Coryell constructed three ditches on McKinnon Draw, which
was so situated that water would move there by seepage or surface
flow before moving down to other courses and on into the river.
Later, water was imported into the watershed by others via the Cedar
Mesa Ditch, which ran near McKinnon Draw and gave off waste
and seepage. The waste and seepage were caught by Coryell's ditches
and so prevented from running down to the lower appropriators.
In a subsequent general water adjudication of the district, Coryell
was awarded only .75 second-feet to his ditches, a right apparently
far below the waste he was catching, and junior in time to those
below him. He never appealed the decree, and continued to take
the waste. Finally the seniors below complained, the water commissioner ruptured the ditches several times, and Coryell attempted to
enjoin them all and quiet his title. His action was defeated, and although the supreme court affirmed, relying heavily on both the
San Luis Valley case and a 1914 case, Ironstone Ditch Co. v. Ashenfelter,58 it announced a rule contrary in effect to San Luis Valley, viz.
that any prior and independent right to foreign water lay only in
the person who had by his own labor and efforts contributed it to
the normal flow of the watershed and hence, in absence of such effort on his part, Coryell the junior must defer to his seniors below
under the regular order of appropriative right:
In both of the cases [referring to San Luis Valley and Ironstone
Ditch], the successful litigants had, by their own efforts, lawfully
contributed water to the stream or stream basin which otherwise
would not have reached it . . . . In the instant case, plaintiff
[Coryell] has not by his own labor or efforts contributed extraneous
water to the normal flow of the watershed ....

The water would

appear to belong to the watershed, to be distributed with other
waters in the watershed according to the decreed-priorities. 9
58 57

Colo. 31, 140 Pac. 177 (1914).

59 Coryell v. Robinson, 118 Colo. at 233-34, 194 P.2d at 346. (Emphasis the court's.)
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Yet in San Luis Valley, the "successful litigant," Prairie Ditch Company, had not worked to import the waste water. It had merely
tapped on and later secured a No. 1 priority to forty second-feet
therefrom. On its face, then, Coryell may seem to stand as potentially
a persuasive support of the city which today asserts a preference in
recapturing and re-using its imported water, for it fits the description
"own efforts ... contributed ... extraneous water." But it has been
severely criticized as poorly reasoned and as misstating the facts and
misapplying the holding of San Luis Valley, and as causing a "tangled web of uncertainty" as to whether a transwatershed appropriator
really can recapture his water.6
As to the other case, Ironstone Ditch Co. v. Ashenfelter,6 ' which
the court coupled with San Luis Valley to turn away Mr. Coryell:
the water involved was apparently local, but trapped and immobile in
marshes not far from the stream. Certain appropriators, Numbers 2
and 3 (as their priorities and ditches were designated by the courts)
became frustrated by the ungovernable pirating of their water by juniors upstream (the juniors even ambushed some of the headgate
patrolmen and threw them into the river) and by vast and irremediable seepage into sand bars long before the remaining water reached
their headgates. So Numbers 2 and 3 went across, and down, the
river and ditched the seepage and waste water from the marshes upstream for a mile, dumped it into the river just above their headgates,
found it adequate for their needs, and then sold their 2 and 3 priorities to a canal miles upstream from everybody. The change of point
of diversion of these priorities was approved in the court below. The
supreme court affirmed, rejecting the protestants' theory that some
seepage from the canal would get down to 2 and 3 and thus set up
a double use of the priorities. More important, the court held that
the feeder ditch of Numbers 2 and 3-the one from the marsheswas carrying water by an independent right, separate from their
original decree and developed since its adjudication. The court first
reiterated the basic rule that an appropriation right depends in no
way upon the place of its application and that the point of diversion,
the conduit, the place of application, and character of use may each
and all be changed.2
Then came the statement to which the Coryell court later turned.
Attention is called particularly to note 63 infra, following the quota60 Martz, Seepage Rights in Foreign Waters, 22 ROCKY MT. L. REv. 407, 409 (1950).
81 57 Colo. 31, 140 Pac. 177 (1914).
62 Id., 57 Colo. at 39, 40, 140 Pac. at 180.
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tion, explaining the stigma of "dictum" which lay upon that statement until the Coryell court coupled it with San Luis Valley as
authority. The statement in Ironstone Ditch Co.:
It must not be forgotten that No. 3 consumers constructed at
their own labor and expense the Feeder ditch by which the seepage
water . . . doing no one any good, was conveyed a mile up the
river .... This was an independent appropriation from extraneous
sources . . . . If, by their efforts, they lawfully contributed water
to the stream, which otherwise would not have reached it . . . it

was theirs, independent of the original adjudication decree, and
because, by their labor, they contributed extraneous water to the
normal flow is no reason why they may not sell
their priorities, and
63
irrigate their land with the independent water.

The recapturing city would point to this paragraph as designating
its foreign appropriation not subject to past decrees of the local
appropriators who claim rights to receive the full discharge. It points
to the strong language regarding efforts to contribute extraneous
water as implying exclusivity of control by him who labors for and
secures that water.
Thus, from Ironstone Ditch Co. and Coryell (even with the
infirmities of both) the city could logically contend today that he
who by his labors and expense procures water not otherwise avail63 Id., 57 Colo. at 42-43, 140 Pac. at 181. Here let it be pointed out that the Coryell
court, choosing Ironstone Ditch Co. as an authority for giving preference to a developer of extraneous water and holding such water to be an independent supply,
implicitly abandoned a decision in 1920 which had labelled as dictum part of the
Ironstone Ditch Co. opinion, and which, although not specifying the part, seemed
to mean that part just quoted in the text, supra. The 1920 case was Rio Grande
Reservoir & Ditch Co. v. Wagon Wheel Gap Improvement Co., 68 Colo. 437, 191
Pac. 120 (1920), which reiterated the rule that seepage which escapes from a reservoir and percolates toward the stream is now again part thereof and cannot be reappropriated by the reservoir which held it. In the case, the reservoir company, contending that it could recapture its seepage, relied on Ironstone Ditch Co. v. Ashenfelter, apparently contending that recapturing its seepage was merely capturing waste
extraneous water. That this was probably the reservoir company's theory is indicated
in the dissent by Garrigues, J. Justice Garrigues (who wrote the Ironstone Ditch Co.
opinion) said, 68 Colo. at 445, 191 Pac. at 132, that he thought that the disputed
water was extraneous to the natural or regular flow of the stream, and later cited
the syllabus of Ironstone Ditch Co. as stating that "seepage water which is being
wasted is the subject of appropriation." At any rate, the opinion of Rio Grande
Reservoir said, 68 Colo. at 444, 191 Pac. 131, that
That part of the opinion in Ironstone Ditch Co. v. Ashenfelter . . . quoted
by the plaintiff in error . . . is purely gratuitous and volunteer matter, and
not responsive to any issue in that case ....
The proceedings there brought
were to change the point of diversion of certain appropriations, and the
only question for decision was whether the proposed change would injuriously affect vested rights to the use of water from that stream. The dictum
. . . relied upon . . . can be considered only as the individual opinion of a
single justice of this court, and of course, while persuasive, can in no sense
be held to be the opinion of this court ....
But now, a generation later, Coryell calls upon that portion of Ironstone Ditch Co.
as authority, and ignores the Rio Grande Reservoir opinion. Clarification must come,
to determine whether the Coryell court was, indeed, intent on making new law. It is
this last possibility which has cast a pall of uncertainty about Coryell.
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able for use in the watershed has a right to its use independent of
others."
These irrigation cases are cited and discussed because of the
working rules which have emerged. These rules, if applicable also
to a municipal entity, may well be weapons of attack for the city,
and seemingly the best available, for they extend preference and
more than a shadow of license to the one responsible for artifically
developed water. The importing city seeks to fit itself into the law's
formula: "artificially developed" water is that produced which
would not otherwise naturally have reached the stream."
In Brighton Ditch Co. v. City of Englewood66 the city moved
to change its point of diversion and the character of use from irrigation to domestic and municipal purposes, thus to effect a radical
decrease in the city's purchase of water from Denver. Downstream
appropriators protested that this would reduce their amount of
waste water because Denver would import less water from the western slope. The supreme court rejected that protest, holding that appropriators on a stream have no vested right to a continuance of importation of foreign water which another has brought into the watershed.67 The same applies to local water: there is no obligation upon
an owner to continue to maintain conditions so as to supply water
to appropriators of waste water at any time or in any quantity, when
Cf. Leadville Mine Dev. Co. v. Anderson, 91 Colo. 536, 17 P.2d 303 (1932)
(Where a person by his own efforts has increased the flow of water in a natural
stream, he is entitled to the use of the water to the extent of the increase, but he
must prove that it was produced and contributed by him and that it would not
otherwise have reached the stream) Comrie v. Sweet, 75 Colo. 199, 225 Pac. 214
(1924); Bieser v. Stoddard, 73 Colo. 554, 216 Pac. 707 (1923). See also Platte
Valley Irr. Co. v. Buckers Irr., Milling & Improvement Co., 25 Colo. 77, 82, 53
Pac. 334, 336 (1898) (dictum) ; Miller v. Wheeler, 54 Wash. 429, 103 Pac. 641,
642-43 (1909).
Could the city even argue that it could sell all its other rights and use the
developed water for its own needs? This raises the apprehension, it may be recalled,
that was uttered by the trial court in Denver v. Sheriff, supra note 36, that Denver
was "going into the business of selling water or disposing of a part or all of her
present water rights and substituting the water acquired" for her present water
supply. 105 Colo. at 201, 96 P.2d at 840-41. The apprehension seems much slighter
now, negated by the city's effort to re-use what it has at present.
6
5 Dalpez v. Nix, 96 Colo. 540, 544, 45 P.2d 176, 178 (1935) ; Comrie v. Sweet, supra
note 64. Cf. West Side Ditch Co. v. Bennett, 106 Mont. 422, 433, 78 P.2d 78, 81
(1938) (the theory of a development of a new water supply contemplates the increase of a stream occasioned through the exertion of man directed to that end, and
does not contemplate accessions to the stream through the process of nature, as by
percolating waters); Spaulding v. Stone, 46 Mont. 483, 488, 129 Pac. 327, 329
(1912) (exclusive use for any purpose of a new supply of water developed or
collected from lands forming no part of the source of the flow).
66 124 Colo. 366, 237 P.2d 116 (1951).
64

67

124 Colo. at 377, 237 P.2d at 122. The court cited in support the broadly-worded
California case, Stevens v. Oakdale Irr. Dist., 13 Cal.2d 343, 90 P.2d 58 (1939),
which is discussed below (note 72 and accompanying text).
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acting in good faith. 8 Or if a senior appropriator by a different
method of irrigation can so utilize his water that it is all consumed
in transportation and consumptive use and no waste water returns,
no appropriator can complain." A claimant to waste waters acquires
a temporary right only to whatever water escapes which cannot find
its way back to the source of supply. No permanent right can be acquired to have discharge of waste water continued-not by appropriation or prescription or estoppel or acquiescence.7" No action therefore will lie for the diversion (i.e., cessation) of an artificial watercourse where from the nature of the case it is obvious that the enjoyment of it depends upon temporary circumstances and is not of a
permanent character. 7' This logically leads, the importing city would
contend, to the conclusion that he who has no right cannot be injured by him who does have the right. A loss of a luxury-viz., a
windfall or bonus-type of increased flow-which has been forthcoming merely from convenience, arose from exactly that: convenience.
E.g., Tongue Creek Orchard Co. v. Town of Orchard City, 131 Colo. 177, 181, 280
P.2d 426, 428 (1955); Green Valley Ditch Co. v. Schneider, 50 Colo. 606, 610,
115 Pac. 705, 706 (1911) (and conversely, the ditch owner cannot maliciously divert the water away to vacant lands); Burkart v. Meiberg, 37 Colo. 187, 190, 86
Pac. 98, 99 (1906); Mabee v. Platte Land Co., 17 Colo. App. 476, 479, 68 Pac.
1058, 1059 (1902) ; Fairplay Hydraulic Mining Co. v. Weston, 29 Colo. 125, 128,
67 Pac. 160, 161 (1901); Twin Falls Co. v. Damman, 277 Fed. 331 (S.D. Idaho
1920); Wedgworth v. Wedgworth, 20 Ariz. 518, 523, 181 Pac. 952, 954 (1919);
Joerger v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 207 Cal. 8, 34, 276 Pac. 1017, 1029 (1929);
Application of Boyer, 73 Idaho 152, 162, 248 P.2d 540, 546 (1952); Meine v.
Ferris, 126 Mont. 210, 217, 247 P.2d 195, 198 (1952) (by implication) ; Hagerman
Irr. Co. v. East Grand Plains Drainage Dist., 25 N.M. 649, 656, 187 Pac. 555, 558
(1920) ; Tyler v. Obiaque, 95 Ore. 57, 61, 186 Pac. 579, 581 (1920); Garns v.
Rollins, 41 Utah 260, 272, 125 Pac. 867, 872 (1912) ; Binning v. Miller, 55 Wyo.
451, 469, 102 P.2d 54, 59-60 (1940).
69
Bower v. Big Horn Canal Ass'n, 77 Wyo. 80, 101, 307 P.2d 593, 601 (1957).
702 KINNEY, IRRIGATION AND WATER RIGHTS, § 661 at 1151 (2d ed. 1912); Ryan
v. Gallio, 52 Nev. 330, 345, 286 Pac. 963, 967 (1930).
True, artificial flow claimants may, by taking the abandoned waste water, have
priority among themselves, but they can have no right of continuance against the
owner of the natural supply, except by grant, condemnation or dedication. 1 WIEL,
WATER RIGHTS IN THE WESTERN STATES, § 56 at 50 (3d ed. 1911). That the sale of
water by a city to outside users is no "dedication" to a public use without the intention thereof by the seller, see City of Englewood v. City and County of Denver,
123 Colo. 290, 299, 229 P.2d 667, 672 (1951), and cases cited.
71 1 WIEL, op. cit. supra note 70, § 57 at 55.
COLO. REV. STAT. § 148-2-2 (1963) provides:
Priority of right to spring water.-All ditches constructed for the purpose of utilizing the waste, seepage or spring waters of the state, shall be
governed by the same law relating to priority of right as those ditches constructed for the purpose of utilizing the water of running streams; provided
that the person upon whose lands the seepage or spring waters first arise,
shall have the prior right to such waters if capable of being used upon
his lands.
This prior right to "waste, seepage, or spring waters," redounds to the benefit of
the importing city under the restrictive interpretation applied to the statute in 1929
when, in substantially the same wording and known as Colo. Laws 1921, § 1637,
it was held to apply only to non-tributary waters, i.e., waters that do not "belong
to the stream." Nevius v. Smith, 86 Colo. 178, 181, 279 Pac. 44, 45-46 (1929).
68
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And the city which now chooses to exercise its right unto itself is acting within the only right in sight, its own.
The type of broad holding supporting the right which the Colorado city now contemplates, to recapture and re-use its foreign supply was made by the Supreme Court of California in an irrigation
case, Stevens v. Oakdale Irrigation District.72 The land of the complaining waste-taker was located on a creek below the boundary of
the defendant District. From about 1912 the District imported foreign water, the waste and percolation of which considerably increased the creek's volume. The complainant took it from the creek
and used it without interruption for about twenty-two years. Then
the District began to recapture the waste by diverting it frcm the
creek within its (the District's) boundaries. At the trial the complainant prevailed. The Supreme Court of California reversed. The
court set forth the issue in this way:
Stating the question another way, where the producer of an
artificial flow does not decrease it at the source, but after importing

it, acts upon it a second time while it is still within his land and
before it leaves his control, . . . may lower appropriators assert a
right to enjoin any decrease in the volume of abandoned water ?

The court answered in the negative. It explained first that transwatershed diversions reduced to possession are private property during
the period of possession, and that when the actual water, or corpus,
has been relinquished or discharged without intent to recapture, the
property in it ceases; but such abandonment is not abandonment of
a water right, but merely abandonment of the specific portions of
water, i.e., the very particles which are discharged or have escaped
from control; and the past abandonment by the importer of certain
water, as distinguished from a water right, does not confer any right
to the complainant to compel a like abandonment in the future or to
control the District's use upon its own land of such water as it imports-and this, despite the fact that the complainant built diversion
works in reliance upon the continued volume. In the process of
growth, the court said, the District, which cannot perfect its system
"in a day," discharges a large volume of arificial flow over a long
period of formative years, but that should not constitute an abandonment of the right to such waters.7"
In elaborating the breadth of its opinion, the court cited with
13 CaM.2d 343, 90 P.2d 58 (1939).
7I3., 13 Cal.2d at 350, 90 P.2d at 61.
71 Id., 13 Cal.2d at 351, 90 P.2d at 61-62.
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5 an irrigation case in which recapapproval United States v. Haga,7
ture of seepage and percolation beyond the boundaries of origin was
permitted where it was contemplated in advance, and then concluded:

[A]s a general proposition, an irrigation district, after importing water from one river, passing it through irrigation works, and
discharging it into a natural creek bed in the second watershed,
may change the flow of water imported or the volume of water
discharged from its works into the second stream, or stop the flow
entirely, so long as this is done above the point where the water
leaves the works of the district or the boundaries of its land. An
exception to the rule is not created by the fact that the district may
act upon the water a second time while in its possession, by retaking
6
it at a point of drainage for further beneficial application.

By analogous application of such reasoning as appears in
Stevens, and with existing mechanical statutory power," the city
would seem to present a plausible argument for right to recapture
from its sewage works for subsequent recirculation for municipal
uses, including irrigation of parks and golf courses and out-of-boun-

daries supply (whether by exchange measurement or directly) to suburban water companies, manufacturers, military installations, private
One who by the expenditure of money and labor diverts appropriable water
from a stream, and thus makes it available for fruitful purposes, is entitled
to its exclusive control so long as he is able and willing to apply it to
beneficial uses .... It is requisite, of course, that he be able to identify it;
but subject to that limitation, he may conduct it through natural channels
and may even commingle it or suffer it to commingle with other waters.
United States v. Haga, 276 Fed. 41, 43-44 (S.D. Idaho 1921).
There may well be small comfort, however, to the Colorado appropriator in this
holding, for aside from the contingency that the recapture is contemplated in advance, Colorado authority has long since held that seepage and percolation cannot
be recaptured outside their source once they begin the movement toward a natural
tributary. E.g., Fort Morgan Reservoir & Irr. Co. v. McCune, 71 Colo. 256, 261,
206 Pac. 393, 395 (1922) ; Rio Grande Reservoir & Ditch Co. v. Wagon Wheel Gap
Improvement Co., 68 Colo. 437, 443-44, 191 Pac. 129, 130-31 (1920).
76 Stevens v. Oakdale Irr. Dist., 13 Cal.2d 343, 352, 90 P.2d 58, 62-63 '(1939). The
Stevens rule was applied in a municipal case, Los Angeles v. Glendale, 23 Cal.2d
68, 77-78, 142 P.2d 289, 295 (1943), in which the City of Los Angeles was held
to retain its right to the use of its foreign water even though some was sold, en
route, to irrigators and, as foreseen at the time of sale, percolated after use by the
latter into the city's underground reservoir and abided there ready for city use. Speculation in California now turns to whether or not recapture may be made of ground
(seepage) water which was origially foreign water imported and put to use by the
Bureau of Reclamation Project which now contemplates recapture. Comment,
Recapture of Reclamation Project Ground Water, 53 CALIF. L. REV. 541 (1965).
77
COLO. REV. STAT. § 139-32-1 (1963).
Powers of governing bodies.-The governing bodies in cities and towns
shall have the following powers: ...
(38)
To construct public wells, cisterns and reservoirs in the streets and
other public and private places within the city or town, or beyond the limits
thereof, for the purpose of supplying the same with water; to provide
proper pumps and conducting pipers or ditches; to regulate the distribution
of water for irrigating and other purposes, and to levy an equitable and
just tax upon all consumers of water for the purpose of defraying the expense of such improvements . . ..
(39)
To supply water from their water systems to consumers outside of the
corporate limits of the cities and towns; and to collect therefor such charges
and upon such conditions and limitations as said towns and cities may impose by ordinance.
75
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clubs, etc., which are now or will be linked to the metropolitan water
system.78
The city is not without its burden in this. It may indeed show
itself as one recapturing or holding captive its foreign water within
its works or boundaries, and so not within reach of the established
Colorado rule that diverted or stored water which is allowed to seep
off and move toward a stream becomes a part of it, free from the
appropriation which first took it. 9 Yet there stands such a principle
as holds in California, that one may not compel another to purchase,
or pay for taking, the former's unneeded surplus water.8" The city
may show that Colorado holds that a city, in operating a waterworks
system, acts in its proprietory or business capacity and when a surplus of the material (water) distributed is acquired it may be sold
to consumers without the city,8' but the city may face disallowance
from deliberately producing a surplus merely for profitable outside
dealing. Court decrees of water rights can be, and are, aimed at
preventing an appropriator's right from developing-wilfully or
not-into a real abuse of a public resource in short supply.82
78 As to the possibilities of discharging the treated water into the natural streams,
just as heretofore, but now with a contract to furnish to the users below (and with
express intent not to abandon), that is potentially a source of complaint by those
downstream who have enjoyed the increase to the stream gratis for years. Those
who would contract to purchase from the city and take delivery by means of a natural
stream must, inevitably, include junior appropriators or even those with no appropriation at all. Indeed, would they not be the first customers in line? They would be
anxious to purchase, and would expect the seniors to stand still and permit the measured "contract water" to pass by. And the seniors-they could never rest well in
any aloof assumption that the city could not store or itself re-use all that treated
sewage water and would have to discharge it. Such an assumption would be unrealistic, for the city would (a) in its performance of its constitutional duty restrain
its own intake of foreign water to its current needs and beneficial use, regardless
of the excess available to it by appropriation right, and (b) with the passage of
years and continued growth of both quantity and variety of demand, apply more
and more of the treated water to its own uses in its own system, eventually reaching capacity-i.e., its volume of consumptive water use would equal the potential
supply, thus consuming totally the treated foreign water which formerly was discharged.
78
E.g., Fort Morgan Reservoir & Irr. Co. v. McCune, 71 Colo. 256, 261, 206 Pac.
393, 395 (1922); Rio Grande Reservoir & Ditch Co. v. Wagon Wheel Gap Improvement Co., 68 Colo. 437, 443-44, 191 Pac. 129, 130-31 (1920) ; Comstock v. Ramsay,
55 Colo. 244, 255-56, 133 Pac. 1107, 1111 (1913).
80
Stevinson Water Dist. v. Roduner, 36 Cal.2d 264, 270-71, 223 P.2d 209, 213 (1950),
supra note 29.
81 Larimer County v. City of Fort Collins, 68 Colo. 364, 367, 189 Pac. 929, 930 (1920),
in which the court considered and upheld as not ultra vires, the city's contract to
reimburse construction costs of extension of its water line beyond the corporate limits.
And see 1 WIEL, WATER RIGHTS IN THE WESTERN STATES, §§ 37, 38 at 36-38
(3d ed. 1911).
82 E.g., The final (consent) decree of the United States District Court, District of
Colorado, in United States v. Northern Colo. Water Conservancy Dist., Civil
Nos. 2782 (incorporating Nos. 5016, 5017), Oct. 12, 1955, applying to numerous
rights and containing careful stipulations as to duty of use and ability to draw pro
tanto upon both transmountain and other sources; Denver v. Sheriff, 105 Colo. 193,
210, 96 P.2d 836, 844 (1939), in which the state supreme court agreed that from
the facts in that particular case, there was no basis upon which the trial court could
have awarded the city an appropriation based on beneficial use for irrigation purposes outside of the Denver Municipal Water System area.
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CONCLUSION

It seems possible and reasonable that a resolution of the questions here presented may emerge from a certain fundament of all
the cases, of all law- duty. There is a duty unmistakable in all
the circumstances considered. It is duty to preserve and not to destroy,
to use and not to abuse. It is, in a more familiar term, a duty not to
waste.
There may be no waste of water.83 The law requires economical
8
use. " The duty not to commit "waste" is imposed upon all users,
i.e., not to use "needlessly or without valuable result; [nor] to employ prodigally or without any considerable return or effect, [nor] to
use without serving a purpose.- 85 Appropriators owe a duty so to
use water as to effect the highest duty reasonably possible.86 The
appropriator must exercise that reasonable degree of care to prevent
waste, and use without excessive waste should be made even though
expense is incurred in constructing facilities therefor." In the arid
states the conservation of water is of the utmost importance to the
public welfare; to waste water is to injure that public welfare.88 So
it would seem that an appropriator should be "commended for recapturing water that has already been used by himself and applying
it again in a beneficial manner.""
The essence of the city's contention would be that in holding
what is properly taken, carefully extracting maximum benefit of use,
and prudently protecting what is already built, and is planned for
the future - what is that but the very definition of duty to preserve
and use a resource which is not constant in amount o and in all events
83

Combs v. Agricultural Ditch Co., 17 Colo. 146, 153-54, 28 Pac. 966, 968 (1892).

8E.g., Town of Sterling v. Pawnee Ditch Extension Co., 42 Colo. 421, 430, 94 Pac.
339, 341, 15 L.R.A. (N.S.) 238 (1908); New Mercer Ditch Co. v. Armstrong, 21
Colo. 357, 366, 40 Pac. 989, 992 (1895).
85 Meridian, Ltd. v. City and County of San Francisco, 13 Cal.2d 424, 447, 90 P.2d 537,
548 (1939), quoting Webster's New International Dictionary (2d ed. 1934).
8
6Joerger v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 207 Cal. 8, 22, 276 Pac. 1017, 1024 (1929);
Tudor v. Jaca, 178 Ore. 126, 141, 164 P.2d 680, 686, reh. denied, 178 Ore. 176, 165
P.2d 770 (1946).
87
Broughton v. Stricklin, 146 Ore. 259, 275, 28 P.2d 219, 224 (1933), reh. denied,
146 Ore. 259, 30 P.2d 332 (1934).
88 Brian v. Fremont Irr. Co., 112 Utah 220, 224-25, 186 P.2d 588, 590 (1947).
89

Barker v. Sonner, 135 Ore. 75, 79, 294 Pac. 1053, 1054 (1931).
90 The maximum flow of the rivers of Colorado has varied significantly and repeatedly.
E.g., the Colorado River, largest of all (and which yields about 69% of the state's
total supply), has been so erratic as to range from 146% of average in the highwater year of 1907 to only 50% of average in the drought year of 1934. As measured
at Glenwood Springs, before the river collects the major part of its tributary inflow,
the average discharge for the 31-year period 1900-30 (2.31 million acre-feet) was
some 37% higher than for the succeeding 33-year period 1931-63 (1.82 million acrefeet). On the eastern slope, the Arkansas River, measured at Canon City, has declined
in average a full one million acre-feet in the priod 1925-63 (4.5 million acre-feet)
from the preceding period 1889-1924 (5.5 million acre-feet). REPORT OF THE
U.S.G.S. supra note 4, at 235-37, 247.
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declines proportionately to the growth of population and industry.
The idea of re-use is itself far from revolutionary.
The reclamation of sewage and waste waters is not as unconventional as it first appears. .

.

. In 1953 reclaimed waters were used

for irrigation at 106 places and for recharge of ground water at
112 places, all in California. There were also 118 places in the
United States where such waters were used for industrial purposes. . ... 1

It seems also that the city which seeks to recapture and re-use
its treated water is suggesting no radical invasion of legal and economic principles of either the state or the Republic. Consider: the
proposal involves originally developed or purchased, perfected water
rights of precise amount and strict supervision; there is nothing that
smacks of invasion by expropriation or seizure. The act and method
of re-use seem, at the best, to find support by the reasoning of statutory and case law under article 16 §§ 5, 6 of the Colorado Constitution, and, at the worst, to be open to serious question only in the
extent and location of the re-use beyond the general metropolitan
area and its water system. And of further importance, there appears
to be no just standing of those below the city to protest the diminution of a discharge of foreign water.2 Standing lies, in the law,
with those who assert rights not in the waste but in the source of the
water - those across the mountains who take from the same source
as the city. Where these latter are protected in thir rights, an actionable protest does not arise from the circumstances herein contemplated.
William K. Hickey
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HIRSHLIEFER, DEHAVEN & MILLIMAN, WATER SUPPLY: ECONOMICS, TECHNOLOGY
AND POLICY 324 n. 87 (1960). See also MCCARTHY, Research and Development for
Re-Use of Water, WESTERN RESOURCES CONFERENCE 1963 at 55 (Univ. of Colo.
Press, Boulder 1964). Industrial re-use of water which had previously been used
for municipal purposes has long been practiced in the United States. See Cannon,

Industrial Re-Use of Water: An Opportunity for The West. WESTERN RESOURCES
CONFERENCE 1963 at 69.
92 See Martz, Seepage Rights in Foreign Waters, 22 ROCKY MT. L. REV. 407, 416-17
(1950).

One Year Review of Colorado Law -1964
I. CIVIL PROCEDURE

A.

RIGHT

To

JURY TRIAL FOR LEGAL COUNTERCLAIM AGAINST

EQUITABLE CLAIM

In Miller v. District Court,' the Colorado Supreme Court bucked
the trend of federal and state court decisions regarding the right
to a jury trial in civil suits. In this case, the plaintiff alleged that
defendants had defaulted on a promissory note secured by a mortgage deed, and demanded foreclosure by sale of the mortgaged
property. Defendants answered by alleging fraud in the procurement of the note and mortgage and filed a counterclaim for the
alleged breach of contract involving the transaction in which the
note and mortgage were executed. Defendants demanded trial by
jury pursuant to Rule 38(b), Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure.'
Ten days prior to the trial, the defendants were informed by the
district court that it had granted the plaintiff's motion to strike the
case from the jury calendar and had ordered that the action be tried
by the court without a jury.
The defendants, petitioners in mandamus, contended that Rule
38(a) 3 established in them a right to trial by jury. The supreme
court affirmed the lower court's action. Referring to Rule 38(a),
the court, Moore, J., said:
This rule, in all material parts, adopts without change the

provisions of Rule 191 of the Code of Civil Procedure. This code
provision has been construed on numerous occasions by this court
prior to the adoption of Rule 38(a). The promulgation of the new
rule, the pertinent parts of which are in the exact language of the
pre-existing code, necessarily included the construction theretofore
given the language of the code provisions. The new rule of civil
procedure did not enlarge upon the right to the jury trial as those
rights were fixed by the code provision and the judicial pronouncements thereunder. No other rule of civil procedure enlarges 4 the
category of cases in which the right to jury trial shall be had.
The court cited several Colorado cases which interpreted the
code to mean that the determination of whether or not an issue of
fact must be tried by a jury was dependent upon the character of
1 Miller v. District Court, 388 P.2d 763 (Colo. 1964).

2 Rule 38(b) provides: "Any party may demand a trial by jury of any issue triable by
a jury by serving upon the other parties a demand therefor in writing at any time
after the commencement of the action and not later than 10 days after the service of
the last pleading directed to such issue. Such demand may be indorsed upon a pleading of the party."
3 Rule 38(a) provides: "Upon demand, in actions for the recovery of specific real or
personal property, with or without damages, or for money claimed as due on contract,
or as damages for breach of contract, or for injuries to person or property, an issue
of fact must be tried by a jury, unless a jury trial is thereafter waived."
4 Miller v. District Court, 388 P.2d 763, 765 (Colo. 1964).
140
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the action in which the issue was joined.5 Here the mortgage
foreclosure, an equitable claim, was held to have invoked the equity
aim of the court and the character of the action thereby determined.
The effect of the court's interpretation of the code, and thus
of Rule 38(a), is disadvantageous to a defendant. If a defendant
interposes a counterclaim in an equitable action, as determined by
the plaintiff's claim, he waives any right to a jury trial he may
otherwise have had (in a separate action) on issues presented by
the counterclaim.' Generally, permissive counterclaims allowed by
Rule 13 (b) will not involve issues of fact raised by the basic claim,
so a separate trial of these claims may not create any disadvantage
other than the economics of litigation.7 As the petitioners argue
in their brief, to insure a right to a jury trial on the legal question
a premium is placed on the race to the court house to file the claim,
thereby permanently fixing the character of the action.
Compulsory counterclaims to an equitable claim present an
entirely different problem Federal Rule 13 (a) has been interpreted
to mean that a defendant must assert those counterclaims arising
from the same transaction or occurrence as the subject of the plaintiff's claim or relinquish them.9 One authority goes so far as to say
that a rule which attaches the consequences of a waiver to the interposition of a compulsory counterclaim would probably be unconstitutional."0
5

Tiger Placers Co. v. Fisher, 98 Colo. 221, 54 P.2d 891 (1936) ; Rosenbaum v. Buchhert, 73 Colo. 260, 215 Pac. 131 (1923) ; Plain Iron Works Co. v. Haggott, 72
Colo. 228, 210 Pac. 696 (1922) ; Neikirk v. Boulder National Bank, 53 Colo. 350.
127 Pac. 137 (1912) ; Selfridge v. Leonard-Heffner Co., 51 Colo. 314, 117 Pac. 158
(1911); Cree v. Lewis, 49 Colo. 186, 112 Pac. 326 (1910); United Coal Co. v.
[Canon City] Coal Co., 24 Colo. 116, 48 Pac. 1045 (1897); Danielson v. Gude,
11 Colo. 87, 17 Pac. 283 (1888).
6
James, Right to a jury Trial in Civil Actions, 72 YALE L.J. 655, 684 (1963).
7McCoid, jury Trials in Federal Courts, 45 IowA L. REV. 726, 736 (1960).
8 CoLo. R. Civ. P. 13 - Counterclaim and cross-claim
(a) Compulsory Counterclaims. A pleading shall state as a counterclaim any claim
at the time of filing the pleading the pleader has against any opposing party,
if it arises out of the transactionor occurrence that is the subject matter of the
opposing party's claim and does not require for its adjudication the presence
of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction, except that such
a claim need not be so stated if at the time the action was commenced the
claim was the subject of another pending action. (Emphasis added.)
(b) Permissive Counterclaims. A pleading may state as a counterclaim any claim
against an opposing party not arising out of the transaction or occurrence that
is the subject matter of opposing party's claim. (Emphasis added.)
9 Hancock Oil Co. v. Universal Oil Prod. Co., 115 F.2d 45 (9th Cir. 1940).
10 Supra note 6. James refers to Bendix Aviation Corp. v. Glass, 81 F. Supp. 645,
(E.D. Pa. 1948) where defendant filed a counterclaim for compensation against
plaintiff's action for specific performance of a contract. The court there said, at 646:
Under the old system of divided law and equity procedure a defendant in an
equity suit who had a cause of action at law against the plaintiff waived his
right to a jury trial if he pleaded it as a counterclaim against the plaintiff's
bill. However, Rule 13(a) now makes it compulsory for him to do so if his
claim arises out of the same transaction. Consequently there can be no question of this defendant's having waived jury trial by putting in his claim as
a counterclaim to an equitable action.

DENVER LAWVI CENTER JOURNAL

VOL. XLII

In Johnson v. Neel, the Colorado Supreme Court had apparently left the door to the implications of compulsory counterclaims
slightly ajar when it said:
In basing the determination of this question on grounds of
equitable estoppel, we are not unmindful of our opinion in Tiger
Placers Co. v. Fisher, 98 Colo. 221, 54 P.2d 891, 892, in which

we recognized the rule that the original complaint filed in an
action fixes "the nature of the suit and by what arm of the court
it should be tried," and whether either party is entitled to a jury

trial even though the cross complaint of the defendant presented
issues properly triable to a jury. That case, and others therein cited,
was determined under the code of civil procedure. Whether or not
the result would be the same under the Rules of Civil Procedure
which contains a provision relating to compulsory counterclaims
(Rule 13 [a]), we do not determine."

Apparently, the door has now been slammed shut. The court disposes of any impact Rule 13(a) may have on previous decisions by
holding that there are no material differences between the code and
Rule 13(a) on the subject of compulsory counterclaims. At least
not enough differences to justify abandonment of the rule on right to
jury trial announced in Neikirk v. Boulder NationalBank. 2
The federal courts have consistently followed the United States
Supreme Court's lead in Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover 3 and
hold that, since the promulgation of the provision for the merger
of legal and equitable actions," the filing of a counterclaim, or any
legal defense against an equitable claim does not constitute a waiver
of trial by jury on the legal questions. They hold that there are no
longer equity cases and legal cases. The legal issues, not the form
of the cases, are determinative of the method of trial. 6
Where before the promulgation of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure the federal courts may have held that a court sitting in
equity could retain jurisdiction even with regard to legal issues raised
in an equitable action, the present courts would reject this principle.
Relying upon Federal Rules 1, 2, and 18, the federal courts hold
that the same court may try both legal and equitable causes in the
same action. 7 Following Beacon, they hold that legal and equitable
issues can be tried at the same time, with the jury (if demanded)
1 123 Colo. 377, 388, 229 P.2d 939, 945 (1951).
1253 Colo. 350, 127 Pac. 137 (1912).
13 359 U.S. 500'(1959).
14 COLO. R. Civ. P. 1 and FED. R. Civ. P. 1.
15 De Pinto v. Provident Security Life Ins. Co., 323 F.2d 826 (9th Cir. 1963); Wirtz
v. Robert E. Bob Adair, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 750 (W.D. Ark. 1963) ; Bendix Aviation
Corp. v. Glass, 81 F. Supp. 645 (E.D. Pa. 1948).
16 Beaunit Mills, Inc. v. Eday Fabric Sales Corp., 124 F.2d 563 (2d Cir. 1942).
17De Pinto v. Provident Security Life Ins. Co., 323 F.2d 826 (9th Cir. 1963).
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rendering a verdict on the legal issues and the court rendering a decision on the equitable issues.18 The right to a jury trial on legal
issues, with a few exceptions not applicable here, will not be denied
to a defendant in federal court on the mere ground that the case
was originally presented to the court as an equitable action by the
plaintiff."9
Many states have followed the trend of the federal courts by
rejecting their previous holdings made under state codes prior to
the adoption of rules similar to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure."0 The Colorado court was given an opportunity to follow
the trend but refused.
The right to jury trial in civil actions has triggered considerable
comment and many solutions have been proposed.2' One common
criticism of the procedure required by the Colorado court's decision
in Miller- separate trials of the equitable claim and legal counterclaim if a jury trial is desired - is that a certain amount of evidence
may have to be repeated, therefore defeating one objective of the
merger provision of the rules: economy of litigation. In view of the
federal cases interpreting the federal rules, from which the Colorado
rules were promulgated, there appears to be no justifiable reason
for requiring the additional litigation.
B.

ORIGINAL JURISDICTION OF SUPREME COURT: PROHIBITION

In Colorado State Council of Carpenters v. District Court,22 the
court exercised its original jurisdiction under unique circumstances.
In an original proceeding by two labor unions and their presentatives, entitled Original Proceedings Under Rule 106(4) and Rule
116 in Nature of Prohibition, the court issued an absolute rule
vacating a distrit court's order for a temporary injunction against
picketing. Lack of jurisdiction in the district court was the basis
for the rule.
Briefly, the proceeding arose from the following facts: Peti18 Ibid.; Damsky v. Zavatt, 289 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1961).
19Thermostitch, Inc. v. Chemi-Cord Processing Corp., 294 F.2d 486 (5th Cir. 1961).
20
E.g. California in Hutchason v. Marks, 54 Cal. App.2d 113, 128 P.2d 573 (1942),
and Minnesota, which had earlier case law to the effect that the decisive test whether
an action is triable to the court or to a jury was determined by the complaint. In
Landgraf v. Ellsworth, 126 N.W.2d 766 (Minn. 1964), the Minnesota court held
that the nature and character of the action was determined from all the pleadings and
the right to jury trial was also so determined. The court refused to follow the old
doctrine, but stated that the more recent cases, which it followed, represented the
correct view of the law.
21 James, supra note 6; McCoid, supra note 7; Pike & Fischer, Pleadings and Jury Rights
in the New Federal Procedure, 88 U. PA. L. REv. 645 (1940) ; 59 COLUM. L. REv.
938 (1959).
2 392 P.2d 601 (Colo. 1964).
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tioners requested that the employer, a construction company building a water reservoir for the City of Fort Collins, sign a bargaining
agreement. When the employer refused, the petitioners caused
pickets to be placed near the entrance to the work project. The
picketing caused complete work stoppage when union members
honored the line and refused to cross. The employer sought an
injunction against the picketing in district court. Petitioners filed
no responsive pleadings to raise any issue of fact but merely appeared
at a hearing on the injunction and orally suggested to the trial judge
that there was grave doubt concerning the court's jurisdiction in
view of the provisions of the National Labor Relations Act. The
employer presented testimony to prove his allegations, whereas the
petitioners offered no testimony whatsoever.
In briefs submitted by counsel to the supreme court, the petitioners alleged that the evidence showed the employer was arguably
engaged in operations which affect commerce, thereby precluding
the district court's jurisdiction, and that the preliminary injunction
was a matter of great public importance because it deprived employees of their rights of self-organization, collective bargaining,
and concerted action. The employer, in a brief by his counsel, contended that the employer's operation did not affect commerce and
that the petitioner had another adequate remedy: writ of error.
The majority of the court, in vacating the district court's order
for a temporary injunction, relied upon Building Construction Trades
Council v. American Builders, Inc.,' in which it was held that the
state courts have no jurisdiction to enjoin peaceful picketing in the
absence of a showing that the National Labor Relations Board has
declined to accept jurisdiction over the controversy. Two recent
United States Supreme Court decisions"4 also were subscribed to as
the basis for the court's decision.
The propriety of granting the extraordinary remedy of prohibition seems to be questionable in this case. The general rule regarding a writ of prohibition is that ordinarily it will not issue where
there is another legally adequate remedy, or where the jurisdiction
of the lower court is debatable, or depends on facts de hors the
record."5 Colorado generally subscribes to the concept that prohi139 Colo. 236, 337 P.2d 953 (1959).
Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96 (1963) ; Local 438, Construction Union v. Curry, 371 U.S. 542 (1963).
2542 AM. JUR. Prohibition§ 5 (1942).
23

24
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bition is primarily a preventive or restraining remedy and is not a
corrective remedy which is the function of a writ of error.26
A showing that a court is proceeding without or in excess of
jurisdiction is not sufficient basis for granting a writ of prohibition;
either non-availability of any other adequate remedy, or irreparable
damage, or "matters of great public importance" must also be shown
before the writ is ordinarily granted.'
The court's decision here apparently was based solely upon the
lack of jurisdiction. Because there is no mention of questions concerning the propriety for issuance of the rule, it is difficult to determine what factors other than lack of jurisdiction existed. Was the
preliminary injunction a matter of great public importance? Was
the ordinary remedy of writ of error inadequate in this situation?
Or is the court saying that, as a matter of policy, prohibition will
lie any time a state court exercises jurisdiction and issues an injunction against picketing of an operation which arguably affects commerce?
In an interesting and critical dissent, Hall, J. raises some interesting points regarding the propriety of the original proceeding
and the court's review of the trial court proceeding. He candidly
states that the supreme court exceeded its jurisdiction by entertaining the matter as an original proceeding. He argues that the
26

27

City of Aurora v. Congregation Beth Medrosh Hag., 140 Colo. 462, 345 P.2d 385
(1959); Leonhart v. District Court, 138 Colo. 1, 329 P.2d 781 (1958) where the
court said:
Corrective measures are not within the sweep and coverage of prohibition;
correction of error is the function of a writ of error. A trial court has the
power to render a right as well as a wrong decision. "Prohibition may never
be used to restrain a trial court having jurisdiction of the parties and of the
subject matter from proceeding to a final conclusion. Nor may it be used to
restrain a trial court from committing error in deciding a question properly
before it; it may not be used in lieu of a writ of error." (Citation omitted.)
138 Colo. at 6, 329 P.2d at 783.
See also People ex rel. Pratt v. District Court, 33 Colo. 306, 79 Pac. 1018 (1905);
Mclnerney v. City of Denver, 17 Colo. 302, 29 Pac. 516 (1892).
COLO. R. Civ. P. 116, "Relief in the nature of prohibition will not be granted except
in matters of great public importance. The fact that a court has erroneously granted
or denied change of venue, or is otherwise proceeding without or in excess of jurisdiction, will not be regarded as sufficient."; Stull v. District Court, 135 Colo. 86,
308 P.2d 1006 (1957) where it was stated:
It appears that there are two requirements in construing the quoted last sentence of Rule 116, R.C.P., to-wit:
(1) That each case is determined by its own circumstances and conditions;
and
(2) That coupled with the claim of lack of jurisdiction or proceedings in
excess thereof, must be at least one other factor spelled out elsewhere in
our rules and decisions, such as that it is a matter of great public
importance, or that no plain, speedy or adequate remedy exists, or that
relief by way of writ of error will be futile. 135 Colo. at 93, 308 P.2d
at 1010.
Allen, Mandamus, Quo Warranto, Prohibition, and Ne Exeat, 1960 U. ILL. L.F. 102,
110.
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majority completely ignored the court's earlier pronouncements
concerning the issuance of prohibition.
As the dissenting judge points out, the majority does not mention the question as to whether the employer's operations affect
commerce even though the employer's counsel urged that there was
no proof that the building of the reservoir affected commerce. Since
"affecting commerce" is essential to create jurisdiction in the National Labor Relations Board and thereby preempt jurisdiction of
a state court, the supreme court side-stepped a very critical issue.
The cases cited for support of the decision are in a different category. In all of them the operations involved either were stipulated
as affecting commerce or were directly involved in interstate commerce. Because of this factual issue, there is some question whether
the state district court lacked jurisdiction.
The supreme court apparently adopted a philosophy that a
state court must keep its hands off any action which might involve
the National Labor Relations Board. This might preclude future
hand slapping by a federal court, but the use of prohibition seems
to be stretching things a little too far. Prohibition is an extraordinary
remedy which should be, as expressed by the court on many prior
occasions, issued only upon sound and cautious discretion.2" The
exercise of discretion encompasses the existence or absence of other
adequate relief.' A writ of error was available to the petitioners.
With no record to review, the court, in effect, gave the petitioners the benefit of a writ of supersedeas, without incurring the liability
or expense of a bond, when it vacated the injunction."0
C.

EXTENT OF INQUIRY
RAISED

As

DEFENSE

INTO JUDGMENT WHEN

To

BANKRUPTCY

EXECUTION THEREOF

A case arose concerning the extent of permissible inquiry into
a judgment subject to discharge in bankruptcy proceedings. Although
28 City of Aurora v. Congregation Beth Medrosh Hag., 140 Colo. 462, 345 P.2d 385

(1940); Leonhart v. District Court, 138 Colo. 1, 329 P.2d 781 (1958); People
ex rel. Benbow v. District Court, 37 Colo. 440, 86 Pac. 322 (1906) ; Mclnerny v.
City of Denver, 17 Colo. 302, 29 Pac. 516 (1892) ; Leonard v. Bartels, 4 Colo. 95
(1878).
29 City of Aurora v. Congregation Beth Medrosh Hag., supra note 28.
30 Cf. Local 1364 Retail Clerk's Union v. Superior Court, 52 Cal.2d 222, 339 P.2d 839,
cert. denied, 361 U.S. 864 (1959) where a writ of prohibition was sought under
similar circumstances. The court there said,
We are not prepared to hold that the allegations of bare conclusions of law as
to jurisdiction establish any facts as to the effect of any alleged labor practice
upon interstate commerce; rather, we agree with the superior court that in the
present state of the record there is an unresolved "factual question" (in addition
to questions of law) upon which determination of its jurisdiction may eventually depend. At the present time the allegations as to jurisdiction show at
most that upon further proceedings in the basic action questions of federal
preemption may be presented; but they show also that no such issue is ripe
for resolution in this proceeding. 339 P.2d at 841.
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there is no specific rule of civil procedure directly involved, the
case is apparently one of first impression in Colorado on the subject
and is worthy of some comment in this review.
In Miller v. Rush,3 a purchaser, plaintiff-in-error (hereafter
referred to as plaintiff), and seller, defendant-in-error (hereafter
referred to as defendant), entered into a written contract whereby
the defendant agreed to construct a residence and convey the same
to the plaintiff "free and clear" of all liens. In a foreclosure action
by lien claimants against both parties, plaintiff put up cash to cover
claims and obtained a cross-claim judgment against the defendant.
Judgment was partially satisfied and plaintiff filed motion for supplementary proceedings under Rule 69, Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking to make discovery of defendant's assets that might
be available for satisfaction of balance due. While proceeding
was pending, defendant filed a debtor petition in bankruptcy. Plaintiff filed a proof of claim reciting that the liability was based upon
defendant's obtaining money by false representation. Defendant
received a general discharge in bankruptcy. When plaintiff resumed
the supplementary proceedings, the trial court granted an indefinite
stay upon defendant's motion asserting defense of bankruptcy. Plaintiff contended that the trial court should conduct a hearing concerning the true nature of his claim and find that the judgment was not
dischargeable because the liability was based upon fraud. The record
of judgment did not contain a single word concerning fraud or
misrepresentation. The trial court refused to consider anything outside the record of judgment and found it was discharged. Plaintiff
sought a writ of error overruling the trial court. The general rule
is that where the origin of the indebtedness is not apparent from the
judgment itself, "...
it is proper to consider and review the whole
record of the proceedings in which the judgment was rendered,
including the pleadings, instructions to the jury, verdict, findings,
special interrogatories, and the answers thereto, and the enrolled
judgment order."32 While the majority of courts retrict their inquiry
to the record of proceedings,33 there seems to be a growing minority
which permits the introduction of testimony, not for the purpose of
attacking or opening the judgment, but to prove that the defense
of bankruptcy is not available to the debtor.'
393 P.2d 565 (Colo. 1964).
§ 815 (1938).
33
National Finance Co. of Provo v. Daley, 14 Utah 2d 263, 382 P.2d 405 (1963);
Lawrence v. Wischnowsky, 344 111. App. 346, 100 N.E.2d 816 (1951); Shawano
Finance Corp. v. Haase, 252 Wis. 12, 30 N.W.2d 82 (1947).
34
Levin v. Singer, 227 Md. 47, 175 A.2d 423 (1961) ; Fidelity and Cas. Co. v. Golombosky, 133 Conn. 317, 50 A.2d 817 (1946) ; Swig v. Tremont, 8 F.2d 943 (1st Cir.
1925) ; Gregory v. Williams. 106 Kan. 819, 189 Pac. 932 (1920).
31

26 AM. JUR. Bankruptcy
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Both the majority and minority views seem to agree that an
inquiry into a judgment general in nature is proper to determine
whether the defense of bankruptcy is available. The primary disagreement arises over the question of whether the inquiry is limited
to the record"5 or if the creditor may show that the defense of bankruptcy is not available by testimony de hors the record. 6
The court sets forth the three points of view on the subject as:
(1). The judgment is conclusive and the court may not go
behind it to determine the facts on which predicated.
(2). Review of the whole record of the case may be had
to determine the real nature of the claim which has
been reduced to judgment.
(3). Not only review of the whole record may be had,
but the court may go outside thereof to determine
the nature of the claim (this is a decided minority
view).
In refusing to accept the minority view, (3) above, as urged
by the plaintiff, the court subscribed to a Utah decision, National
Finance Company of Provo v. Daley37 in which it was stated:
In our judgment, it better comports with the orderly processes of
justice to require the plaintiff to bear the responsibility of pleading,
proving, and claiming the full benefit of whatever character of cause
of action he possesses then to allow another trial upon the same
cause of action raising issues which could have been dealt with in
the original action.
The court pronounced that Colorado had in effect renounced
the minority view in Valdez v. Sams. 8 In that case, the plaintiff
alleged wilful negligence. The default judgment (entered when
defendant failed to answer) contained no findings other than simple
negligence and no exemplary damages were awarded. After judgment was entered, defendant received a general discharge in bankruptcy. Thereafter, when plaintiff began execution on the judgment and commenced garnishment proceedings, the defendant
obtained a rule releasing the garnishee and prohibiting further writs
of garnishment. The supreme court, in holding that a judgment not
specifically setting forth findings making judgment non-dischargeable therefore is dischargeable, stated:
Examination of the record in this action leads to the conclusion that
the trial court entered judgment based on simple negligence. If

plaintiffs desired to protect themselves against the possibility that
defendant might seek a discharge in bankruptcy, it was incumbent

35
36

See cases cited supra note 33 •
See cases cited supra note 34.

37

14 Utah 2d 263, 382 P.2d 405 (1963).

38 134 Colo. 488, 307 P.2d 189 (1957).
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on them to secure a specific finding in the trial court that the neg-

ligence of defendant was such that a discharge in bankruptcy it
was incumbent on them to secure a specific finding in the trial court
that the negligence of defendant was such that a discharge in banknot operate to release the judgment. No such finding
ruptcy would
39

was made.
The Colorado law still is not clear since the court did not
specifically state which of the other two views it followed. The
trial court expressly refused to go behind the judgment and examine
"the depositions, exhibits, pleadings, or other papers in the principal
action herein which preceded the judgment, because the same are
merged by the judgment." In affirming the trial court's action, the
court would appear to be adhering to view (1) above. However,
in Valdez, the court considered allegations in the complaint so
maybe view (2) above is followed. To preclude any problems, it
appears that a plaintiff should definitely obtain a specific finding
of non-dischargeable matters in the judgment.
D.

COMPLAINT -

NECESSITY FOR SPECIFIC ALLEGATION OF PLACE

WHERE TORT WAS COMMITTED

In Sprott v. Roberts,'° the court held that a complaint was
insufficient for failure to adequately allege the place where an
alleged tort was committed and a motion to dismiss on this basis
was good. The action was brought against an anestheseologist for
damages resulting from alleged malpractice. The complaint alleged
that the plaintiff had been taken by his mother to a dentist's office
for dental work and that the dentist engaged defendant to administer an anesthetic. Negligence of the two doctors in administering
the anesthetic was the alleged cause of damages. The trial court
granted defendant's motion to dismiss. The supreme court held that
the motion to dismiss was good on the basis of failure to allege the
place where the tort was committed, but reversed the trial court on
the ground that the plaintiff should have been allowed to amend his
complaint in accordance with Rule 15 (a).
The important aspect of the case is the court-imposed requirement that the place of the alleged tort must be alleged in particular.
This requirement seems to be contrary to the purpose of simplicity
of pleadings set forth in Rule 8(e)."' The federal courts have held
that the new Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "restrict the pleadings
to the task of general notice-giving.''2 Colorado has also held that
39

Id. at 491.

40 390 P.2d 465 (Colo.

1964).

41COLO. R. Civ. P. 8(e) (1), "Each averment of a pleading shall be simple, concise,
and direct. . . . No technical forms of pleading or motions are required."
42Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
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the chief function of a complaint is to give notice, and the test of
sufficiency is whether it gives fair notice to a defendant to enable him
to answer and prepare for trial." It seems like these requirements
are met in Sprott v. Roberts," but the court apparently ignored these
pronouncements. What makes it more confusing is the fact that in
J & K Const. Co. v. Malton, which was decided a little over a week
before Sprott, the court subscribed to the above test of sufficiency
and added that "the rule now is that pleadings are to be construed in
favor of the pleader." 46
Certainly, the defendant was sufficiently notified of the alleged
event and its location to enable him to answer and prepare for trial.
As pointed out by the dissent, this decision seems to be a step backwards towards the supertechnical requirements of common law
pleading.
E.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

In O'Herron v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 7 the
court followed federal court decisions in reversing a summary judgment. An insurance company, third party defendant in a personal
injury action, admitted the issuance of policies to defendants but
denied coverage and by counterclaim for declaratory judgment
alleged that the policies did not cover defendants, third party plaintiff, because of specific provisions in the policies. The insurance
company took depositions from defendants and testimony contained
therein was in agreement with no dispute of the facts. The defendants filed affidavits in opposition to the insurance company's motion
for summary judgment. The affidavits made qualifying statements,
in the form of conclusions, regarding the issue of whether the car
involved in the accident was being used for business or personal
purposes. The parties relied upon different provisions of the policies
as grounds for their position. The trial court entered a summary
judgment in favor of the insurance company on the basis of factual
issue in the depositions.
The supreme court reversed the lower court, finding that even
though there was no dispute in the depositional testimony, the
parties' "discordant contentions bringing about dissimilar results,
arise from divergent views of the testimony contained in the depositions." The court found that divergent inferences could be drawn
43J & K Const. Co. v. Molton, 390 P.2d 68 (Colo.

Colo. 501, 223 P.2d 1051 '(1950).
390 P.2d 465 (Colo. 1964).
4
5 390 P.2d 68 (Colo. 1964).
46id. at 71.

47 397 P.2d 277 (Colo. 1964).

1964); Bridges v. Ingram, 122

1965

ONE YEAR REVIEW

from the facts, and these inferences would lead to variant results
depending upon which were more reasonable.
In support of its position that there was an issue of fact arising
from the inferences, the court, Frantz, J., cited federal court decisions 48 and stated:
That pleadings, depositions, admissions or affidavits contained

undisputed matter and can be taken as true is not decisive of the
question of whether there is a genuine issue of any material fact.
"An issue of fact may arise from countervailing inferences
which
'
49

are permissible from evidence accepted as true.

Following the Colorado rule that the part), moving for a summary judgment, in order to prevail, has the burden of showing the
clear absence of any genuine issue of fact,5" the court found that the

inferences drawn from the depositions precluded such a showing
and held that the motion for summary judgment should have been
denied.
In view of the effect of a summary judgment upon a party
against whom the motion is filed, this decision seems to be a just
approach. A literal construction of the bare depositions would have
precluded the third party plaintiff from a trial on an apparently
genuine issue of fact. The more liberal rule, followed by the court
here, allows litigation of a dispute even though the depositions did
not expressly manifest the dispute.*
Glenn A. Buse

*[Editor's Note: The Colorado Supreme Court decided another
significant case on civil procedure during 1964, Clemens v. District
Court, 390 P.2d 83. A comment on this case will be contained in
the next issue of the Denver Law Journal.]
48

Empire Electronic Co. v. United States, 311 F.2d 175 (2d Cir. 1962) ; Cameron v.
Vancouver Plywood Corp., 266 F.2d 535 (9th Cir. 1959).
49
O'Herron v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 397 P.2d 227, 230-31 (1964).
5Koon v. Steffes, 124 Colo. 531, 239 P.2d 310 (1951).
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CORPORATIONS AND AGENCY

CORPORATIONS-COURT REJECTS THE

SEC

STANDARD

FOR IN-

CLUSION OF STATEMENTS IN PROXY SOLICITATIONS

Perhaps the most interesting corporate law case in Colorado
was decided in the Federal District Court. Western Oil Fields, Inc. v.
McKnab' dealt with the rights of a group of shareholders of an unlisted stock to include certain statements in a proxy solicitation. The
corporate management brought an action based on state law for
protective orders against a group of shareholders alleging that certain statements were included in proxy solicitations which were in
part "untrue, incomplete, misleading, full of innuendoes and the
same amount to either actual or constructive fraud made in conflict
and
with the fiduciary obligation to the other shareholders ....,,2
which may have deceived the other shareholders as to the true facts
surrounding the controversy. The management asked that the annual
meeting date be postponed, all proxy solicitations be cancelled, and
that the court restrain solicitation of proxies which do not relate
facts constituting a fair statement surrounding the matter. In denying the requested relief the district court, Arraj, J., said:
It is essential to the plaintiff's case that the accused statements
be significant and material, in the sense that they influenced or
reasonably could have influenced, shareholders to give their proxy
had the alleged
in a situation where they would not have done so
3
fraudulent statement or statements not been made.
No testimony was presented to indicate that anyone who had executed
a proxy had been misled. In addition, the court said that it would
be impossible for it to supervise further solicitations.
The Colorado Supreme Court has not expressed, as yet, an
opinion on this point but the rule adopted here is in line with the
cases on proxy solicitation decided in other states under state laws."
In re R. Hoe & Co. presents a statement of the judicial attitude"A certain amount of innuendo, misstatement, exaggeration and
puffing must be allowed as a natural by-product of a bitter camRId. at 163.
3 Id. at 166.

4Willoughby v. Post, 182 F. Supp. 496 (S.D.N.Y. 1960), modified 277 F.2d 149
(2d Cir. 1960); Textron v. American Woolen Co., 122 F. Supp. 305 (D. Mass.
1954); Mason v. Basic Properties, Inc., 230 N.Y.S.2d 560 (Sup. Ct. 1962); DalTran Service Co. v. Fifth Avenue Coach Lines, Inc., 14 App. Div. 2d 349, 220
N.Y.S.2d 549 (Sup. Ct. 1961) ; Shora v. Great Sweet Grass Oils Ltd., 205 N.Y.S.2d
98 (Sup. Ct. 1960); In re R. Hoe & Co., 137 N.Y.S.2d 142 (Sup. Ct. 1954); In
re Zickl, 73 N.Y.S.2d 181 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
5
In re Hoe, supra note 4, at 147; see ARANow & EINHORN, PROXY CONTESTS FOR
CORPORATE CONTROL 435 (1957).
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paign. ' The attitude exemplified in these cases quite possibly is
an aspect of the old common law that is not easily forgotten.
The interesting aspect of Western Oil Fields is that, in the
attempt to determine the standard to govern proxy solicitation
statements for unlisted securities, the plainiffs cited many cases
dealing with Securities and Exchange Commission proxy rules, but
the court looked elsewhere for guidance.' Under the Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934' the Securities and Exchange Commission
was authorized to set certain standards for proxy solicitation for
unlisted securities. This authorization was implemented by section
14a of the Securities and Exchange Commission rules which does
establish a definite criterion for stockholder protection, but so far
this has not been extended beyond those persons listed in the regulation.8
Thus, Western Oil Fields is another example of the reluctance
of courts to adopt the standard established by the Securities and
Exchange Commission for proxy solicitation.'
Where do these decisions leave the investor? The considerations
of corporate democracy and adequate disclosure which fostered
enactment of this federal proxy regulation would certainly seem
to be applicable in protecting unlisted securities." The number of
investors holding unlisted securities is substantial" and these stockholders have no chance to take part in management or learn about
the conduct of management apart from the proxy.
The lack of measures to deal with the reluctance to provide
1232

F. Supp. 162 (D. Colo. 1964).
6232 F. Supp. 162, 164; see Bresnick v. Home Title Guar. Co., 175 F. Supp. 723
(S.D.N.Y. 1959) discussed in Standards of Disclosure in Proxy Solicitation of Unlisted Securities, 1960 DUKE L.J. 623, 635.
7 48 Stat. 895 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78(N) (1958).
8 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-2: "Sections 240.14a-1 to 24 0.14a-11 apply to every solicitation
of a proxy with respect to securities listed and registered on a national securities
exchange, whether or not trading in such securities has been suspended .... " These
rules have been extended beyond those securities listed on national exchanges but
the extension would not necessarily cover the situation in Western Oil Fields. For
a short summary of the operation of the Securities Exchange Commission proxy rules
see Hopper, The Securities and Exchange Commission as it Affects the General
Practitioner, 36 COLO. L. REv. 36, 60 (1963). For a study of the administration
of proxy rules see Mehren & McCarroll, The Proxy Rules: A Case Study in the
Administration Process, 29 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 728 (1964).

OThe opportunity to adopt this standard in state decisions has been presented to
other courts and summarily rejected, e.g., Bresnick v. Home Title Guar. Co., 175
F. Supp. 723 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).

10See Bernstein & Fischer, The Regulation of the Solicitation of Proxies: Some Reflections on Corporate Democracy, 7 U. CHI. L. REv. 226 (1940); 5 FLETCHER,
CYCLOPEDIA ON CORPORATIONS § 2052.1 p. 212 n. 64 (Revised volume 1952).
j'CCH

FED. SEC. L. REP., Special Report No. 902 p. 5 (5 June 1963).
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shareholders with some needed protection is indeed a gap in the
law, which should be filled legislatively or judicially. Colorado
has no statute. Other state statutes dealing with the matter are few
and generally not as comprehensive as the SEC laws." The solution,
at least for the present, would seem to lie with judicial recognition
of a state standard based on or equivalent to the Securities and Exchange Commission proxy rules-"one whose violation is most likely to shock the chancellor's conscience in any event-and thus obtain
the advantage of emancipation from whatever bothersome restrictions
may still surround traditional concepts of fraud in the particular
state.""
B.

CORPORATIONS-COMMON LAW CONCEPT OF FRAUD
ED AS THE
SALE

BASIS

FOR A CLAIM

Is

ADOPT-

FOR MISREPRESENTATION

IN

OF SECURITIES

Nichoalds v.McGlothen,"4 a Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
case, dealt with fraud in the purchase and sale of securities. Nichoalds, who was the principal officer of two different corporations,
the Compass and Trilon corporations, was conducting financing
operations for Compass through Trilon. Loans were made by Trilon
for operating expenses of a ranch, located in Montana. This ranch
was an asset of Compass. Nichoalds, in advertising the Compass
property for sale at a price of $89,000, represented that Compass
had adequate money to pay all expenses. He also represented that
the listed encumbrances were the only ones outstanding against the
property. McGlothen, the plaintiff, offered $15,000 for a one-half
interest in the Compass Corporation, consisting of 8,000 shares of
stock, and was accepted. Thereafter, McGlothen learned that there
was an unlisted loan on the property and that certain assets of Compass were pledged to secure that loan. Then McGlothen learned
that Compass did not have sufficient cash to pay operating expenses.
He brought this action asking for a rescission of the agreement and
for a return of the purchase price and damages. In affirming the
district court decision granting the plaintiff's request for rescission,
Kerr, J., said for the Tenth Circuit: "We think the evidence and
legal principles support only one conclusion, namely, that Nichoalds
concealed from McGlothen material facts which equity and good
12 Loss, The SEC Proxy Rules and State Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1249 (1960).

See J. I.

Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964) where a federal court allowed a private
remedy based on a violation of rule 14 a; Private Actions and the Proxy Rules: the
Basis and Breadth of the Federal Remedy, 31 U. CHi.

L. REV. 328 (1964).

13 Loss, The SEC Proxy Rules and State Law, 73 HARv. L. REV.

14330 F.2d 454 (10th Cir. 1964).

1249, 1264 (1960).
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conscience required him to disclose fully and honestly . .""'. citing
Morrison v. Goodspeed.6 The court also indicated, alternatively,
that in the instant case the nondisclosure would be actionable notwithstanding a lack of intent to commit a fraud where the remedy
sought is rescission."
The application of Morrison to this set of facts to establish
fraud is well settled in Colorado, 8 and in itself is not particularly
noteworthy. However, a point of importance concerning this case
is that the plaintiff might have been able to base his claim under a
federal law.
The Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 contains a provision
in section lob 9 controlling purchase and sale of securities. With
this basic provision the Securities and Exchange Commission has
enacted Rule X-10B-5, 0 which makes it unlawful to practice fraud
in the purchase and sale of securities in interstate commerce or on
national security exchanges. Kardon v. National Gypsum Co.2 in
1946 held that a civil remedy is implied in this provision. Other
courts have indicated that the facts upon which an action may be
brought under section X-10B-5 have been liberalized compared to
those required at common law.22 In an action for damages under
X-10B-5, all the plaintiff need do is prove damage and a misstatement or omission of a material fact, and if he asks merely for rescission, he need not show damage.23
There has been some dispute in past cases concerning the extent
of the protection offered by X-10B-5. Some courts have limited
15 Id. at 457.
16 100 Colo. 470, 68 P.2d 458 (1937).
17 330 F.2d 454, 457 (10th Cir. 1964) ; see the district court opinion at 212 F. Supp.
757, 761 (D. Colo. 1962).
I8 Bell Press, Inc. v. Phillips, 147 Colo. 461, 364 P.2d 398 (1961); Ginsberg v. Zaga,
126 Colo. 536, 251 P.2d 1080 (1952) ; cf. Leece v. Griffin, 150 Colo. 132, 371
P.2d 264 (1962).
1948 Stat. 891 (1934), as amended 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1946).
20 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5: "It shall be unlawful for any person directly or indirectly,
by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails
or of any facility of any national security exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud.
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase
and sale of any security."
2169 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946); 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1947) (on the
merits) ; 83 F. Supp. 613 (E.D. Pa. 1947) (request for additional findings of fact
and law).
22See The Prospects for Rule X-10B-5: An Emerging Remedy for Defrauded Investors, 59 YALE L. REV. 1120 (1950).

2 Id. at 1131, and cases cited therein.
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this protection to only those over-the-counter securities or listed securities traded on organized security markets.' However, by the
clear weight of authority the coverage is extended to any purchaser
of securities."5 There has also been some division of authority on
whether a civil liability could be created by a statute not containing
express provision for civil liability; however, Kardon and other
cases have inferred liability. 8
The last problem that McGlothen would encounter in bringing
an X-10B-5 suit would be to place the transaction in interstate commerce. Although the case does not discuss this point, it would seem
that because Compass was located in Montana and McGlothen
brought his action in Colorado, some interstate transaction occurred.
The courts have generally been very liberal in this regard so long as
the transaction was connected with interstate commerce. 7
C.

CORPORATIONS-RETURN RECEIPT FROM REGISTERED

LETTER

MUST BE RECEIVED BY SECRETARY OF STATE BEFORE SUBSTITUTED SERVICE OF PROCESS ON A FOREIGN CORPORATION WILL
SATISFY DUE PROCESS

Leach v. Farnsworth & Chambers Co. ' is a federal district
court case which construed Colorado law pertaining to jurisdiction
over foreign corporations. Plaintiff Leach filed a motion with the
district court requesting an order allowing service of process on
defendant, a foreign corporation not qualified to do business in
24 The argument is based on the fact that the preamble to the Act of 1934 has language which could be inferred to so limit the coverage of X-10B-5. See 48 Stat.
881 § 2 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78(b) (1946).
25
E.g., Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808, 830 (D. Del. 1947).
26
Nemitz v. Cunny, 221 F. Supp. 571, 573 (N.D. Ill. 1963); Rosen v. Albern Color
Research, Inc., 218 F. Supp. 473, 476 (E.D. Pa. 1963) ; Beury v. Beury, 127 F. Supp.
786, (S.D.W. Va. 1954). In Beury the court said:
The only reasonable construction of this statute (X-10B-5) is that it
confers exclusive civil jurisdiction on federal courts to entertain only those
actions which involve some right of recovery which goes beyond those common law rights which might have been fully adjudicated and enforced by
appropriate action in a state court . . . before the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 was passed. 127 F. Supp. at 790.
See also Fratt v. Robinson, 203 F.2d 627, 635 (9th Cir. 1953), where, in citing 53
C.J.S. Limitations of Actions § 83(a) (1948) with approval, the court said:
"..
the phrase 'liability created by statute' or 'liability created by law' within the
meaning of such a statute, has been held not to include or extend to actions arising
under the common law." The law review article cited at note 22 supra raises some
additional objections to an action based on X-10B-5. For additional discussion and
some answers to those objections, see Securities Regulation-Civil Liability Under
Rule X-1OB-5 for Fraud in the Purchase or Sale of Securities, 52 MICH. L. REV. 893
(1954).
27 Fratt v. Robinson 203 F.2d 627 (9th. Cir. 1953); Northern Trust Co. v. Essaness
Theatres Corp., 103 F. Supp. 954 (N.D. Il1. 1952).
282 3 1 F. Supp. 157 (D. Colo. 1964).
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Colorado, in accordance with Colo. Rev. Stat. §31-9-19(3) (1963)

.-

Service was made on the Secretary of State, and the defendant moved
to dismiss on the ground of denial of due process as guaranteed by
the Colorado and federal constitutions because of lack of notice.
The court first ruled that Erie R.R. v. Tompkins"0 required only
a consideration of constitutionality under the Colorado constitution.'
In sustaining defendant's motion to dismiss, the court relied on a
Colorado case dealing with service of process on non-resident motorists, Clemens v. District Court. 2 Thus, the question to be dealt with
here is whether Clemens can be applied to Leach.

In Clemens, the Colorado Supreme Court was dealing with
the non-resident motorist statute3 which is identical to that for nonresident corporations in the requirement for the Secretary of State
to give notice to a prospective defendant. Both allow certification of
service after a registered letter is sent to the last known address of
the defendant, but require no return receipt before entry of a certificate of service. The court in Leach held the following language in
Clemens to compel its decision:
Here, proceeding under the statute, service was had on two
defendants; one received notice, the other did not. Though the
29 In the 1963 edition of COLO. REv. STAT.

§ 31-35-19(3) was changed to § 31-9-19(3):
(3)
If any foreign corporation shall hereafter transact business in the
state without having qualified to transact business, it shall be deemed
that such corporation has designated and appointed the secretary of state
as an agent for process upon whom may be served any process from a
court of record in any civil action arising out of any act or omission of
such corporation within this state. When any civil action is commenced, the
court upon verified motion giving the last known address of such corporation, and stating facts showing transaction of business within this state
may ex parte authorize service to be made upon the secretary of state.
Service shall be made by delivering two copies of the process, complaint,
motion and order of court, with a fee of five dollars which shall be taxed
as part of the cost of the proceeding, to the secretary of state, his assistant,
or deputy. Notice of such service and a copy of each instrument so served
shall forthwith be sent by the secretary of state by registered mail addressed
to the defendant at its last known address with return receipt requested.
Promptly after such mailing the secretary of state shall file with the clerk
of the court a certificate showing such mailing. Service shall be complete
on the day the certificate is filed with the clerk of the court.
30 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
31 231 F. Supp. 157, 159 (D. Colo. 1964). See COLO. CONST. art II, § 25, "No person
shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law."
32 390 P.2d 83 (Colo. 1964).
33
COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-8-3 (1963), formerly § 13-8-3 (1953):
Service shall be made by delivering two copies of the process, complaint, motion and order of court to the secretary of state . . . .Notice of
such service and a copy of each instrument so served shall forthwith be sent
to the secretary of state by certified or registered mail, addressed to the
defendant at his address given in the order of court, with return receipt
requested. Promptly after such mailing the secretary of state shall file with
the clerk of the court a certificate showing such mailing. Service shall be
complete thirty days after service of process on the secretary of state as provided in this section.

DENVER LAW CENTER JOURNAL

VOL. XLII

effectiveness of procedures prescribed for getting notice to defendants should not be finally adjudged on results attained in an isolated
case, the result here attained does cast grave doubt on the effectiveness of the methods provided and pursued.
Procedures only fifty percent effective cannot be held as reasonably calculated to bring notice to the defendant or to constitute
34
due process.

In arriving at the Clemens decision the Colorado court relied
on both federal and state concepts of the requirements of due pro35
cess.
The general rule on requirement of notice to satisfy due process
was stated in Hess v. Pawlosk3 and has been interpreted to mean

that such service must be reasonably calculated to apprise the defendant of the action against him. 7 The cases have not been in accord as to what can be interpreted as reasonable notification as to
both non-resident motorists and to foreign corporations;3" however
a case decided in the Federal District Court of Maryland, Speir v.
Robert C. Herd & Co.,3" offers a compelling analysis.

In Speir the defendant corporation challenged the validity of
service of process made under a Maryland statute which required
that a registered letter be sent to defendant, but did not require a
34

Clemens v. District Court, 390 P.2d 83, 90 (Colo. 1964).
Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927); McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90 (1917);
Grote v. Rogers, 158 Md. 685, 149 Atl. 547 (1930) ; Kurilla v. Roth, 132 N.J.L. 213,
38 A.2d 862 (1944).
36 274 U.S. 352 (1927).
37
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 318 (1950); International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 320 (1945); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAWS § 75 (Tent. Draft no. 3, 1956):
Notice and Opportunity to Be Heard. A state cannot exercise judicial jurisdiction over a person, who is subject to its jurisdiction, unless a reasonable
method of notification is employed and unless he is afforded a reasonable
opportunity to be heard. Comment: e. Actual knowledge of proceedings
not required. It is not necessary that the defendant should have received
actual knowledge of the action in which the judgment is rendered. It is
sufficient that the steps taken to give him notice of the action and an
opportunity to be heard satisfy the requirements of the rule of this section.
38 Sugg v. Hendrix, 142 F.2d 740 (5th Cir. 1944)
(statute required return receipt,
held valid); Clawson v. Central Nebraska Packing Co., 219 F.Supp. 1 (D. Ind.
1963); Kohler v. Derderian, 187 F.Supp. 173 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); Allison v. Montgomery Ward, 159 F.Supp. 550 (D.N.H. 1957); Bucholz v. Hutton, 153 F.Supp.
62 (D. Mont. 1957); Powell v. Knight, 74 F.Supp. 191 (E.D. Va. 1947); Harrison
v. Matthews, 235 Ark. 915, 362 S.W.2d 704 (1962) ; Boise Flying Serv. v. General
Motors Acceptance Corp., 55 Idaho 5, 36 P.2d 813 (1934) ; Fidelity & Casualty Co.
of New York v. Cross, 127 Miss. 31, 89 So. 780 (1921) (dealing with an insurance company) ; Levitt v. Colonial Boat Works, Inc., 70 N.J. Super. 555, 176 A.2d
48 (1961); National Mfg. Corp. v. Buffalo Metal Container Corp., 204 Misc. 269,
126 N.Y.S.2d 755 (1953) ; State v. Ford Motor Co., 208 So. C. 379, 38 S.E.2d 242
(1946). Cf., Maston v. Desormeau Dairy-Vend Serv., Inc., 11 App. Div. 2d 860,
203 N.Y.S.2d 343 (1960); Parr v. Leal, 290 S.W.2d 536 (C.C.A. Tex. 1956).
39189 F.Supp. 432 (D. Md. 1960). See Gkiafis v. Steamship Yiosonas, 221 F.Supp.
253 (D. Md. 1963) ; Maryland Nat'l Bank v. Shaffer Stores Co., 240 F.Supp. 775,
785 (D. Md. 1965) (where the court rejects Leach).
35
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return receipt."0 The defendant argued that due process was not
satisfied without the requirement of a return receipt, as evidenced
by the non-resident motorist statutes in effect in Maryland which
did require the receipt. The court rejected the defendant's argument
and held the statute to be valid. It relied on several cases, including
some cited in Clemens, for the point that a corporation is not the
same as a non-resident individual. The court generally followed
the theory that a corporation should be aware of the statutory requirements of a state in which it does business and should keep current a certification of its address so that, in the event an action is
brought against it, notification will occur. 4 The possibility that the
address of the corporation may be unknown should not affect validity, because lack of an address is the exceptional case and constitutionality is decided on the basis of normal circumstances.42
40

§ 96(d) (1957):
If any corporation of this state, or any foreign corporation required by any
statute of this state to have a resident agent or any foreign corporation
subject to suit in this state under § 92 of this article (1) has not a resident
agent, . . . such corporation shall be conclusively presumed to have designated the Commission as its true and lawful attorney authorized to accept on
its behalf service of process.
ANN. CODE OF MARYLAND art. 23 § 98 (1957):
When service of process upon any corporation of this state or upon any
foreign corporation is made by leaving copies of the process in the office
of the Commission as provided in this subtitle:
(a) In general-It shall be the duty of the Commission forthwith to
record the day and hour of such service and to forward by registered
mail one copy of the process with a notice of such service, addressed
to such corporation at its mailing address, if it has a mailing address,
if it has a mailing address on file with the Commission, or if it has not
a mailing address on file with the Commission, addressed to it at its
principal office, if it has a principal office, or, if it has neither a mailing address on file with the Commission nor a principal office, addressed to it in care of the secretary of state or the corresponding
official of the state or place under the statute or common law of which
it was formed or is existing, if known to the Commission: and

ANN. CODE OF MARYLAND art. 23

(b) ....
41 189 F.Supp. at 435.

42

The Speir court cited Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U.S. 13, 20
(1927):
The cases, in which statutes have been upheld providing that nonresident
corporations may properly be served by leaving a summons with a state
official, where the corporation has not indicated a resident agent to be
served, are not especially applicable to the present statute . . . .Such corporations may be properly required to accept service through a public officer
as a condition of their doing business in the state. Their knowledge of the
statutory requirement may perhaps prompt frequent inquiry as to suits
against them... ;
and Grote v. Rogers, 158 Md. 685, 149 Atl. 547 (1930) for the proposition that
"A foreign corporation is expected to protect itself by keeping up to date
the certification of its mailing address."
Speir v. Robert C. Herd & Co., 189 F.Supp. 432, 435 (D. Md. 1960). American
Land Co. v. Zeiss, 219 U.S. 47, 67 (1911), "The criterion is not the possibility of
conceivable injury but the just and reasonable character of the requirements, having
reference to the subject with which the statute deals."
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On the basis of the comparison of Leach and Speir, it would seem
that the Colorado Federal District Court has made an unnecessary
extension of the requirements of due process for service of process
on foreign corporations. 3
D.

CORPORATIONS-SALES IN THE STATE BY A LOCAL DISTRIBUTOR
OF A FOREIGN CORPORATION AMOUNT TO DOING BUSINESS IN

THE STATE

The case of American Type Founders Co. v. District Court of
the City and County of Denver," decided in the Colorado Supreme
Court prior to both Leach and Clemens, questioned the application
of the statute' which was declared void in Leach. American Type
Founders, a foreign corporation, had sold some printing equipment
through a local distributor who was located in Denver. Suit was
brought against American Type Founders for breach of this contract. The same statute, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 31-9-19(3) (1963), was
used to obtain service of process. Founders filed a motion to dismiss
for lack of jurisdiction on the ground that the corporation was not,
in fact, transacting business without having qualified to transact
business as provided by the statute.4 The supreme court affirmed
the district court's denial of the motion. In so holding, the supreme
court reaffirmed the long-established precedent that the requirements of this statute are "doing business" in the state.' 7 As authority
for this point, the court has continually relied on InternationalShoe
Co. v. State of Washington." American Type Founders is of inter43The Speir case must be distinguished from cases similar to State of Washington v.
Superior Court, 289 U.S. 361, 366 (1933), where the Court upheld the constitutionality of a statute that did not require notice to be sent to a foreign corporation
saying:
the fact that appellant qualified to do business in the state and complied
with the registration statute also distinguishes cases of attempted service
on a state official pursuant to a statute with which the defendant corporation had never complied, and where at the time of suit it had removed from
the state and was transacting no business.
In Leach and Speir neither defendant corporation had complied with the state statutes,
the former not having qualified to do business, the latter having not made a proper
appointment of an agent.
389 P.2d 85 (Colo. 1964).
45 COLO. REV.STAT. § 31-9-19(3) (1963).
46

Ibid.

7

4' Bay Aviation Serv. Co. v. District Court, 149 Colo. 542, 370 P.2d 752 (1962);
Norton v. Dartmouth Skis, Inc., 147 Colo. 436, 364 P.2d 866 (1961); Hibbard,

Spencer, Bartlett & Co. v. District Court, 138 Colo. 270, 332 P.2d 208 (1958).
Compare Focht v. Southwestern Skyways, Inc., 220 F.Supp. 441 (D. Colo. 1963),
a!f'd in Cessna Aircraft Co. v. Focht, 336 F.2d 603 (10th Cir. 1964).
48326 U.S. 310 (1945).
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est, recalling that it preceded the Clemens and Leach decisions, because of the definite possibility that the next time the supreme court
is presented with this problem it may declare the statute void, on the
strength of Leach. 9
E.

AGENCY-INSURERS

OWE

No DUTY

TO THEIR AGENTS TO ACT

WITH CARE TO PREVENT LAPSE OF INSURANCE

POLICIES IN

WHICH THE AGENT HAS AN INTEREST

In Berenbeim v. Maccabees,s" the court ruled on the question
of the duty of an insurer with respect to commissions due its agents
on renewals of insurance policies.
Plaintiff Berenbeim was a district manager for the defendant
insurer and in the course of his employment he wrote insurance
policies for various individuals. Berenbeim's contract provided that
he was to have 'certain vested commissions upon termination
of employment. Those commissions were a percentage of the premiums paid by the policyholders . . .,""'regardless of whether he was

currently employed by defendant Maccabees. Berenbeim was terminated for cause and he brought this action contending, in part, that
Maccabees "negligently, carelessly and recklessly failed to send out

notices of premiums due, failed to take proper steps to keep policies
of insurance in force in which the plaintiff had an interest.'52 The
trial court sustained Maccabees' motion for a summary judgment. On
appeal, the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed. Moore, J., said on
this point, quoting the assertion of Maccabees, "defendant had and
49

50
51
52

If the Colorado Supreme Court does overrule American Type Founders, the enactment of a new statute would obviously be necessary. Of important consideration in
this regard is the fact that Colorado has seen fit only to enact a "doing business"
statute. The decisions of the United States Supreme Court in Hanson v. Denckla,
357 U.S. 235 (1958); McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957);
International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945) indicate that
a state may enact "minimum contacts" statute which would considerably extend the
state's power to obtain personam jurisdiction. In light of the fact that in Clemens
v. District Court, 390 P.2d 83 (Colo. 1964), the court saw fit to place emphasis on
the minimum contacts basis it is suggested that Colorado place itself among those
states which have extended the embrace of jurisdiction without violating due process.
See Kurland, The Supreme Court, The Due Process clause and the in Personam
Jurisdiction of State Courts-From Pennoyer to Denckla: a Review, 25 U. CHI.
L. REV. 569 (1958). See Colo. Sess. Laws 1965, ch. 119 in which CoLo. REV. STAT.
37-1-26, -27 (1963) was enacted providing a method of service of process of foreign
corporations requiring personal service. Effective date is May 10, 1965. And see Colo.
Sess. Laws 1965, ch. 109 in which COLO. REV. STAT. 31-9-19(3) was amended to
require return receipt.
392 P.2d 172 (Colo. 1964).
Brief for Defendant, pp. 19-20, Berenbeim v. Maccabees, 392 P.2d 172 (Colo. 1964).
392 P.2d at 173 '(Colo. 1964).
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has no duty toward plaintiff with respect to the manner in which
53
defendant conducts its own business.
The case presents an interesting question concerning the rights
of an insurance agent to commissions on renewals of policies which
he has previously written. More specifically, can an employer negligently and recklessly act to deprive his employee of this right?
This specific point had not been considered in Colorado prior to
this time.
The general rule with respect to commissions on renewals is
that they must be provided for by the express terms of the contract
including the right to renewals on termination of employment; the
employee's rights to these commissions will not be found to be
merely implied. 4 On this point Berenbeim qualified because of the
express provision in his contract, but failed in his claim because the
company had no duty to secure renewals of the policies. With no
renewals, there could be no commissions.
53
54

Id.at 174.
Aronoff v. Carraher, 146 Colo. 223, 361 P.2d 354 (1961), citing Corpus Juris
Secundum with approval said:
A renewal agreement whereby a contract of insurance may be continued in
force after its expiration, is in itself a contract of insurance. It has been
generally held that a renewal is in effect a new contract of insurance, for
the period of time covered by such renewal, at least in the sense that it is
subject to the laws in force at the time it is effected, and at least where there
is no provision in the original policy for its renewal. 146 Colo. at 228.
Massachusetts Bonding and Ins. Co. v. Board of County Comm'rs, 100 Colo. 398,
68 P.2d 555 (1937), citing Corpus Juris with approval saying:
A renewal of a fidelity policy or bond constitutes a separate and distinct
contract, for the period of time covered by such renewal, unless it appears
to be the intention of the parties, as evidenced by the provisions thereof,
that such policy or bond and the renewal thereof shall constitute one continuous contract. 100 Colo. at 401.
Pruitt v. Southern Underwriters, 83 So.2d 115 (Fla. 1955), "the agent has no vested
rights in commissions on renewal premiums . . . and his right to be paid commissions on renewals must be based entirely upon the terms of the contract;" Barr v.
Sun Life Assur. Co. of Canada, 200 So. 240 (Fla. 1941):
ITlhe great weight of authority holds that the agent has no vested rights
in commissions on renewal premiums and that his right to be paid commissions on renewal premiums must be based entirely upon the terms of the
contract and even where a contract provides for commissions on renewal
premiums the contract is construed to require the payment of such commissions only as long as the employee continues as the agent of the company
and, unless otherwise provided in the contract, he is entitled to no commissions on renewals made after the termination of his employment as Agent.
200 So. at 243.
Stevenson v. Brotherhoods Mut. Benefit, 317 Mich. 575, 27 N.W.2d 104 (1947):
"'T]he right of an insurance agent to commissions on renewal premiums depends upon
the contract existing between the agent and the insurance company."; Cortina v.
General Ins. Co. of America, 40 Misc. 2d 916, 244 N.Y.S.2d 343 (1963) ; Underwood v. Greenwich Ins. Co., 161 N.Y. 413, 55 N.E. 936 (1900); 4 COUCH,
INSURANCE § 26:400-11 (2d ed. 1960).
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The contentions of the parties would be easily solved had the
contract required Maccabees to obtain renewals, for there is ample
authority to support an action based on negligence when there is a
duty involved.55 However, in insurance contracts as between the insured and insurer, the general rule is that unless the contract contains an express provision for such renewal, it terminates on expiration of the period of the original conract, " and before there is renewed coverage a new contract must be agreed upon. The cases do
not speak of a duty upon the insurer actually to attempt to obtain a
renewal; in fact, in Berenbeim it appeared that the insurance agentBerenbeim himself, if still employed-had the duty to obtain the
renewal. 7
Notwithstanding the fact that there might not have been a duty
on the part of the insurance company to obtain renewals, there is
at least one decision which indicates the insurance agent may maintain an action for relief for a lapse caused by the insurer.58 The best
55Lembke Plumbing and Heating v. Hayutin, 148 Colo. 334, 366 P.2d 673 (1961),
(Defendant negligently installed some pipes which broke, causing damage to plaintiff's house. The contract imposed no duty to use care, however, "the duty upon
Lembke was even more fundamental, to-wit: the common law obligation to exercise
due care, caution and skill resting on all persons and in all undertakings when the
rights of others are involved. Although this duty may not be contractual, the law
allows no vacuum and imposes the duty." 148 Colo. at 337) ; Dean v. Hershowitz,
119 Conn. 398, 177 Atl. 262, 266 (1953) (A duty arises where "in the performance of some act within the scope of that relationship, unless he uses proper care,
is likely to do injury to the person, property, or rights of the other.") ; Douglas v.
United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 81 N.H. 371, 127 At!. 708, 711 (1924) (So far as
an obligation to use care is concerned, it is imposed by law upon all who undertake
a service) ; Burnham v. Stillings, 76 N.H. 122, 79 Atl. 987 (1911) (It is not usual
to express this duty in the contract.); Lewis v. Scott, 54 Wash. 2d 851, 341 P.2d
488 (1959) ; 38 AM. JUR. Negligence § 20 p. 662 (1941):
Accompanying every contract is a common-law duty to perform with
care, skill, reasonable expedience, and faithfulness the thing agreed to be
done, and a negligent failure to observe any of these conditions is a tort,
as well as a breach of contract. In such a case, the contract is mere inducement creating the state of things which furnishes the occasion of the tort.
In other words, the contract creates the relation out of which grows the duty
to use care.
5
6 Metts v. Central Standard Life Ins. Co., 142 Cal. App. 2d 445, 298 P.2d 621 (1956);
Rosin v. Peninsular Life Ins. Co., 116 So. 2d 798 (Fla. 1960) ; McGregor v. Interocean Ins. Co., 48 Wash. 2d 268, 292 P.2d 1054 (1956). Compare Hutchinson
v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 293 S.W.2d 307 (Mo. 1956).
57 Brief for Defendant, pp. 20-21, Berenbeim v. Maccabees, 392 P.2d 172 (Colo. 1964).
58 Hahn v. North American Life Ins. Co., 13 Hun. 195 (N.Y. 1878). Plaintiff was
employed by defendant as a general agent to solicit insurance and collect premiums.
The agreement provided that he was to receive compensation on premiums, regardless
of whether or not he continued working for the company, so long as they should be
paid to the company. Plaintiff claims damages caused by the defendant in processing
policies obtained by the plaintiff to be transferred to other companies, or causing
them to lapse, thus depriving the plaintiff of his right to commissions upon renewal
premiums. The court allowed the plaintiff to recover on those policies which the
defendant caused to be transferred or lapse.
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expression on the point is in Ensign v. United Pac. Ins. Co.59 where
the court stated in a strong dictum that an agent could recover commissions lost by an arbitrary cancellation of a policy by the insurer.
This dictum was quoted with approval in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in deciding an appeal from a Colorado
Federal District Court case, Sterling ColoradoAgency, Inc. v. Sterling
Ins. Co. " Sterling suggests that facts sufficient to evidence bad faith
on the part of the insurer toward the insurance agent would be adequate to give the agent a claim for renewals lost."1
F.

AGENCY-SERVANT RETURNING FROM A MEAL WHILE TRAVELING FOR
OF

His

His

MASTER IS DOING AN ACT WITHIN THE SCOPE

EMPLOYMENT

Hynes v. Donaldson,62 decided in the Colorado Supreme Court,
presents an interesting determination of the extent of "scope of employment" with respect to agents while traveling for their principals.
Donaldson was an employee of the defendant corporation and had
served for several years in the New Mexico area. On trips out of
town he was paid a per diem plus mileage. In 1959 Donaldson was
advised of his impending transfer to the corporation's Denver office
and, to enable him to make an easier transition, he was directed to
go to Denver and discuss prospective business, familiarize himself
59 107 Utah 557, 155 P.2d 965 (1945). Plaintiffs were non-exclusive agents of the
defendant, employed to solicit and submit applications for insurance on various
classes of risks. Plaintiff had earlier written a policy of insurance with A and now
A desiring a new rate, because of changed conditions, contacted a broker who in turn
contacted plaintiff. The insured had desired to get the coverage immediately, but
plaintiff was slow in acting, therefore the defendant wrote the policy through
another agent.
In holding for the defendant, the court said:
Respondent (defendant] could not, of course, by arbitrary action cancel the
policy with the object of preventing the collection of premiums by plaintiffs and securing thereby an advantage to itself. Nor, . . . could it arbitrarily refuse quotation to an agent of a proper rate and secure the insurance through another at such rate, at least where the business contact with
the insured had been originally made by the agent. To do so would
evidence a lack of fair dealing which would deprive appellants of the
contemplated fruits of their contract with respondent. But neither may the
agent through lack of diligence on his part chance the loss of such business
by the insurer and still be entitled to the benefits accruing as a result of
the diligence of another. This is precisely what appellants demand. 155
P.2d at 967. (Emphasis added.)
Ensign was quoted with approval in Sterling Colo. Agency, Inc. v. Sterling Ins. Co.,
266 F.2d 472 (10th Cir. 1959) where the court said:
It is true that an insurer cannot by arbitrary action cancel a policy to prevent collection of renewal premiums by the agent . . . ; or to force the
agent to accede to improper demands, . . . or otherwise interfere in business
which it has promised the agent in order to defeat his rights. Such activities
have been found to be violative of the implied covenant of good faith between principal and agent. 266 F.2d at 474.
60 266 F.2d 472 (10th Cir. 1959).
61
Id. at 474.
62 395 P.2d 221 (Colo. 1964).
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with the area, and search for a home for his family. When he arrived in Denver he was housed in a motel which had been rented
for him by the defendant corporation. The day on which the accident in question occurred Donaldson breakfasted with an official
of the corporation and then spent some time looking for a house.
That evening he dined with a corporate official and discussed corporate business. On the way back to his motel, an automobile accident occurred in which he injured the plaintiff, Hynes. Hynes
brought this action against the corporation, Donaldson's principal.
The trial court granted defendant corporation's motion for summary
judgment but the supreme court, in an opinion by Frantz, J., reversed,
holding that:
An employee who, in following his master's instructions, is
away from home or the headquarters of his employment ...

which

makes it impossible to return home each night must of necessity eat
and sleep in various places to carry on the business of his master.

Under the circumstances we hold that a servant while lodging in a
public accommodation, preparing to eat, or while going to or returning from a meal,
is performing an act necessarily incident to his
3

employment.6
Finally, the court held that whether the facts of this case brought
Donaldson within this rule was a jury question.
The basis of affixing liability on the master for the acts of his
servant is the doctrine of respondeat superior. The master is liable
when he has placed his servant, over whom he has the right to control, in such a position as to cause injury to third parties.64 The periods during which the master has this right to control and direct the
agent are said to be within the "scope of employment."" In addition,
the courts have extended liability for acts of the servant which are
incidental to the scope of employment, those acts which the master
could have reasonably anticipated as probable in view of the terms
of the employment." Colorado has generally recognized these principles as evidenced by the cases cited in Hynes.67
Id. at 223.
64Foerker v. Nicholson, 41 Colo. 12, 92 Pac. 224 (1907), The court quotes Quarman
63

v. Burnett, 6 M W 497, 151 Eng. Rep. 509 (Ex. 1840):
[Tihe master is responsible for the acts of his servant; and that person is
undoubtedly liable, who stood in the relation of master to the wrongdoer he who had selected him as his servant, from the knowledge of or belief in
his skill and care, and who could remove him for misconduct, and whose
orders he was bound to receive and obey; ... 41 Colo. at 13.
65 Id.

6 Miller v. Teche Lines, Inc., 175 Miss. 351, 167 So. 52 (1936).
A case in which an action
was brought when an alleged agent shot and killed the plaintiff's husband as he
trespassed on defendant's land. However, no employment was shown between defendants and the alleged agent, even though the land did belong to these defendants.

67 Sayers v. Nuckolls, 3 Colo. App. 95, 32 Pac. 187 (1893).
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The issue presented in Hynes was whether the accident occurred
at a time when Donaldson's acts were within the master's right to
control him either directly or incidentally. The question here is particularly difficult because on the day in which the accident occurred
Donaldson was looking for a possible residence for his family in
the event he was moved to Denver. Granted, Donaldson was in Denver by order of his master, but it would seem that at least while
Donaldson was looking for a home he was beyond the scope of
employment.8
The difficulty arises because in support of its decision, the court
places much emphasis on the fact that the accident occurred after
Donaldson had eaten his evening meal, citing three travelling salesIn denying the plaintiff relief the court annouced the rule that "there must be an
relation of master and servant must exist; that the wrong of the
employment -the
servant was incidental to or in the line of his employment and within the authority
given." 3 Colo. App. at 102. The wrong committed was not an incident to the
employment but the criminal act of a confederate; In Cooley v. Essridge, 125 Colo.
102, 241 P.2d 851 (1952), the defendant employer was doing some construction
work and had entered into a contract with the plaintiff whereby the latter agreed
to furnish equipment and operators, and pay all expenses of his operation. Defendant also hired one Berglin to see that dirt was deposited correctly and see that
plaintiff did his work. Subsequently Berglin was employed by the plaintiff to put
in some overtime; the wages for this period were to be paid by plaintiff. On the
day the accident occurred one of plaintiff's operators didn't appear. Berglin didn't
contact the defendant but employed one Ferrel to help with some machinery. Ferrel
drove the machine up a hill and due to his acts it was damaged.
In denying plaintiff a recovery the court said:
There is no competent evidence in the record to support a finding that
Berglin was acting within the scope of his employment when he undertook
the matters of which the complaint is here made resulting in plaintiff's
damages. The things which Berglin undertook to do were not for Edna's
(defendant's) benefit but for plaintiffs advantage, and were matters which
were exclusively for plaintiffs benefit. They amounted to a wilful trespass
and were unlawful; and, as we have said, Edna '(defendant) is not liable
therefor in the absence of express authorization. 125 Colo. at 114. (Emphasis added.)
Gibson v. Dupree, 26 Colo. App. 324, 144 Pac. 1133 (1914), was a case where
the plaintiff, while riding a bicycle, was struck by an auto driven by N. The auto
was kept by the employers of N subject to a bailment for E. N had been forbidden
to take any auto out of the garage except upon call of the owner. The accident
occurred while N was returning from having a battery charged. Caring for batteries
was a part of his duties but he had no authority to use the auto. In holding the
employers liable for N's tort the court said: "Such disobedience in using the automobile for such purpose has relation merely to the manner in which the act (going
and returning with the battery) was performed. The masters are liable for injury
caused by the disobedience of the servant in so using the automobile." 26 Colo.
App. at 328.
68Admittedly this house-hunting occurred while Donaldson was employed by the
defendant but there was no control exercised by defendant nor was there benefit to
him apart from the fact that Donaldson's family would have a place to live upon
arrival in Denver. For cases holding this activity beyond the scope of employment
see Gibbons & Reed Co. v. Howard, 129 Colo. 262, 269 P.2d 701 (1954) ; Cooley
v. Essridge, 125 Colo. 102, 241 P.2d 851 (1952); Marron v. Helmecke, 100 Colo.
364, 67 P.2d 1034 (1937) ; see Tregellas v. American Oil Co., 188 A.2d 691 (Md.
1963); Porter v. Jack's Cookie Co., 106 Ga. App. 497, 127 S.E.2d 313 (1962);
McClean v. Chicago Great W. Ry., 3 Ill. App. 2d 235, 121 N.E.2d 337 (1954);
Loos v. Boston Shoe Co., 123 Cal. App. 2d 564, 266 P.2d 884 (1954) ; SEAVEY, LAW
OF AGENCY § 83B (1964), "It is only during the period in which the servant has
duties that the employer is liable for his unauthorized conduct." At p. 141.
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men cases as authority for the point that the meal was incidental to
the scope of employment."9 But in each one of these cases the travelling salesman had caused some injury, either while performing or
after having performed a service for his master. In Hynes, Donaldson
was eating a meal after having performed an act for himself and apparently on a day during which he could look for a home. It may
be argued that the dinner was eaten with an official of the defendant
corporation, but the court does not limit the decision to that set of
facts." The apparent basis of the holding of the case is the sole fact
that a meal was eaten while Donaldson was in Denver by order of
the master. 7 But, as illustrated in the travelling salesmen cases, the
meal must be related to some act done for the master. This decision
is puzzling because surely the court does not mean that any meal
that Donaldson eats while in Denver is incidental to his employment,
but the import of the court's words would seemingly lead to that
conclusion.
This decision should be limited to the facts of this case because
an adoption of a liberal interpretation of Hynes will bring an unreasonable broadening of the scope-of-employment concept.
In 1964 there were no partnership cases interpreting Colorado
law which would require a discussion in this review.
William E. Brayshaw
69

Brunk v. Hamilton, 334 Mo. 517, 66 S.W.2d 903 (1933). In this case defendant's
agent was a travelling salesman employed to procure sales over a large area. He
fixed his own hours. On the day the accident occurred, the agent was driving a
company car, he had left his base to sell various products and on the return he
stopped at one town to have dinner. After dinner and on the way back to his base
the accident happened. Defendant argued that the agent was no longer working for
him when the accident occurred. In rejecting the defendant's argument the court
said: "Such activities or suspensions of activity are necessary concomitants of the
employment." 66 S.W.2d at 907. The court also dealt with the question of stopping
for dinner as being within the scope of employment, saying: "Cessation of work
for eating, drinking, and other like necessities are necessary incidents of employment,
and an employee so engaged does not sever his relation from his work, nor does he
do so by going to or from his places of work."; 66 S.W.2d at 907. Ryan v. Farrell,
208 Cal. 200, 280 Pac. 945 (1929): Here the agent was also a travelling salesman
who had gone into his territory to solicit some customers for his master, the defendant Rex. On the return trip he injured the plaintiff. In holding that the plaintiff
was entitled to a new trial the court said: "An employee who has gone on an errand
on behalf of his master does not cease to be acting in the course of his employment
at the moment he starts upon the return trip after having performed the errand."
280 Pac. at 946; May v. Farrell, 94 Cal. App. 703, 271 Pac. 789 (1928), on identical
facts with the Ryan case, discussed above, the court said, in holding the agent's acts
were within the scope of employment, "it being sufficient . . . that he was engaged
in acts contributing to the service .... " 271 Pac. at 794.
70
Hynes v. Donaldson, 395 P.2d 221, 223 (Colo. 1964), "[P]reparing to eat or
returning from a meal .... "
7' Cunningham v. Union Chevrolet Co., 177 Tenn. 214, 147 S.W.2d 746 (1941). The
mere fact that the injury complained of was caused by negligence of the servant in
the performance of an act which, taken per se, was within the scope of his employment, will not impose a liability upon the matter, if the act was merely incidental
to the servant's attempt to perform an act entirely beyond the scope of his authority.
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III. CRIMINAL LAW, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE,
AND HABEAS CORPUS
During 1964 the Colorado Supreme Court decided over fifty
cases dealing with criminal law, criminal procedure, and habeas
corpus. No attempt is made herein to discuss each case; only those
cases deemed significant warranted comment.
A.

ACTS

DONE

SUBSEQUENT TO THE COMMISSION

OF HOMICIDE

NOT ADMISSIBLE TO SHOW PREMEDITATION AND DELIBERATION

In a 1964 homicide case, Stafford v. People, where deceased
was killed by a blow from defendant's fist, it was held that the facts
that defendant buried the body, repeatedly lied concerning the disappearance of the victim, went under an assumed name, and escaped
from jail while awaiting trial were properly introduced as evidence
of guilt but could not supply the missing element of malice.' It has
been held a number of times in Colorado that a blow with the fist
or open hand is not calculated to cause death, and malice or intent
to kill cannot generally be implied because death resulted from the
blow?
The more difficult question for the court was whether malice
could be implied from the acts of the accused subsequent to the killing. The court answered in the negative, relying on two North
Carolina cases3 which, in part, said flight and other acts showing
guilt subsequent to the homicide were not proper as evidence of
premeditation and deliberation.
There is a division of authority as to the propriety of allowing
the jury to consider subsequent conduct as bearing on the issue of
malice and premeditation. Most states seem to be in agreement that
such evidence, in conjunction with the other circumstances of the
crime, is admissible to show only state of mind and consciousness
of guilt at the time of flight.' However, some jurisdictions allow
1388 P.2d 774 (Colo. 1964).
McAndrews v. People, 71 Colo. 542, 208 Pac. 486 (1922); Murphy v. People, 9
Colo. 435, 13 Pac. 528 (1887). See, Annot., 22 A.L.R.2d 854 (1952) as to the
inferdence of malice or intent to kill where killing is by blow without a weapon.
3 State v. Steele, 190 N.C. 506, 130 S.E. 308 '(1925) ; State v. Foster, 130 N.C. 666,
41 S.E. 384 (1902). See a more recent case holding the same but not cited in the
Stafford opinion, State v. Blanks, 230 N.C. 501, 53 S.E.2d 452 (1949).
4
E.g., Green v. U.S., 259 F.2d 180 (D.C. Cir. 1958) ; State v. Golden, 67 Idaho 497,
186 P.2d 485 (1947) ; State v. Nelson, 65 N.M. 403, 338 P.2d 301 (1959) ; State
v. Ross, 92 Ohio App. 29, 108 N.E.2d 77 (1952); see generally 2 WIGMORE,
EvIDENCE § 276 (3rd ed. 1940). It is interesting to note that Colorado is one of
the few jurisdictions where such evidence is not expressly permissible to prove the
crime, but can only be used in corroboration of other evidence to show a guilty
conscience. Bernard v. People, 124 Colo. 424, 238 P.2d 852 (1951); Kostal v.
People, 144 Colo. 505, 357 P.2d 70 (1960) (Bernard v. People, supra, is cited with
approval, but the court states the rule as being that such evidence is admissible as
having a slight tendency to prove guilt).
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such evidence to be used in determining malice, premeditation and
deliberation.5 Colorado, by the Stafford decision, is not in accord
with this latter view.
B.

FORMER JEOPARDY -

MISTRIAL PROPER IN CASE TRIED BEFORE

COURT WITHOUT A JURY

Colorado has, since 1958, held that jeopardy attaches in the
prosecution of a criminal case which is tried to the court without a
jury at that moment when the judge begins to hear the evidence.6
In 1964 the Colorado Supreme Court held that there was no abuse
of discretion by the trial court in granting a mistrial in a murder
case tried without a jury when a state's witness, the defendant's
husband, was stricken and died while testifying. The defendant was
visibly disturbed, and the court, in granting a mistrial, acted within
the bounds of its discretionary power.7 Such declaration by the
trial court precluded defendant from successfully pleading former
jeopardy. The issue before the supreme court was whether there
was legal justification to warrant the mistrial. The court relied upon
language expressed in an earlier Colorado case tried before a jury,
Brown v. People," to substantiate its position. Essentially, a mistrial
5\Wahl v. State, 229 Ind. 521, 98 N.E.2d 671 (1951): "The jury had the right to
consider all of the circumstances bearing upon the question of premeditated malice,
regardless of whether the circumstances occurred before or after the homicide ..
"
State v. Staley, 56 S.D. 495, 229 N.W. 373 (1930): "If accused's conduct subsequent to the homicide is directly connected with and tends to prove a preconceived
plan and its continued execution in which the homicide is but one of several acts
planned it may then be shown to characterize the homicidal act as unlawful and a
part of a premeditated criminal plan ..
" Franks v. State, 187 Tenn. 174, 213
S.W.2d 105 (1948): "Any effort to conceal the crime on the part of the slayer is
admissible as showing premeditation ..
" Jones v. State, 153 Tex. Cr. App. 345,
220 S.W.2d 156 (1949): Acts of the accused immediately subsequent to the homicide admissible as showing malice. In State v. Bowser, 214 N.C. 249, 199 S.E. 31
(1938), the jury, in determining the question of premeditation and deliberation,
could properly consider the accused's conduct after the homicide. The case seems
contrary to the North Carolina position as expressed in prior and subsequent decisions, but the holding could be explained as pertaining only to conduct immediately
following the death. The opinion gives no explanation of the apparent disparity.
6 Markiewicz v. Black, 138 Colo. 138, 330 P.2d 539 (1958) (In a case submitted
to the court without a jury, jeopardy begins after accused has been indicted, arraigned,
has pleaded and the court has begun to hear the evidence).
7
McCoy v. District Court, 397 P.2d 733 (Colo. 1964).
8 132 Colo. 561, 291 P.2d 680 (1955), which said that:
To be legally justified there must be a reasonable objective sought and a substantial purpose attained. The granting of a mistrial would not be legally
justified because of some whimsical notion or frivolous impulse, such as for
instance, that some members of the jury dyed his hair or wore an artificial
limb. While the cause for the order must be substantial and real, it need
not be vital. It need only be such as could affect, or might in some way or
manner be considered as interfering with, retarding, or influencing, to even
a slight degree, the administration of honest, fair, even-handed justice to either,
both, or any, of the parties to the proceeding... 132 Colo, at 561, 568-69.
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is proper if there is a "reasonable objective sought" and a "substantial
purpose attained."' In the instant case, the court felt the fair administration of justice was an objective necessitating a mistrial and that
the cause for the order was "substantial and real.''
There is no express authority in Colorado warranting a mistrial
when the court is acting as the trier of facts. Justice Frantz, strongly
dissenting in this case, declared the majority holding contrary to all
known authority and to the Colorado Constitution, Article 2, Section 18, which provides:

"

. .

nor shall any person be twice put in

jeopardy for the same offense. If the jury disagree, or if the judgment be arrested after the verdict, or if the judgment be reversed for
error in law the accused shall not be deemed to have been in jeopardy."" The above excerpt from the Colorado Bill of Rights includes
no language that could be interpreted as authority for holding that
a mistrial granted in a case before a court without a jury precludes
accused from claiming former jeopardy. Justice Frantz states:
... Indeed, mistrial and discharge of a jury are interchangeable
judicial acts. I can conceive of no matter arising in the course of a
trial to a court which would warrant that court to declare a mistrial.

12

Mistrials will bar the defense of former jeopardy when the
case is tried before a jury," but there is apparently no authority in
other jurisdictions for granting a mistrial when the case comes before
the court presiding without a jury. 4 A proper course of action for
the trial court would have been to continue the case for a reasonable
period of time. The Supreme Court of Colorado clearly acted contrarily to the universally accepted view restricting mistrials to jury
cases in affirming the lower court's procedure.
9

Id. at 568.
1°McCoy v. District Court, 397 P.2d 733, 735 (Colo. 1964).
1 Id. at 736.
12 Ibid.
13Brown v. People, 132 Colo. 561, 567, 291 P.2d 680, 684 (1955).
14 E.g., Fisk v. Henarie, 32 Fed. 417, 427 (9th Cir. 1887), "Where a jury is discharged without a verdict, the proceeding is properly known as a mistrial ..
"
State v. Patterson, 64 Ariz. 40, 165 P.2d 309 (1946); Curley v. Boston HeraldTraveler Corp., 314 Mass. 31, 49 N.E.2d 445, 446 (1943), which held that, "A
mistrial is declared because of some circumstances indicating that justice may not
be done if the trial continues, and it results only in the discharge of the jury and
the impanelling of another jury to try the case anew .. "; Clark v. State, 170 Tenn.
484, 97 S.W.2d 644, 646 (1936), wherein the court stated that, "The term 'mistrial'
is aptly applied to a case in which a jury is discharged without a verdict.
'
See
generally, 27 WORDS AND PHRASES, Mistrial 620 (Perm. ed. 1961).
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C.

TRIAL COURT PROPER FORUM TO REQUEST ATTORNEYS' FEES
FOR

PROSECUTING

A WRIT

OF ERROR

ON BEHALF

OF AN

INDIGENT

In Corbett v. People, "5the supreme court held that the trial
court was the proper forum in which to request attorneys' fees and
out-of-pocket expenditures for prosecuting a writ of error on behalf
of an indigent criminal defendant.
This was the first time that such a request had been made in
the trial court. To substantiate its position, the high court relied
upon an analogous principle which says the trial court is the proper
forum in which an indigent would request aid of counsel to sue out
a writ of error.
D.

(1)

PLEA OF GUILTY CANNOT BE WITHDRAWN

AFTER THE

SENTENCE HAS BEEN IMPOSED.

(2)

IT IS PROPER FOR THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY TO EXPLAIN
TO ACCUSED CONSEQUENCES

OF A PLEA OF GUILTY.

Pursuant to Rules 32(e) and 37(d) of the Colorado Rules of
Criminal Procedure, the supreme court held that a motion to withdraw a plea of guilty to the crime of taking indecent liberties with
the person of a child, made after the sentence was imposed, was
properly denied.'
Rule 32(e) provides: "A motion to withdraw
a plea of guilty or of nolo contendere may be made only before
sentence is imposed or imposition of sentence is suspended." Rule
37(d) states: "No writ of error on behalf of the defendant shall
lie to a judgment based upon a plea of guilty or nolo contedere,
... " Rule 32(d) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure is
the counterpart of Rule 32(e). The court, at the time of promulgating the Colorado rules, purposely deleted that portion of Rule
32(d) which says: ". . . but to correct manifest injustice the court
after sentence may set aside the judgment of conviction and permit
the defendant to withdraw his plea."
Justice Moore, writing for the court in 1964, stated:
Omission of the last quoted clause from Rule 32(e) of the Colorado Rules of Criminal Procedure was not an oversight on the
part of this court. The committee of lawyers who served in preparation of the original draft of proposed Rules of Criminal Procedure
included the language above quoted from Federal Rule 32(d).
This court purposely deleted it from the rule to be followed in this
jurisdiction. 18
15389 P.2d 853 (Colo. 1964).
6
1n re Pigg's Petition, 384 P.2d 267 (Colo. 1963); In re Griffin's Petition, 382
P.2d 202 (Colo. 1963).
17Glaser v. People, 395 P.2d 461 (Colo. 1964).
18Id. at 462.
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Whether a plea of guilty can be withdrawn after the sentence
has been imposed is a much debated question. 9 In absence of a statutory provision to the contrary, whether to allow or refuse the withdrawal after sentence has been imposed lies within the sound discretion of the court."0 In a few states where statutes explicitly permit
withdrawal of a guilty plea before sentence, the statutes are so
construed as to prohibit a withdrawal after sentence has been imposed.21 In other states with like statutes, either requiring or permitting withdrawal before imposition of sentence, the above-mentioned rule of discretion is followed and is in accord with federal
practice ("to correct manifest injustice")," and with procedure in
a majority of the states. 3 Colorado is in the minority in absolutely
prohibiting the withdrawal of a guilty plea after sentence has been
imposed.
In another 1964 case, the question arose as to who explains to
a defendant the consequences of a plea of guilty. Section 39-7-8 of
the Colorado Revised Statutes2s contains the following language:
"In all cases where the party indicted shall plead guilty, such plea
shall not be entered until the court shall have fully explained to the
accused the consequences of entering such plea...." In this case,
the district attorney, acting under the court's direction, made the
necessary explanation to the accused, and the court accepted the plea
of guilty to the crime of indecent liberties; the supreme court
affirmed the judgment, declaring that the acceptance of the plea
did not violate any of defendant's constitutional rights.2 ' The court
reasoned that the above-mentioned statute does not require the judge
to make the explanation; the obvious meaning is that the rights of
the defendant must be protected pursuant to the court's sound discre19

20

E.g., Myers v. State, 115 Ind. 554, 18 N.E. 42 (1888) ; State v. Olson, 115 Minn.
153, 131 N.W. 1084 (1911). Curran v. State, 53 Ore. 154, 99 Pac. 420 (1909) ;
See also, Annot., 99 L. Ed. 217 (1955); 4 ANDERSON, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW
AND PROCEDURE § 1909 (1957).

E.g., Smith v. U.S., 324 F.2d 436 (D.C. Cir. 1963) ; Sands v. State, 126 So. 2d 741
(Fla. 1961) ; Fair v. Balkcom, 216 Ga. 721, 119 S.E.2d 691 (1961) ; State v. Plum,
14 Utah 2d 124, 378 P.2d 671 (1963) ; Pulaski v. State, 23 Wis. 2d 138, 126
N.W.2d 625 '(1964).

21 State v. Telavera, 76 Ariz. 183, 261 P.2d 997 (1953) ; State v. Rinehart, 255 Iowa
22

1132, 125 N.W.2d 242 (1963) ; State v. Scott, 101 Wash. 199, 172 Pac. 234 (1918).
FED. R. Civ. P. 32(d).

2 E.g., Holston v. State, 103 Ga. App. 373, 119 S.E.2d 302 (1961)

; State v. Raponi,

32 Idaho 368, 182 Pac. 855 (1919) ; Clift v. Commonwealth, 268 Ky. 573, 195
S.W.2d 557 (1937) ; State v. District Court, 81 Mont. 495, 263 Pac. 979 (1928) ;

People v. Longe, 269 App. Div. 474, 57 N.Y.S.2d 337 (1945) ; Gist v. State, 278
24

P.2d 250 (Okla. 1954).

See generally, 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 421 (4) (1961).
25 The court refers to the 1953 COLO. REV. STAT. § 39-7-8, which is identical in the
1953 and 1963 editions of the statutes.
26

Kephart v. People, 395 P.2d 7 (Colo. 1964).
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tion. In this instance the district attorney warned the accused of the
consequences of pleading guilty, advised him his right to counsel,
explained the nature of the charge, and advised him of his right to
a jury trial. There was no denial of due process."
There have been a number of other Colorado cases interpreting
section 39-7-8, Colorado Revised Statutes, in such a liberal fashion,
but they have dealt with the situations wherein his own counsel has
advised defendant of the consequences of pleading guilty and the
trial court has inquired into the adequacy of counsel's explanation
of defendant's rights.28 The Kephart case of 1964 is the first in
which the statute has been construed so as to allow the district
attorney to make this important explanation.
While the rule is not universal, especially as to misdemeanor
cases, it is generally recognized that when one pleads guilty to a
criminal charge, the court must inform the accused of his rights and
the significance of his decision.29 There are many cases in other
jurisdictions where, under analogous circumstances, the accused had
been held to have been sufficiently advised by the court." Research
has found no case in any jurisdiction prior to Kephart wherein
accused has been advised of his rights by a district attorney.

E.

RETRIAL IN A FIRST DEGREE MURDER CASE MUST BE ON THE
ISSUES OF BOTH GUILT AND PUNISHMENT.

In Jones v. People,"' the court held that issues of guilt and
punishment in a first degree murder case must be resolved by the
jury in a unitary fashion. The defendant had two trials. He had
been convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to death in
1960, but that judgment was reversed in 1961 and the case remanded
27 Id. at 9.
28

29

30

E.g., Marler v. People, 139 Colo. 23, 336 P.2d 101 (1959) ; Glass v.
Colo. 210, 255 P.2d 738 (1953).
E.g., Rowe v. U.S., 227 F. Supp. 666 (W.D. Wis. 1964) Martinez v.
Colo. 521, 382 P.2d 990 (1963) ; Adams v. State, 224 Md. 141, 167 A.2d
State v. Jones, 267 Minn. 421, 127 N.W.2d 153 (1964).
E.g., People v. Emigh, 174 Cal. App. 2d 392, 344 P.2d 851 (1959);

People, 127
People, 152
94 (1961)
(Defendant

deemed sufficiently informed of rights when represented by court-appointed attorney) ; Gladden v. State, 227 Md. 266, 176 A.2d 219 (1961) (Record discloses that
defendant specifically requested that no counsel be appointed and that judge informed
defendant of his plea) ; Brown v. State, 223 Md. 401, 164 A.2d 722 (1960) (Court
and counsel advised defendant as to his rights and the consequences of his plea);
Jones v. State, 221 Md. 141,

156 A.2d 421

(1959)

(Counsel

and court fully

explained the consequences of pleading guilty); State v. Wall, 36 N.J. 216, 176
A.2d 8 (1961) (Though technical meaning of non vuh not explained to accused,
consequences of plea were fully explained by counsel and the court); People v.
Serrano, 20 App. Div. 2d 777, 247 N.Y.S.2d 749 (1964)

(Plea of guilty to murder

in second degree allowed to stand, though the court, prior to plea, elicited information from defendant indicating a killing in the heat of passion.).
31393 P.2d 366 (Colo. 1964).
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for a new trial because evidence of mitigating circumstances was
denied admission.32 At the subsequent trial the extent of punishment was the sole issue determined by the jury. Upon a sentence of
death, defendant once again appealed. Now the court has declared
that where a sentence of death for first degree murder was reversed
and the case remanded for new trial because the defendant was
erroneously prohibited from introducing evidence of mitigating
cirumstances, a retrial on the issues of both guilt and punishment
was necessary."
In arriving at its decision, the majority pointed out that Section
40-2-1, Colorado Revised Statutes, which defines homicide and its
modes of commission, and Section 40-2-20, which provides that
once the killing has been proved the burden is upon the accused to
prove circumstances of mitigation, have long been construed in
relation to each other.3 " The court went further, stating that section
40-2-3, Colorado Revised Statutes, which provides, in part, that a
jury deciding guilt in a first degree murder case shall also fix the
penalty, must be construed in connection with sections 40-2-1 and
40-2-20 and must be a unitary action on the part of one jury.3"
The court said that it was powerless, pursuant to section 40-2-3,
to remand the case only on the issue of punishment; that a judicial
amendment of a legislative act is clearly improper, 36 as also is attributing to a statute a legislative intent which is inconsistent with the
plain and literal meaning of the statute."
Pringle, J., and Moore, J., dissented," Justice Moore stating in
his opinion that the procedure followed by the lower court in the
second trial was proper due to the fact that no defense to the murder
was presented at either trial and the only issue remaining upon
remand of the case was the extent of the punishment to be prescribed.3 9 Two factors were most persuasive in guiding the dissenters:
(1) The evidence prohibited in the first trial, which gave rise to
the error, was not presented to the jury in the second trial; (2) a
32Jones v. People, 146 Colo. 40, 360 P.2d 686 (1961).
33 393 P.2d at 368.
34
Kent v. People, 8 Colo. 563, 9 Pac. 852 (1886).
35 To the effect that a jury selected pursuant to law which finds a defendant
murder must also fix the penalty, see, People v. Hall, 199 Cal. 451, 249
'(1926) (but, if jury silent as to punishment, death penalty inferred) ;
People, 79 Colo. 576, 247 Pac. 559 (1926); Demato v. People, 49 Colo.
Pac. 703 (1910) ; People v. Hicks, 287 N.Y. 165, 38 N.E.2d 482 (1941).
3
6 Farmers' Irr. Co. v. Kamm, 55 Colo. 440, 135 Pac. 766 (1913).
37
Isaak v. Perry, 118 Colo. 93, 193 P.2d 269 (1948).
38 393 P.2d at 370.
3

9 Ibid.

guilty of
Pac. 859
Shank v.
147, 111
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Maryland case, Brady v. State,40 wherein the procedure followed by
the trial court upon the second trial was identical with that in the
instant case, the pertinent provisions of a Maryland statute being
the same as Colorado's." Jones presents a stronger case than Brady
for remand on the issue of punishment only, because in the latter
case there was also disagreement as to whether the prohibited evidence went not only to the matter of punishment but even to that of
guilt.
It is not uncommon for states to allow juries, pursuant to constitutional provisions or statutes, to assess the extent of punishment
to be administered in a first degree murder case; however, for lesser
offenses the court usually assesses punishment pursuant to statute, 2
and, as a general rule, when a new trial is ordered before a jury,
the parties are put in the same position as though the case had never
before been heard.4" Jones demonstrates that Colorado adheres to
the general view; the dissent presents the theory that an exception
can reasonably be made when the jury in the first trial has, without
error, passed on the issue of guilt and there remains to be decided
at the second trial only the extent of the punishment to be administered.
F.

ONE CONVICTED OF A CRIMINAL OFFENSE CANNOT BE SUBJECTED TO BODY EXECUTION

IN A CIVIL ACTION FOR THE

SAME WRONG.

Section 77-9-3 of the Colorado Revised Statutes and Rule
101(a) of the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure provide that a
person convicted of a criminal offense cannot be subjected to body
execution in a civil action for the same offense;4 4 proper construction
of the appropriate passages indicates, however, that acquittal of the
criminal charge prohibits a claim of immunity from body execution."
The defendants in Boyer v. Elkins 4 were acquitted of the criminal
40226 Md. 422, 174 A.2d 167 (1961), ajj'd, Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
41
ANNOT. CODE OF MD. art. 27, § 413 (1957).
42 E.g., People v. Lane, 16 Cal. Rptr. 801, 336 P.2d 57 (1961) ; State v. Maxey, 42
N.J. 62, 198 A.2d 768 (1964); Carroll v. State, 212 Tenn. 464, 370 S.W.2d 523
'(1963) ; State v. Sayward, 63 Wash. 2d 485, 387 P.2d 746 (1963).
43
E.g., State v. Killigrew, 202 Ind. 397, 174 N.E. 808 (1931); Hobbs v. State, 231
Md. 533, 191 A.2d 238 (1963) ; Duncan v. State, 41 Okl. Cr. 89, 270 Pac. 335
(1928) (Statute which provides that granting a new trial places parties in the same
position as though no trial had been had is constitutional.).
44 COLO. REv. STAT. § 77-9-3 (1963) provides that: "In no case shall an execution
issue against the body of a person when the person shall have been convicted in a
criminal prosecution for the same wrong." COLO. R. Civ. P. 101(a) (1963) states:
"[Iln no case shall such execution issue when the defendant shall have been convicted in a criminal prosecution for the same wrong."
45
Boyer v. Elkins, 390 P.2d 460 (Colo. 1964).
46 Ibid.
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charge of assault and battery but were subsequently subjected to
body execution pursuant to civil litigation of the same matter. The
supreme court held that the distinction made between one convicted
of a criminal offense and one acquitted of the criminal offense was
reasonable and did not violate the equal protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution; therefore, body execution could proceed.47
Relying on an earlier Colorado case,48 the court said that the
classification is reasonably related to the lawful purpose of the act,
i.e., that one convicted of a criminal charge should not be required
to suffer a second punishment. In Kennedy v. Simansky,49 the court
would not allow a body execution against one found guilty of assault
and battery in a civil action when, in an earlier criminal prosecution,
he had been merely fined for the same assault.
It is apparent that Colorado is the only state allowing body
executions which has declared that one previously convicted in a
criminal prosecution for the same wrong shall not be subject to
subsequent body execution."0 Various classes of persons have been
held to be exempt from arrest and imprisonment on execution
against the person,5' but it seems that no other jurisdiction would
exempt the judgment debtor who was previously prosecuted in a
criminal action for the same wrong. On the contrary, it would seem
that body executions initiated in a civil proceeding, but subsequent
to criminal prosecution for the same wrong, are commonplace outside Colorado. 2
G.

THE

RIGHT

AFFECT

IN

OF COUNSEL
COLORADO.

SHALL

THIS

HAVE

RULING

NO RETROSPECTIVE
SUBSEQUENTLY

RE-

VERSED BY THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT.
5 3
In Arthur v. People,
the court stated that the now-existing
requirement that accused persons shall be advised concerning their
right to counsel and offered assistance of counsel would not be given
47 Id. at 465.
48

Grant v. Gwyn, 148 Colo. 56, 365 P.2d 256 '(1961). In this case defendant was
convicted of a criminal offense and subsequently declared immune from body execution pursuant to an adverse civil verdict on the same incident.

4975 Colo. 103, 224 Pac. 233 (1924).

SOld.; Grant v. Gwyn, 365 P.2d 256 (Colo. 1961).
51 E.g., Swift v. Chamberlain, 3 Conn. 537 (1821)
(electors while going to or returning from the polls); Brazill v. Green, 137 N.E. 346, 243 Mass. 252 (1922)
(officer of the court if engaged in official duties) ; Bush v. Pettibone, 4 N.Y. 300
(1850) (idiots, lunatics or infants); Harrison v. Caudle, 141 S.C. 407, 139 S.E.
842 (1927)

(females exempt).
4
13c (1942).

52 See 33 C.J.S. Executions §

53 393 P.2d 371 (Colo. 1964).
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retrospective effect. Defendant was convicted of forcible rape in
1956, and the court, in the present case, felt that failure to advise
accused of right of counsel or failure to offer assistance of counsel
was not a violation of due process pursuant to state or federal law
at the time of the 1956 conviction." Recognizing that the United
States Supreme Court has brought about a change in the law, 5 the
court would not believe it was the intention of the Supreme Court
to apply the present law retrospectively." However, in Arthur v.
Colorado,57 a per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court reversed the
Colorado decision.
In Gideon v. Wainwright,58 the Supreme Court said nothing as
to the retrospectivity of the newly-promulgated rule. The ruling,
however, had been applied retrospectively prior to the Arthur case
in another per curiam opinion by the Supreme Court. 9 Whether to
apply a new ruling retrospectively has always been a difficult question for the courts,"0 but there is already abundant commentary to
the effect that Gideon should apply retrospectively.61 It is unfortunate the Supreme Court has chosen to deal with the issue summarily.
H.

FORFEITURE OF APPEARANCE BOND USUALLY FINAL IF DEFEND-

ANT

APPREHENDED

BY

THE

STATE

WITHOUT

ASSISTANCE

FROM THE SURETY

One interesting bail case came before the supreme court in 1964,
People v. Johnson."2 The court held that where, after forfeiture of
the appearance bond, the defendant is apprehended by the state
without assistance from the surety, judgment should be entered
54

The leading Colorado case on the subject at that time was Kelley v. People, 120 Colo.
1, 206 P.2d 337 (1949). See also Rules 11(a) and 44 (as amended) of the Colorado Rules of Criminal Procedure, requiring that persons accused shall be advised
concerning their right to counsel and offered assistance of counsel if indigent. Such
requirement was nonexistent when the defendant was convicted. See also Bute v.
Illinois, 333 U.S. 640 (1948), which the court relied on in deciding the Kelley case,
as authority for the proposition that federal and state due process are not necessarily
identical in comparable cases concerning right of counsel in criminal adjudications.
55
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
56 393 P.2d at 375.
5785 Sup. Ct. 943 (1965).
58372 U.S. 335 (1963).
59 Pickelsmer v. Wainwright, 84 Sup. Ct. 80 (1964).
60
E.g., United States v. Walker, 323 F.2d 11 (5th Cir. 1963).
61 See concurring opinion of Judge Sobeloff in Jones v. Cunningham, 319 F.2d 1, 4-5
(4th Cir. 1963), arguing that Gideon does apply restrospectively. For a strong
moral and legal argument advocating applying Gideon retrospectively, see Tucker,
The Supreme Court and the Indigent Defendant, 37 So. CAL. L. REV. 151, 177-178
(1964). See generally, 37 U. COLO. L. REv. 144 (1964); Showalter, Right to
Counsel- Retroactive Application of Gideon Rule, 36 U. COLO. L. REV. 578 (1964).
62
People v. Johnson, 395 P.2d 19 (Colo. 1964).
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against the surety for the penal amount of the bond, unless the court
sees fit to order a lesser amount, under no circumstances to be less
than the costs necessitated by defendant's failure to appear.
The surety is afforded protection pursuant to statute,63 either
before or after forfeiture,64 if he returns the defendant himself.
The court felt the clear intent of the statute was not to afford a surety
such protection, unless the trial court in the exercise of its sound
discretion thought otherwise, when the defendant was apprehended
without the aid of the surety. The court adopted appropriate lan65 to the
guage stated in a New York opinion, People v. Fiannaca,
effect that sureties, in most cases, would be held strictly liable for the
penal amount of the bond upon the disappearance of their principals.
The New York court in the Fiannacacase based its reasoning on the
earlier case of People v. Schwaize,"6 where it had said: ". . . Justice
may be defeated by the escape of the principal, and, if it is clearly
understood that the bondsman will be held rigidly accountable for
the escape, the administration of the criminal law will be promoted ... "67
In the absence of statutes to the contrary, sureties are generally
not discharged by any event occurring after forefiture of the bond.68
There are, however, instances when relief will be granted (absent
a statute to the contrary) if the default was excusable and the state
has lost no rights against the accused. 9 If the state will allow
remittance after forfeiture, it is usually only when the accused appears
63 COLO. REV. STAT.

§ 39-2-18 (1963)

provides:

In all cases of bail for the appearance of any person charged with any criminal
offense, the sureties of such person at any time before judgment is rendered,
upon scire facias to show cause why execution should not issue against such
sureties, may seize and surrender such person to the sheriff of the county
wherein the recognizance shall be taken, and it shall be the duty of such
sheriff, on such surrender and delivery to him of a certified copy of the
recognizance by which such sureties are bound, to take such person into
custody, and by writing acknowledge such surrender, and thereupon the
sureties shall be discharged from any such recognizance, upon payment of all
costs occasioned thereby.
64
Van Gilder v. Denver, 104 Colo. 76, 89 P.2d 529 (1939), where the court held that
a surety on a criminal recognizance may be released from liability thereon by the
surrender of the defendant, even after forfeiture and judgment against him on the
bond, if he acts before final disposition of the case, extending to a review on error.
65 306 N.Y. 513, 119 N.E.2d 363 (1954).
66 168 App. Div. 124, 153 N.Y.S. 111 (1915).
67
1d. at 126.
68

69

E.g., United States v. Copua, 94 F.2d 292 (7th Cir. 1938) ; United States v. Russo,
7 F. Supp. 391 (E.D.N.Y. 1934). But see, Annot., 84 A.L.R. 416, 422 (1933) as
to the inherent power of the court to relieve bail-bondsman from forfeiture of his
bond.
See generally, 8 C.J.S, Bail § 92(a) (1962).
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on his own volition 70 or surrenders through his surety. 71 The lastmentioned contingency is imposed by statute in Colorado. 7' The
Johnson opinion, however, indicates that the trial court is allowed
to exercise its sound discretion in the matter. The prevailing view
is that sureties cannot, as a matter of right under the statutes, redeem
themselves by surrendering the principal after forfeiture, and are
not released by the subsequent voluntary appearance of the accused ;73
the court may, however, refuse or grant the remittance, in whole or
in part, pursuant to its discretion.74
I.

(1)

AUTHORITY OF STATE BOARD OF PAROLE IS NOT LIMITED TO
PERSONS CONVICTED AND SENTENCED TO PRISON SUBSEQUENT TO CREATION OF THE BOARD.

(2)

MEANS OF PAROLE DO NOT INCLUDE EXECUTIVE COMMUTATION AND

RELEASE OF PRISONER TO FEDERAL JURIS-

DICTION.

A habeas corpus petition failed because the authority of the
State Board of Parole is not limited merely to persons who have been
convicted and sentenced to prison subsequent to the legislature's
creation of the board.75 The petitioner was convicted and sentenced
prior to the statutory establishment of the Board of Parole. He was
paroled by the board. The subsequent revocation of his parole gave
rise to the habeas corpus proceeding. The supreme court held that
section 39-18-1 of the Colorado Revised Statutes 76 (which deals
with parole regulations) was not an ex post facto law. The court
dismissed petitioner's contention that the board could not revoke his
70

General Cas. Co. of America v. State, 229 Ark. 485, 316 S.W.2d 704 (1958);
Edwards v. State, 321 P.2d 955 (Okla. 1958). But see, Van Gilder v. People, 75
Colo. 515, 227 Pac. 386 (1924) (The appearance for trial of the defendant in a
criminal case is not equivalent to a surrender of his person by a surety on his bond.).
71 United States v. Rutherford, 59 F.2d 1027 (3d Cir. 1932) ; Weber v. United States,
32 F.2d 110 (8th Cir. 1929) ; Southard v. People, 74 Colo. 67, 219 Pac. 218 (1923) ;
State v. Arioso, 207 Iowa 1109, 224 N.W. 56 (1929) ; Bruntlett v. Carroll County,
193 Iowa 875, 188 N.W. 142 (1922); Commonwealth v. Grady, 236 Ky. 98, 32
S.W.2d 720 (1930) ; Speight v. Porter, 2 La. App. 597 (1925) ; State v. Hinojosa,
364 Mo. 1039, 271 S.W.2d 522 (1954).
72
CoLo. REv. STAT. § 39-2-18 (1963). See note 62, supra.
73 United States v. Levine, 1 F. Supp. 104 (E.D.N.Y. 1932) ; Hickey v. State, 150 Ark.
304, 234 S.W. 168 (1921) ; People v. Durbin, 32 Cal. Rptr. 569, 218 Cal. App. 2d
886 (1963); People v. Simon, 244 I11.App. 484 (1927); State v. Shell, 242 Iowa
260, 45 N.W.2d 851 (1950); People v. Continental Cas. Co., 301 N.Y. 79, 92
N.E.2d 898 (1950) ; State v. Jimas, 166 Wash. 356, 7 P.2d 15 (1933).
74
E.g., United Benefit Fire Ins. Co. v. United States, 306 F.2d 325 (9th Cir. 1962)
People v. Durbin, 32 Cal. Rptr. 569, 218 Cal. App. 2d 886 (1963) ; State v. Fedrico,
82 N.H. 258, 132 At. 679 (1926). See generally, Annot., 84 A.L.R. 416, 424
(1933).
75
Coleman v. Tinsley, 393 P.2d 739 (Colo. 1964).
7
The court refers to the 1953 COLO. REv. STAT.; § 39-18-1 is § 39-18-4 in the 1963
edition of the statutes.
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parole, stating that if the act creating the board was invalid, the
board had no right to grant a petitioner's parole in the first place.
Petitioner could not enjoy the benefits of a parole system and then
disclaim it when he violated its provisions.
Both the Colorado and the United States constitutions prohibit
the passing of ex post facto laws.77 Colorado has interpreted this
prohibition78 in a manner consistent with the leading United States
Supreme Court case, Calder v. Bull." Since Calder, it has been
understood that the interdict against ex post facto laws does not
apply to civil statutes.80 An ex post facto law within the constitutional prohibition must be one which imposes punishment for an
act which was not punishable when it was committed, imposes additional punishment, or alters the situation of the accused to his
disadvantage. 1
Thus, the key factor in determining whether a statute is an
ex post facto law is whether it works to the disadvantage of the
accused, changing punishment or increasing it beyond that annexed
to the crime when committed. Parole regulations, clearly, were
promulgated for the benefit of those incarcerated in state penal
institutions and not designed to work a hardship on the inmates
77 U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 9,10 "No . .. ex post facto law shall be passed." "No State
shall . . . pass any . . . ex post facto Law ..
"; COLO. CONST. art. 2, § 11. "No

ex post facto law . . . shall be passed by the general assembly."
8 Garvey v. People, 6 Colo. 559, 45 Am. Rep. 531 (1883).

7

79 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798). Justice Chase wrote:
I will state what I consider ex post facto laws within the words and the intent
of the prohibition.
1st. Every law that makes an action done before the passing of the law,
and which was innocent when done, criminal, and punishes such action.
2d. Every law that aggravates a crime and makes it greater than it was
when committed.
3d. Every law that changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when committed.
4th. Every law that alters the legal rules of evidence and receives less
or different testimony than the law required at the time of the commission of
the offense in order to convict the offender.
80 See generally, 16A C.J.S. Constitutional Law §§ 435-438 (1956).
81

Andrus v. McCauley, 21 F. Supp. 70 (E.D. Wash. 1936). See, e.g., Graham v.
Thompson, 246 F.2d 805 (10th Cir. 1957) (An ex post facto law is a law that
changes punishment and inflicts greater punishment than the law annexed to the
crime when committed); United States v. Papworth, 156 F. Supp. 842 (N.D. Tex.
1957) (This clause precludes retroactive application of any substantive statute that
increases punishment or changes ingredients of offense between time of its commission and time of trial) ; Barton v. State, 81 Ga. App. 810, 60 S.E.2d 173 (1950)
(The application of a subsequent reduction of the penalty only to cases arising after
the enactment thereof does not raise the question of ex post facto legislation, because
ex post facto law prohibited by this clause refers only to laws which aggravate the
crime, increase the punishment, or allow conviction on a less or different weight of
evidence, and not to those which reduce or modify the penalty) ; Commonwealth
ex rel. Wall v. Smith, 345 Pa. 512, 29 A.2d 912 (1942) (An ex post facto law
within the constitutional prohibition against enactment of ex post facto law is one
which makes a crime of an act which when committed was not a crime or a law
which increases the punishment for an act already committed).
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therein. That a statute applies retrospectively does not necessarily
mean that it is an ex post facto law within the meaning of the state
and federal prohibition.82 In Kolkman v. People,8" the Colorado
court cites with approval Beazell v. Ohio, 4 to the effect that the
intent of the prohibition is ". . . to secure substantial personal rights
against arbitrary and oppressive legislation, . . . and not to limit the
legislative control of remedies and modes of procedure which do
not affect matters of substance,...."85
In another case of interest, the district court was held to have
erred in not issuing a writ of habeas corpus and in failing to grant
a hearing to a prisoner who alleged that he was not on parole, but
that his Colorado sentence was commuted by the governor for the
purpose of release to a federal court, and who further alleged that
he had been erroneously ordered by a Colorado supervisor of parole
to report to the parole office in Denver. " The order of release did
not constitute a parole, and at no time did petitioner agree to the
conditions of parole. The inference clearly is that section 39-18-1
of the Colorado Revised Statutes" does not include executive commutation and release to federal jurisdiction as a means of parole
from the state penitentiary.
Gerald IF. Wischmeyer

Satterlee v. Mathewson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 410 (1829) (Retrospective laws which do
not impair the obligation of contracts or partake of the character of ex post facto
laws are not condemned or forbidden by any part of the Constitution.).
8389 Colo. 8, 300 Pac. 575 (1931).
84269 U.S. 167 (1925).
85
Id. at 171.
8
Espinoza v. Tinsley, 390 P.2d 941 (Colo. 1964).
8
rThe court refers to the 1953 CO.
REV. STAT.; 39-18-1 is 39-18-4 in the 1963
edition of the statutes.
82
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IV. DOMESTIC RELATIONS
A. (1)

FATHER WHO, WITHOUT FAULT,
SUPPORT

PAYMENTS,

CANNOT

Is

DELINQUENT IN CHILD

BE

DENIED

VISITATION

RIGHTS AS PUNISHMENT FOR DEFAULT.
(2)

TRIAL COURT MAY ORDER PSYCHIATRIC EXAMINATION OF
PARTIES IN A DOMESTIC RELATIONS CASE THOUGH COLO.

R. CIV. P. 35(a) DOES NOT

SPECIFICALLY SO PROVIDE.

The court's decision in Kane v. Kane1 involved holdings on

several different points, two of which are of significance. The first
involves enforcement of an order to pay child support. A father had
been ordered to pay $460.00 per month child support, and he had
asked for a stay of execution of that order on the grounds that his
net income was only $500.00 per month. The wife had asked that
the father be denied visitation rights until he became current in his
child support payments. The supreme court granted the stay of
execution and ordered interim payments of $200.00 per month pending resolution of the issue. Then, citing no authority, the court
held that a husband cannot be punished by denying him visitation
rights until he becomes current in his payments. Colorado thus
joins a number of other jurisdictions wherein this rule has been
expressed.2
The general philosophy underlying such a rule is usually said
to be that children are entitled to the love and companionship of
both their parents, insofar as that is possible and consistent with
their welfare; a parent whose child is placed in the custody of another
person has a right of visitation with the child at reasonable times
It is only where the best interests of the child' indicate otherwise that
the father should be denied the right of visitation.' Thus visitation
rights and duty to pay support may be said to be independent of
1 391 P.2d 361 (Colo. 1964).
2
E.g., Fitch v. Fitch, 207 Iowa 1193, 224 N.W. 503 (1929); Gibford v. Gibford,
55 Wash. 2d 760, 350 P.2d 158 (1960) ; Block v. Block, 15 Wis. 2d 291, 112
NW.2d 923 (1961). Cf. Weiner v. Weiner, 149 N.Y.S.2d 362 (Sup. Ct. 1956).
Contra, Barbour v. Barbour, 134 Mont. 317, 330 P.2d 1093 (1958) (accompanied
by a strong dissent in favor of the rule adopted by Colorado).
3 See generally 2 NELSON, DIVORCE § 15.26 (1961).
'Searle v. Searle, 115 Colo. 266, 272, 172 P.2d 837, 840 (1946), cites with approval
this definition from Brock v. Brock, 123 Wash. 450, 212 Pac. 550, 551 (1923):
In determining what is best for the welfare of the child of tender years, the
court must consider not only the food, clothing, shelter, care, education and
environment, but also must bear in mind that every such child is entitled to
the love, nurture, advice and training of both mother and father, and to deny
the child an opportunity to know, associate with, love and be loved by either
parent, may be a more serious ill than to refuse it in some part those things
which money can buy.
5
Grosso v. Grosso, 149 Colo. 183, 368 P.2d 561 (1962); Strakosch v. Benwell, 135
Colo. 317, 310 P.2d 720 (1957); Fitch v. Fitch, 207 Iowa 1193, 224 N.W. 503
(1929) ; Syas v. Syas, 105 Neb. 533, 34 N.W.2d 884 (1948).
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each other,' with the welfare of the child the paramount consideration at all times.7 Careful note should be taken, however, of the
limiting words "through no fault of his own" 8 which the court used
in connection with the husband who is delinquent in support payments. The limiting words probably mean that before applying this
rule a court should require a husband to show that his delinquency
resulted from a bona fide financial inability to pay and not from
mere negligence or stubbornness or any other improper motive. Of
course, orders restricting or modifying the right of visitation are
within the discretion of the court.'
Compliance with orders of a court respecting alimony and support may be enforced by contempt proceedings"° and may include
imprisonment." Because contempt proceedings are elastic, other
remedies may be available where support money has not been paid,
but denial of visitation should not be so used. The best reasoning
behind not restricting visitation rights as a punishment for nonsupport is found in the principal case.
We can conceive of no greater cause for disharmony in human
or family relationships than the application of such vindictive rules.
And, we can conceive of nothing more apt to make a father stubborn 12to the point of contempt of abandonment than this application.
The Kane opinion also produced the court's clearest statement
confirming a trial court's power to order psychiatric examination
of parties in a domestic relations case, though such an examination
is not, said the court, specifically provided for in Colorado Rules
of Civil Procedure 35 (a)."3 It is true that the rule does not specifically provide that such an examination can be ordered in a domestic
relations case, but it expresses no limitation as to the type of action
to which it may be applied;" nor must the mental condition be

directly in controversy in order to employ its provisions." The prevailing view, in line with a philosophy of liberal construction of the
6

1n

re Dublin, 201 Wis. 621, 112 N.Y.S.2d 267 (1952).

7 Lear v. Lear, 29 Wash. 692, 189 P.2d 237 (1948).
8

Kane v. Kane, 391 P.2d 361, 363 (Colo. 1964).
Hayes v. Hayes, 134 Colo. 315, 303 P.2d 238 (1956); Bird v. Bird, 132 Colo. 116,
285 P.2d 816 (1955); Miller v. Miller, 129 Colo. 462, 271 P.2d 411 (1954);
Anderson v. Anderson, 124 Colo. 74, 234 P.2d 903 (1951) ; Emerson v. Emerson,
117 Coo. 384, 188 P.2d 252 (1947).
10 CoLo. REv. STAT. § 43-1-12 (1963).
11Harvey v. Harvey, 384 P.2d 265 (Colo. 1963).
12Kane v. Kane, 391 P.2d 361, 363 (Colo. 1964).
3 CoLo. R. Civ. P. 35(a) provides: "In an action in which the mental or physical
condition of a party is in controversy, the court in which the action is pending may
order him to submit to a physical or mental examination by a physician."
144 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE
35.03, at 2557 (1963).
9

'

Beach v. Beach, 114 F.2d 479 (D.C. Cir. 1940).
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Rules, is that there is no limitation on the type of action in which the
rule may be available."
In a 1951 case, Richardson v. Richardson," the Colorado
Supreme Court declared that a trial court had authority to require
the husband in a divorce proceeding to submit to a mental examination. In Nelson v. Grissom,8 the divorced father contested the
remarried mother's petition to remove the children from the state,
on the ground that the step-father, due to emotional instability, was
unfit to share custody of the children. Since the step-father was out
of the state, a mental examination was not ordered for him, but
the court implied that such an examination could properly have been
ordered had he been within the jurisdiction, 9 holding that hospital
records pertaining to the step-father's previously conducted psychiatric examination at Colorado Psychopathic Hospital were admissible, if otherwise competent and not privileged, as bearing on the
step-father's parental fitness."
The court's correct and liberal interpretation of Rule 35(a) in
Kane should serve as a reminder to Colorado attorneys that the rule
is available in other than personal injury cases.
B.

(1)

HUSBAND

MAY NOT BE REQUIRED TO MAINTAIN LIFE

INSURANCE

POLICY ON

His

LIFE, FOR WIFE'S BENEFIT,

AS PART OF ALIMONY AWARD.

(2)

COURT'S

ORDER

DIVIDING

PROPERTY

CANNOT

THAT PROPERTY ACQUIRED BY HUSBAND

REQUIRE

AFTER DIVORCE

AND PROPERTY SETTLEMENT BE SHARED WITH DIVORCED
WIFE.

Two important issues were passed on in Menor v. Menor2'the first dealt with whether the husband could be ordered to maintain an insurance policy on his own life and the second involved
the problem of how to divide property which existed in the form
of corporate stock. The Colorado Supreme Court disapproved orders
of the trial court in both instances.
In the division of property the husband had been ordered to
keep in full force and effect, for his wife's benefit, a $150,000
18 2A BARRON & HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 821.1, at 478

(1961).
17 124 Colo. 240, 236 P.2d 121 (1951).
18 152 Colo. 502, 382 P.2d 991 (1963).
19 The court said, at 152 Colo. 504, "Evidence

as to [the step-father's] emotional
stability, or lack of it, was certainly material to this issue, even though he was not
a party to this litigation." (Emphasis added.)

20 152 Colo. at 504.
21 391 P.2d 473 (Colo. 1964).
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executive protection life insurance policy naming her as sole beneficiary. The general rule is that a court does not have the authority
to order involuntary maintenance of an insurance policy to pay
future alimony.' Alimony is terminated by remarriage of the exwife," or the death of the ex-wife or ex-husband, 4 though attempts
have often been made to have alimony continue after the death of
the ex-husband through voluntary stipulations as to life insurance.
If the parties have reached such an agreement by contract, and the
contract is incorporated in the divorce decree, its terms may be
enforced after the death of either party."5 Absent this situation,
alimony stops with the death of the ex-husband and he cannot be
forced to provide for payments after his death through maintenance
of a life insurance policy. However, if the policy has a cash surrender value at the time of the divorce, this value may be taken into
consideration in a division of property by the court."8 The court
seems to have characterized the trial court's action with respect to
the insurance policy purely as an award incident to alimony. Had
the court characterized the insurance as aiding in support of the
children, would a different result have been reached?
Presumably, part of the proceeds from the insurance policy on
the father's life would benefit his three children even though the
sole named beneficiary of the policy was the mother of the children.
As a general rule in Colorado a father's duty to support his children
terminates on the emancipation of the child,27 or the father's death,28
and courts are without power, in rendering support orders, to have
the father establish an estate payable to his children upon his death. "
One recent case3" upheld an order forcing maintenance of an insur2See 2 NELSON, DIVORCE § 14.60 (1961).

2 See COLO. REv. STAT. 46-1-5 (1963) which states that: "[Tjhe remarriage of the
former wife shall relieve the former husband from further payment of alimony to
her... ."
24

Doll v. Doll, 140 Colo. 546, 345 P.2d 173 (1959) ; Elmer v. Elmer, 132 Colo. 57,
285 P.2d 601 (1955); International Trust Co. v. Liebhart, 111 Colo. 208, 139 P.2d
264 (1943).
25
Magarrell v. Magarrell, 144 Colo. 228, 355 P.2d 946 (1960); In re Yoss' Estate,
237 Iowa 1092, 24 N.W.2d 399 (1946); Flicker v. Chenitz, 55 N.J. Super. 273,

150 A.2d 688, (1959), where the court stated:
"It has been generally held that while the obligation to pay alimony in
technical sense ordinarily terminates upon the death of the husband, yet if
expressly undertakes to pay a stipulated sum . . . and the agreement
approved by the court . . . the provision is enforceable against the estate
the former husband upon his death."

its
he
is
of

26 2 NELSON, DIVORCE § 14, at 126 (1961).
27Taylor v. Taylor, 147 Colo. 140, 362 P.2d 1027 (1961).
2Doll v. Doll, 140 Colo. 546, 345 P.2d 723 (1959).
2Miller v. Miller, 52 Cal. App. 2d 443, 126 P.2d 357 (1942) ; Elmer v. Elmer, 132
Colo. 57, 285 P.2d 601 (1955); Brown v. Brown, 131 Colo. 467, 283 P.2d 951
(1955); Riley v. Riley, 131 So. 2d 491 (Fla. 1961) ; Rex v. Rex, 331 Mich. 399,
49 N.W.2d 348 (1951) ; Mahaffey v. First Nat'l Bank, 231 Miss. 798, 97 So. 2d
756 (1957) ; Kunc v. Kunc, 186 Okla. 297, 97 P.2d 771 (1939).
30 Riley v. Riley, 131 So. 2d 491 (Fla. 1961).
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ance policy on the theory that it was to be security for the payment
of a support order. This case has been strongly criticized however.'
The husband owned fifty percent of the stock in a corporation,
from which he derived his income. The trial court ordered that
present rights in the stock not be disturbed, but that in the event of
dissolution of the corporation or sale of the shares, twenty-five
per cent of the proceeds from such sale go to the wife and three
children and be divided among them equally. The husband objected
to awarding the wife an interest in the proceeds of a future possible
sale or dissolution of his corporate assets on the ground that this
would be an award of the future estate of the father.
Property settlements are based upon the situation of the parties
at the time of the decree"2 and are forever binding on the parties."
It is necessary to distinguish alimony from property settlement
because alimony, by its very nature, must be derived from a future
estate and property division must mean to divide property held at
the time of division.'4 Courts have a continuing jurisdiction over
alimony,"5 which may be increased, decreased, or terminated."6 The
purpose of alimony is to provide support for the former spouse
during the uncertain years following the divorce.
In the Meno-r case the order of the trial court as to the shares
of stock would have had effect only after the decree of divorce.
It could thus not have been a division of property for it would not
reflect the situation at the time of the divorce.37 Nor was it alimony
by its very terms. Such an award based on future disposition of the
stock would in no way reflect a division of the property as of the
date of divorce, since the stock might subsequently appreciate or
depreciate in value. The court ordered the value of the stock on the
date of the divorce decree ascertained, such valuation properly being
the subject of a division of property.
Stanley Lopata

31 Ibid. (dissenting opinion) ; 36 TUL. L. REv. 367 (1962).

" Stephenson v. Stephenson, 134 Colo. 96, 299 P.2d 1095 (1956); Brown v. Brown,
131 Colo. 467, 283 P.2d 951 (1955) ; Shapiro v. Shapiro, 115 Colo. 505, 176 P.2d
363 (1947) ; Gourley v. Gourley, 101 Colo. 430, 73 P.2d 1375 (1937).
33 Magarrell v. Magarrell, 144 Colo. 228, 355 P.2d 946 (1960); Zlaten v. Zlaten, 117
Colo. 296, 186 P.2d 583 (1947) ; Low v. Low, 79 Colo. 408, 246 Pac. 266 (1926).
34 See cases cited note 33 supra.
35 Harris v. Harris, 113 Colo. 41, 154 P.2d 617 (1944);
Stevens v. Stevens, 31 Colo.
188, 72 Pac. 1061 (1903).
36 Elmer v. Elmer, 132 Colo. 57, 285 P.2d 601 (1955), wherein the court held that,
"It is fundamental that alimony is subject to modification due to the changed circum"
stances of the parties, such as marriage, death ..
37 Brief of Plaintiff in Error, pp. 16-19, Menor v. Menor, 391 P.2d 473 (Colo. 1964).
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V. EVIDENCE
A.

LAY TESTIMONY,

BASED

ON

COMBINATION

OF FIRST-HAND

KNOWLEDGE AND HEARSAY, ADMITTED TO SHOW TRUTH OF
MATTERS ASSERTED

In a condemnation action the sole issue at the trial was the
compensation due from the water and sanitation district to the landowners for the taking of an easement for a water pipe line. From
judgment entered on the verdict for the landowners the water district
appealed to the Supreme Court of Colorado, asserting as error that
the testimony of one of the landowners regarding the depth of gravel
on the condemned land was hearsay and therefore inadmissible.
The knowledge upon which the witness based his testimony
was derived from two sources. First, he was present when the pipe
line was dug, and he observed the pipe being put in. Second, he was
present at the time "test holes" were dug to determine gravel depth
prior to the commencement of quarrying operations by a gravel company which had leased the land. The witness observed the depth
measurements being made and received them at that time from the
owner of the gravel company. The witness, therefore, was testifying
to facts that he knew partly at first hand, and partly from the reports
of another. The supreme court held:
Under such circumstances the judge should exclude, or admit,
according to his view of the reasonable reliability of the evidence.
McCormick, Evidence, § 10, p. 20. The trial court saw fit to admit
Dan Pomponio's testimony, and in this ruling we see no abuse of
discretion.1

The supreme court failed in its holding on this issue to include
any identifiable theory upon which it based its decision. It is not
clear whether the court decided that the testimony was admissible
as reliable first-hand knowledge, or whether the testimony was
partly hearsay but admissible for some other reason.
It is apparent that there is a hearsay problem that should have
been resolved. The testimony of the witness as to the measurements
reported to him out of court by the owner of the gravel company
was offered to show the truth of the matters asserted therein, and
thus rested for its value upon the credibility of the out-of-court declarant who was not subject to the normal safeguard of oath, confrontation, and cross-examination. Such testimony is clearly hearsay.2
Many occasions naturally arise where a lay witness will testify to
facts that he knows partly from his own opportunity to observe
and partly from reports of others. To what extent should such evidence be admissible? That the judge should admit such evidence if
1 Baker Metropolitan Water and Sanitation District v. Calvaresi, 397 P.2d 877 (Colo.
1964).
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in his discretion it appears reliable may be stating the rule too
broadly.
Will testimony of this nature be admitted if the greater portion
of it is based on knowledge derived from the out-of-court reports
of third persons? May the rule be stated that unless testimony is
wholly hearsay, it will be admitted if it appears reliable? Probably
the supreme court did not intend to open the door to the admission
of this type of testimony to that degree.
The court cited McCormick, Evidence, § 10, p. 20, as the basis
for its decision. McCormick states:
One who has no knowledge of a fact except what another has
told him cannot, of course, satisfy the present requirement of knowledge from observation. When the witness, however, bases his testimony partly upon first-hand knowledge and partly upon the accounts
of others, the problem is one which calls for a practical compromise.
Thus when he speaks of his own age, or of his kinship with a
relative, the courts will allow the testimony. And in business or
scientific matters when the witness testifies to facts that he knows
partly at first-hand and partly from reports, the judge, it seems,
should admit or exclude according to his view of the need for and
the reasonable reliability of the evidence.

A careful scrutiny of the cases which McCormick cites in support of this passage will reveal that if testimony consisting of both
hearsay and first-hand knowledge is to be admissible, the circumstances giving rise to its reliability must be very potent indeed if any
substantial part of it is based on the report of others. In all the cases
which McCormick cites, there is either a substantial relationship
between the witness and the reporting parties which gives rise to the
reliability of the reported information,3 or the witness is testifying
as an expert and the information relayed to him by others out of
2

McCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 225 (1954); 31A C.J.S. Evidence § 200 (1964).
Hunt v. Stimson, 23 F.2d 447, 452 (6th Cir. 1928). The trial court excluded testimony of the general sales manager of a lumber company on the grounds that his
testimony was incompetent for lack of first-hand knowledge. The witness was testifying to the amount of lumber on hand on a given day to prove ability to perform
a contract. Part of the basis for his conclusion was his memory of certain memoranda,
in the form of tallies prepared by other employees regularly in the course of the
business, which had not been preserved. The court of appeals considered that the
witness was the general sales manager, he was "constantly familiar" with the particular lumber yard, he observed all of the piles of lumber in question, he participated
in tallying many of them, he could estimate with fair accuracy the quantity of a
pile from his observation, he necessarily kept informed as to amounts currently
available, and that there was a 40% margin of safety in his estimate, and reversed.
The court said, "We think that such objections as there were went to its weight,
not its competency .... " because the witness' memory of the former memoranda was
-... so aided by the circumstances as to entitled it to jury consideration .... " In
this case not only is the information reported to the witness by employees in the
regular course of the business but the witness is testifying as to matters with which
he is particularly qualified. There is a substantial guarantee of trustworthiness to
the testimony.
Dick v. Puritan Pharmaceutical Co., 46 S.W.2d 941 (Mo. App. 1932). Testimony of the owner and manager of a business that certain letters were mailed out
was held not excludable as hearsay even though he had not personally mailed them
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court is within his qualified realm,' or the court has allowed in the
hearsay portion of the testimony under one of the exceptions to the
hearsay rule.5 The law review article he cites deals entirely with
the problems encountered where an expert bases his opinion upon
his own first-hand knowledge and the reports of others dealing
with matters within his qualified field."
The examples that McCormick uses as a vehicle for his expression that mixed hearsay and first-hand testimony should be
admissible according to the judge's view of the need for, and the
reasonable reliability of, the evidence indicate that it may not have
been his intention to apply this rule to the situation where a lay
witness is testifying to facts which do not have a considerably high
degree of reliability. In the example he gives of a witness speaking
of his own age, or of his kinship with a relative, the unreasonableness of applying the hearsay rule on the ground that knowledge of
the fact was based partly on reports of third persons is obvious.7
The other examples fall within testimony relating to business or
scientific matters. Generally when a witness testifies to business matters and his knowledge thereof is derived partly from reports of
third persons, the knowledge thus derived has been received in the
but had been informed of their mailing by the secretaries who sent them. The court
observed that the witness was in close touch with the business and such information
was ordinarily known and continually acted upon by men in charge of such a business and held; "Testimony based on knowledge thus coming to him in the course
of business is not to be excluded as hearsay . . . It was not necessary for him to
prove this fact by every factory girl who attended the details of mailing each and
every sample and letter .
4 Schooler v. State, 175 S.W.2d 664, 670 '(Tex. Civ. App. 1943). A research geologist
testifying as an expert gave testimony as to structure and oil prospects of land based
on personal inspection and in large part on geological reports made by others. The
court held:
We think the testimony was admissible. The conclusions of an expert
as to so technical a subject as the geological features of a defined area
arrived at in part from study of unsworn reports prepared by other experts
are analogous to the diagnosis by a physician based in part on unsworn
reports of tests made by hospital technicians. Testimony of diagnoses based
in part on such reports has been held to be admissible. Sundquist v. Madison, Rys. Co., 197 Wis. 83, 221 N.W. 392; see also Abbott's Civil Jury
Trials, 5th Ed., p. 587. The objection, we think, goes more to the weight
to be given to, than to the admissibility of, such testimony. Testimony
predicated both upon personal knowledge and upon hearsay has been held
to be admissible in this jurisdiction. Norris v. Lancaster, Tex. Com. App.,
280 S.W. 574. 175 S.W.2d at 670.
5 Gresham v. Harcourt, 75 S.W. 808 (Tex. Civ. App. 1903). The witness was testifying as to the number of sheep belonging to partnership. The witness was present
when the sheep were counted and heard two men who did the counting call out
the numbers and she put the numbers down in a book at that time. The court said
that this was not hearsay, but was 'original testimony coming within the rule of
" 75 S.W. at 808.
res gestae ...
6 Maguire and Hahesy, Requisite Proof of Basis for Expert Opinion, 5 VAND. L. REv.
432 (1952).
7 This may properly be called the common sense exception to the hearsay rule-"Plainly
the whole human scheme is acrawl with hearsay, and highly intolerant we should
be of any legal technician who tried substantially to cut down the convenient operation of this huge undefined exception to the rule of exclusion." MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE
-COMMON

SENSE

AND THE

COMMON LAW

130 (1947).
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course of the business and has found its way into business records.
Reports of this nature are commonly regarded as being one of the
exceptions to the hearsay rule.8 The need for and the reliability of
such evidence has been recognized by the majority of jurisdictions.
And almost inevitably, when a witness is testifying to scientific matters, he is first qualified as an expert in that field. There are sound
reasons for regarding expert testimony based partly on the reports
of other investigators or technicians as being competent.' And this
is especially true when the reports of third persons are attested by
the expert as being information upon which he would normally
act, or use as the basis for his judgment, in the practice of his profession."0 Even though there are good grounds for the need for, and
reliability of, such expert testimony, McCormick himself recognizes
that the majority of jurisdictions probably would still not allow an
expert to base his opinion on the report of others because of the
absence of the first-hand knowledge qualification." Colorado stands
with the majority which would exclude such testimony.'
8 Business records as an exception to the hearsay rule: See generally Empire Diesel,
Inc. v. Brown, 146 Colo. 477, 361 P.2d 964 (1961); MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE §§ 28190 (1954) ; 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 1517-20 (3d ed. 1940) ; Tracy, Introduction
of Business Records, 24 IowA L. REV. 454'(1939).
9 National Bank of Commerce v. New Bedford, 175 Mass. 257, 261, 56 N.E. 288,
290 (1900). (The court held that knowledge derived from hearsay is reliable because the expert gives it the "sanction of his general experience.") ; Finnegan v. Fall
River Gas Works Co., 159 Mass. 311, 34 N.E. 523 (1893); MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE

§ 15 (1954) ; Maguire, supra note 6. In Finnegan, supra, Holmes approved reception
of such testimony on the theory that the out-of-court report "gains an authority" by
being accepted by the expert.
10 MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 15 at 33 (1954).

"id. at 32. See also People v. Black, 367 111. 209, 10 N.E.2d 801 (1937) wherein
the court found that an expert witness "invaded the province of the jury" in weighing
matters privately reported to him; People v. Keough, 276 N.Y. 141, 11 N.E.2d 570
(1937) in which the court said:
Where his [expert's] opinion, however, is based upon the statements of
third persons not in the presence of the jury, the latter not only is in
ignorance of what those statements contain, but also has no opportunity
to pass on the truth and probative force of the statements or to determine
whether the statements were not concocted to produce a desired result
11 N.E.2d at 572 ;
....
State v. David, 222 N.C. 242, 22 S.E.2d 633 (1942) where the court held that
testimony of an expert based on information obtained in any other manner than
from the evidence given in court is hearsay and inadmissible; Annot., 98 A.L.R. 1109
(1935). But see United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 35 F. Supp. 820 (S.D.
N.Y. 1940) in which it was held that:
Opinion testimony by an acceptable expert resting wholly or partly on information, oral or documentary, recited by him as gathered from others,
which is trustworthy and which is practically unobtainable by other means,
is competent even though the firsthand sources from which the information
came be not produced in court ....

In other words, when hearsay evidence

is offered it is admissible if resort to it be essential in order to discover
the truth and if the surroundings persuade the court that the information
adduced by the expert as a basis of his opinion is reliable. 35 F. Supp. at 823.
12Walsen v. Gadis, 118 Colo. 63, 194 P.2d 306, 319 (1948). In an action between
conflicting claimants to subterranean ore, a map drawn by mining company not a
party to the litigation was inadmissible to establish basis for the opinion of a mining
engineer, who had independent first-hand knowledge, as to location of ore. The court
said the exhibit "should be the result of the engineer's own effort and observations
and could then be the basis for his opinions; otherwise not .... " 118 Colo. at 88.
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Surely, then, it would be premature to apply the statement of
the rule in the principal case to the situation where a lay witness is
testifying, where there are no circumstances which clothe the hearsay
part of the testimony in a substantial degree of trustworthiness, and
where there is no clear showing of necessity to resort to such evidence.
There has been growing recognition of the need to liberalize the
exclusionary rules of evidence in favor of admissibility, and the unruliness of the hearsay rule has been especially criticized. 3 But the
nature of the legal profession is notoriously conservative 4 and its
natural inclination is to resist any revolutionary change.
Only Texas, which is notably a jurisdiction of comparatively
liberal rules toward admissibility of evidence," has admitted testimony based on facts known partly at first hand and partly from
hearsay when neither need to resort to such testimony nor strong
circumstances which give rise to the reliability of the hearsay element are present. 6 That jurisdiction goes so far as to say that unless
testimony is "wholly hearsay" it is admissible. 7 The adoption of such
a rule would seem to give too much discretion to the trial judge to
admit testimony based in large part on hearsay. The principal reasons
for the exclusion of hearsay are the want of the normal safeguards
of oath, confrontation, and cross-examination for the credibility of
the out-of-court declarant.' And it is evident that most jurisdictions
adhere to the rule quite stringently. 9 The Texas rule intimates that
13 Maguire, op. cit. supra note 7, at 147.
141d. at 150.
"5Texas is probably the only jurisdiction to clearly accept declarations of "present sense
impressions" as an exception to the hearsay rule. This theory is roughly akin to the
excited utterances (res gestae) exception except that it does not require a startling
or shocking event and is therefore without the supposed safeguards of impulse, emotion, or excitement. Houston Oxygen Co. v. Davis, 139 Tex. 1, 161 S.W.2d 474
(1942). See generally MCCORMICK, op. Cit. supra note 10, § 273.
16 Schooler v. State, 175 S.W.2d 664 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943) ; Fort Worth and R.G.
Ry. v. Thompson, 77 S.W.2d 289 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934) ; Norris v. Lancaster, 280
S.W. 574 (Tex. Coin. App. 1926). In Norris, supra, the testimony of shipper's
superintendent as to the condition of vegetables which he had inspected prior to
shipment held admissible although he did not remember the particular freight car
and referred to records of shipment, which had not been made by him, and were not
offered into evidence. The court said:
The rule undoubtedly is that, where it appears a witness' testimony is
predicated both upon personal knowledge and upon hearsay, his testimony
is admissible . . . . To exclude testimony upon the ground of hearsay, it

must affirmatively appear that such testimony is wholly hearsay, and that
the witness is not speaking as to matters otherwise within his own knowledge ....

28 S.W. at 576.

17 Norris v. Lancaster, supra note 16.
18 MCCORMICK, op. Cit. supra note 10, § 225 at 460.

19 Board of Com'rs of Lake County v. Keene Five-Cents Sav. Bank, 108 Fed. 505,
510 (8th Cir. 1901) which held that "The rule that hearsay is incompetent evidence
is essential to the preservation of personal liberty and the rights of property. It
should be guarded against encroachment with jealous care . ... "
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as long as the witness has some first-hand knowledge his testimony
is admissible even if mostly hearsay. Such a rule applied liberally
would vitiate the hearsay rule as well as the reasons which created
it. There have been comparativly few cases in Texas that have recited the rule, which may indicate a reluctance to apply a rule so
liberal and potentially limitless in application.
It is notable that while McCormick included as an element of
his proposed rule that the judge in his discretion ". . should admit
or exclude according to his view of the need for . . ." evidence of
the type in question, the Colorado Supreme Court chose to exclude
the element of necessity. In the statement of the rule, the judge can
admit or exclude merely on the basis of the reasonable reliability of the
evidence."0 There was no showing in the reported case that the out20 Leading legal scholars have recognized the probative value of hearsay in situations
where it was excluded because it did not come under a recognized exception and have
advocated drastic revision of the hearsay rule for that reason. The proposed solution
is to allow relevant, material hearsay if it satisfies general requirements of necessity
and trustworthiness. See e.g. MCCORMICK, op. cit. supra note 10, 626-34; 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1427 (3d ed. 1940) ; and 13 STAN. L. REV. 945 (1961). Perhaps
this is not such a drastic revision in view of the fact that Wigmore maintains the
original basic principles underlying the exceptions themselves are necessity and
circumstantial guarantee of trustworthiness. When the courts have adopted the proposals and have gone outside the orthodox hearsay exceptions to allow hearsay, they
have invariably done so on the grounds of necessity and circumstantial guarantee of
trustworthiness. In Dallas County v. Commercial Union Assur. Co., 286 F.2d 388
(5th Cir. 1961 ) the court said:
We do not characterize this newspaper as a "business record", nor as an
'ancient document", nor as any other readily identifiable and happily tagged
species of hearsay exception. It is admissible because it is necessary and
trustworthy, relevant and material, and its admission is within the trial
judge's exercise of discretion in holding the hearsay within reasonable
bounds. 286 F.2d at 397.
Even in this relatively liberal approach to admissibility, necessity is a vital element.
Courts that have recognized that hearsay may be admissible if resort to it be essential
in order to discover the truth, do not generally hold that total inaccessibility of
first hand knowledge is a condition precedent to its admissibility, but they rarely
find "necessity" to exist in absence of at least a showing that "great practical inconvenience" would be imposed in producing the first-hand material. See United States
v. Aluminum Co. of America, 35 F. Supp. 820 (S.D.N.Y. 1940).
In a situation like ours, where a witness testifies to facts known partly at firsthand and partly from hearsay, it is likely that much probative value would be lost
if the testimony were excluded, and this is undoubtedly the type of situation the legal
scholars had in mind. But there must be solid grounds on which to admit such
testimony. The supreme court, in the principal case, by failing to include necessity
as a condition precedent to admission, seems to have strayed from the recognized
theories and general trend and has adopted, probably unintentionally, a very liberal
rule indeed.
This paper does not intend to delve into other areas of evidence which necessarily come into play in considering a problem of the scope of the one at hand. However, at this point it is apparent that there is a best evidence question that should be
considered. It is generally accepted in Colorado that testimony of what certain persons
told the witness is inadmissible where such persons can be produced, since the best
evidence of which the case is susceptible must be produced. See Sloan Sawmill and
Lumber Co. v. Gutthal, 3 Colo. 8 (1876). Proof of unavailability, which might take
the form of great practical inconvenience, may satisfy this problem but would necessarily bring into play the degrees of secondary evidence problem. Assuming that the
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of-court declarant was unavailable at all, or even that it would have
been inconvenient to bring him in. Furthermore, the degree of reliability that McCormick evidently intended, on the basis of the cases
and articles he cited, is hardly met in the principal case. There is
nothing in the relationship between the landowner (witness) and
the out-of-court declarant, his lessee, or in the surrounding circumstances, that gives the reported information any substantial degree
of reliability; nor is the witness testifying as an expert; nor did the
court consider the hearsay element of the testimony as coming under
one of the exceptions.
Perhaps the supreme court considered the hearsay element in
the witness' testimony so insignificant as compared to the first-hand
knowledge that it was not worth serious consideration, or the court
may have found that the hearsay-derived knowledge was only supplementary to the first-hand knowledge. That is, the knowledge
based on the report of the out-of-court declarant was offered to
prove the truth of a matter which the witness already knew from
his first-hand observation. In the latter case the court would be thoroughly justified in its holding."'
The case is probably not valuable, as to the issue in question,
for the very reason that it is based upon no identifiable theory. It is
probable that, if an attorney were to use this case as a vehicle to get
lay testimony admitted where the witness has some knowledge from
personal observation, but which is based largely on hearsay, the court
will require a considerably higher degree of reliability of the hearsay element before it allows the testimony. It is also probable that
the court will resort to such testimony only when necessary."
If the reliability of the hearsay element of such testimony can
be proved by showing that it falls under one of the exceptions to
he hearsay rule, the evidence is clearly admissible. The court in the
principal case might have considered a few possible exceptionsout-of-court declarant is unavailable, shouldn't there also be a showing that the
written report of the test hole measurements, if there was one in the principal case,
was also unavailable before the hearsay testimony should be admitted? See Hartford
Fire Ins. Co. v. Smith, 3 Colo. 422 (1877) ; but see Allen v. W.H.O. Alfalfa Milling
Co., 272 F.2d 98 (10th Cir. 1959) which held that the mere fact that matter is
provable by writing does not bar oral proof, and that parol proof based on knowledge
gained independently of the written matter is admissible even though it may pertain
to the same matter.
21 See Allen v. W.H.O. Alfalfa Milling Co., supra note 20, which held that where a
witness swears he has personal knowledge of a fact, his testimony is not rendered
inadmissible by a further showing that he also knows it from hearsay. See also, 31A
C.J.S. Evidence § 203 (1964).
22 See note 20 Supra.
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res gestae," declarations of present sense impressions,24 or past recollection recorded.25 It is difficult, however, to apply a recognized
exception to the particular facts in the principal case and this is
precisely the type of situation which prompted this review.
Surprisingly little authority has considered the problems encountered when a lay witness testifies to facts known partly at first
hand, and partly from hearsay. What little authority there is has
dealt with the problems only sparsely and has done nothing to develop a necessary systematic rationale26 for the admission or exclusion
of such testimony. Perhaps the lack of authority in this area is due
to the fact that the hearsay and first-hand elements are generally
separable and the court merely separates out the hearsay, thereby
eliminating the problem. At other times the reliability of the hearsay
is readily apparent through application of one of the exceptions or
for other reasons already discussed.
The real problem arises when the knowledge derived from
the mixed hearsay and first-hand observation is so interwoven or
ultimately dependent on both elements that it is impossible to separate the hearsay from the first-hand testimony, and where the hearsay does not fall within a recognized exception. More often than
not, testimony of this nature will have a high degree of probative
value and blanketly to exclude it because based partly on hearsay
would not be desirable or in accordance with the need to revise the
2 See generally MCCORMICK, op. cit. supra note 10, at 585-87. In Baney v. People,
130 Colo. 318, 275 P.2d 195 (1954) the Colorado Supreme Court stated that whether
a declaration is part of the res gestae depends upon whether the declaration was "the
facts talking through the party," or "the party talking about the facts." The latter
is not part of the res gestae and is clearly the situation in the principal case. In
another case, Stahl v. Cooper, 117 Colo. 468, 471, 190 P.2d 891 (1948), the court,
while recognizing that the tendency is to broaden, rather than restrict, the res gestae
rule, nevertheless restricted it to statements "in the nature of an exclamation, rather
than an explanation; it must be spontaneous and instinctive rather than deliberate
.For
an article discussing res gestae in Colorado which recognizes that the
rule of necessity should govern admission of this type of evidence, see Burke, More
on Res Gestae, 30 DICTA 351 (1953).
24 See generally Houston Oxygen Co. v. Davis, 139 Tex. 1, 161 S.W.2d 474 (1942);
MCCORMICK, op. cit. supra note 10, at 584-85; Note, 46 U. COLO. L. REV. 430

(1964). Even this extremely liberal approach requires that the out-of-court declarant
comment on what he sees at the very time that he is receiving the impression, and
this element is missing in the principal case.
25 See generally MCCORMICK, op. cit. supra note 10, 590-595. The recording itself, under
this exception, is the evidence. The original writing, if procurable, must be produced,
and secondary evidence of its terms is admissible only when the original is shown to
be unavailable. It may be possible, in a search to apply the facts in the principal case
to a recognized exception, to consider the much-debated oral co-operative records
exception. But if that were applied both the out-of-court declarant and the person
to whom he reported must appear and vouch for the correctness of the reported information.
26 The need for systematic rationale was recognized by Maguire in dealing with problems where an expert testifies to mixed hearsay and first-hand testimony, Maguire
and Hahesy, supra note 6, at 450. Texas is a shining example of lack of reasoning
in its decisions on such issues-blanketly admitting the testimony. See the Texas cases
cited, supra note 16.
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strict application of the hearsay rule.27 Whether the court should
exclude or admit should depend, it seems, on a careful analysis of the
various factors, looking ultimately to see if there is a necessity to
resort to such testimony, and if the circumstances clothe the hearsay
basis of the testimony with a substantial degree of trustworthiness.
By stating the rule as such there is room for flexibility within the
structural principles Wigmore expounded as the original basis for
the exceptions to the hearsay rule.28 Because the rule is basically the
same as applied where an expert witness gives an opinion based
partly on hearsay,29 the courts will have the benefit of looking to that
more developed area for guidance. However, the standards as to the
degree of circumstantial reliability necessary to admit the evidence
where a lay witness testifies must necessarily be higher than those
where an expert is testifying, because the knowledge derived from
the expert's out-of-court sources has the sanction of his general experience and is therefore more reliable by its very nature.
David R. Slemon

27 Maguire, op cit. supra note 7, at 145, 147; see also the discussion supra note 20.

at 147.
United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 35 F. Supp. 820 (S.D.N.Y. 1940).
30 Maguire and Hahesy, supra note 6, at 450.
28Id.
29

DENVER LAW CENTER JOURNAL

VI.

A. (1)

VOL. XLII

TORTS

THE STANDARD OF CARE OWED BY OPERATOR OF AMUSE-

MENT PARK RIDE TO PASSENGERS Is THAT OF HIGHEST DEGREE.

(2)

PLEA OF UNAVOIDABLE ACCIDENT MAY No LONGER BE

SET Up As SEPARATE DEFENSE IN ACTION BASED ON NEGLIGENCE.

The case of Lewis v. Buckskin Joe's, Inc.' involved an action for
personal injuries sustained by paying passengers of an amusement
park stagecoach ride when the stagecoach overturned. In the lower
court a jury had returned a verdict in favor of the defendants and
against all of the plaintiffs. The Colorado Supreme Court concluded,
in a split decision, that the lower court had committed error in instructing the jury that the defendants "owed a duty of ordinary care"2
to the plaintiffs. Justice Hall, writing for the majority, held that
under the circumstances of the case, the defendants "should be held

to the highest degree of care,"' and failure to so instruct the jury
constituted reversible error.4 Four separate opinions, other than the
majority opinion, were written in this case. Three of these, by Justices Day, Moore, and McWilliams, attacked, in whole or in part,
the reasoning used in the majority opinion while the fourth, by Justice Frantz, tried to justify the majority's position.
Justice Hall, in the majority opinion, cited no cases supporting
his pronouncement that the defendants "should be held to the highest degree of care." 5 He did say, however, that "it is not important
whether defendants were serving as a carrier or engaged in activities
for amusement,"'6 which could indicate that he meant to impose the
same duty of care upon the operators of amusement park rides as
has been placed upon common carriers.7 If this was the court's in1396

P.2d 933 (1964). The case was a consolidation of three suits involving a total
of twelve plaintiffs. Only nine of the original plaintiffs joined in the appeal.
2 396 P.2d at 938.
3 396 P.2d at 939.
4 Ibid. The opinion also reprimanded the trial judge for numerous procedural errors
which had been committed: (1) The trial judge incorrectly instructed the jury as
to the issues from the pleading rather than from the evidence as presented-the two
were considerably different (at 939); (2) In the instructions, seven of the twelve
plaintiffs had been referred to merely as "et al.;" '(3) The defendant was given an
instruction relating to the contributory negligence of the plaintiffs even though he
had not offered even a scintilla of evidence (at 940-41) ;'(4) There was no evidence
in the record that the jury had ever been submitted any verdict forms by which they
could have found for any or all of the plaintiffs (at 942).
I1d. at 939.
6 Ibid.
7

For cases dealing with the duty owed by common carriers see Publix Cab Co. v. Fessler,
138 Colo. 547, 335 P.2d 865 (1959) (a taxi) ; Colorado Springs & I. Ry. v. Allen,
55 Colo. 391, 135 Pac. 790 (1913) (a train) ; Colorado & S. Ry. v. McGeorge, 46
Colo. 15, 102 Pac. 747 (1909) (a train) ; Sanderson v. Frazier, 8 Colo. 79, 5 Pac.
632 (1885) (a stagecoach) ; Kansas Pac. Ry. v. Miller, 2 Colo. 442 (1874) (a train).
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tention, it must be recognized as contrary to the prevailing view in
the United States and to earlier Colorado decisions.8 While some
jurisdictions would hold owners and operators of amusement devices to the highest degree of care-equivalent to that required of
a carrier of passengers-the weight of authority requires only ordinary or reasonable care commensurate with the risks involved."
Justice Frantz indicated that perhaps the reason for requiring
the "highest degree of care" from amusement park operators is that
an earlier Colorado case, Hook v. Lakeside Park Co., 1 requires it.'2
Hook involved an action for injuries suffered while riding in a LoopO-Plane at Lakeside Amusement Park in Denver. The trial court dismissed the complaint at the close of plaintiff's case and entered
judgment in favor of the defendant. The Colorado Supreme Court
affirmed the trial court and said:
The legal standard applicable to liability for injuries incurred
on an amusement device is that of reasonable precautions to avoid
injury, or as it is sometimes called, that of ordinary care. 13 (Emphasis added.)

From this language it seems clear that the Hook case does not require
that operators of amusement devices exercise the "highest degree of
care" but only "ordinary care." In Hook the court correctly stated
8

Hook v. Lakeside Park Co., 142 Colo. 277, 351 P.2d 261 (1960). In Hook the
court said:
The presumptions or inferences available to a passenger in an action
against a carrier are not available in such circumstances [actions against
operators of amusement devices]. The warranty of safe carriage, present
in the carrier case, is absent where a plaintiff undertakes to ride on a device
such as a Loop-O-Plane in an amusement park. [T]he predominant warranty
which the operator offers is not that the passenger shall be safe, but that he
shall receive a thrill. 142 Colo. at 282.
9
See Pajak v. Mamsch, 338 I11.
App. 337, 87 N.E.2d 147 (1949) (a ferris wheel);
Styburski v. Riverview Park Co., 298 Ill. App. 1, 18 N.E.2d 92 (1938) ; Gromowsky
v. Ingersol, 241 S.W.2d 60 (Mo. Ct. App. 1951) (an airplane ride); Tennessee
State Fair Assn. v. Hartman, 135 Tenn. 159, 183 S.W. 735 (1915) (the "Ocean
Wave"); Banner v. Winton, 28 Tenn. App. 69, 186 S.W.2d 222 (1944) ("Loopthe-Loop").
10See Potts v. Crafts, 5 Cal. App. 2d 83, 42 P.2d 87 (1935) (miniature automobile);
Firszt v. Capitol Park Realty Co., 98 Conn. 627, 120 Atl. 300 (1923) ("aeroplane
swing"); Carlyle v. Goettee, 64 Ga. App. 360, 13 S.E.2d 206 (1941)
(motor
scooter); Bee's Old Reliable Shows, Inc. v. Maupins Admix., 311 Ky. 837, 226
S.W.2d 23 (1950) ("tilt-a-whirl"); Wagnespack v. Playland Corp., 195 So. 368
(La. App. 1940) ("loop-o-plane"); Carlin v. Smith, 148 Md. 524, 130 Atl. 340
(1925); Beaulieu v. Lincoln Rides, Inc., 328 Mass. 427, 104 N.E.2d 417 (1952)
("whip") ; Frear v. Manchester Traction, Light & P. Co., 83 N.H. 64, 139 At. 86
(1927) (ferris wheel); Schweit v. Harum Scarum Amusement Corp., 247 App. Div.
755, 285 N.Y.S. 63 (1936) (revolving barrel) ; Durbin v. Humphrey Co., 133 Ohio
St. 367, 11 Ohio Ops. 27, 14 N.E.2d 5 (1938) ("the bug") ; Engstrom v. Huntley,
345 Pa. 10, 26 A.2d 461 (1942) ("tilt-a-whirl"); 4 AM. JUR. 2d Amusements and
Exhibitions § 88 (1962).
11142 Colo. 277, 351 P.2d 261 (1960).
12 396 P.2d at 946.
13 142 Colo. at 281-82.
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that operators of amusement park devices must "render care commensurate with the risk involved.''4 The court also held that the
Loop-O-Plane involved in that case was "extremely and intrinsically
hazardous" and "consequently a slight deviation from the standard' ""
would render the operator liable for resultant injuries. Justice Frantz,
and perhaps Justice Hall, determined that Hook was susceptible of
two interpretations and read the decision as requiring every operator of an amusement park ride to exercise the highest degree of care. 6
This interpretation not only seems contrary to the express language
of Hook, as pointed out by Chief Justice Moore 7 and Justice McWilliams 8 in their separate opinions, but it also tends to establish
"degrees of care" contrary to the dictates of an early Colorado case."
In placing upon the operators of amusement park rides the
burden of exercising "the highest degree of care," as opposed to
"reasonable care under the circumstances" or "ordinary care,"
the
Colorado Supreme Court has taken a position contrary to the weight
of authority 0 and contrary to Colorado precedent."
The second major change in Colorado tort law arising out of the
Lewis case, by way of dictum, is the prohibition against further use
of the defense of "unavoidable accident" to allegations of negli14 Id. at 282. See cases cited supra note 10.
15 d. at 282.
16 396 P.2d at 946.
17 Id. at 944-45. Justice Moore contended, "It is my opinion that the majority opinion
in this [degree of care owed by the defendants] connection is out of harmony with
Hook v. Lakeside Park Co. " (Citation omitted.)
'Bid. at 947-48. Justice McWilliams made it clear that he did not consider this a
"'carrier case" but recognized that there is "a sharp division of judicial expression
as to the standard of care owed by the owner and operator of an amusement park
device to its patrons." (at 947). Regarding this division of opinion, McWilliams
said, "This matter has already been considered by this court in Hook v. Lakeside Park
Co." (Citation omitted.) '(at 948). He then stated that in his opinion Hook required
only "reasonable or ordinary care under all the facts and circumstances." (at 948).
19Denver Consolidated Electric Co. v. Simpson, 21 Colo. 371, 376, 41 Pac. 499 (1895).
The court stated, "This court does not recognize any degrees of negligence,
such as slight or gross and logically it ought not to recognize any degrees of its
antithesis, care." See generally 65 C.J.S. Negligence § 10 (1950). Cf., Clark v.
Colorado & N.W.R.R., 165 Fed. 408, 411 (8th Cir. 1908). But see Wall v. Cameron,
6 Colo. 275, 277 (1882) (a common carrier case).
20 See cases cited supra note 10.
21
Hook v. Lakeside Park Co., 142 Colo. 277, 351 P.2d 261 '(1960).
22 396 P.2d at 942, where Justice Hall stated:
We conclude that from and after announcement of this opinion, an
instruction on unavoidable accident should never be given; and, though
recognizing that accidents may be unavoidable, now go on record holding
that a plea of unavoidable accident may not be set up as a separate or
independent defense and that to now instruct on unavoidable accident is
error. We expressly overrule previous pronouncements of this court to the
contrary.
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gence. While such a prohibition is contrary to the majority view,'
it is well-founded in reason. An examination of the reason supporting the change shows that the change will prove to be more of procedure than substance. The only real loss to the defendant is a mechanical instruction-proof of a so-called "unavoidable accident"
will still require a verdict in favor of the defendant.
In an action for injuries based on defendant's failure to use
reasonable care, plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant was negligent; that he owed the plaintiff
a duty to use care; and that as a proximate result plaintiff was injured. Since, by definition,24 an unavoidable accident is one which
did not result from an act of negligence, the defendant can prevent
recovery by plaintiff by satisfying the jury that the accident which
caused the injury was unavoidable. However, prior to the Lewis
case the defendant was, in effect, entitled to a double instruction
on the defense of unavoidable accident.24 It was the desire to avoid
this "added 'you-should-find-for-the-defendant' type of instruction," 25 which might "be misunderstood by the jury as constituting
some sort of separate defense," 6 that prompted the court to overrule a great deal of Colorado precedent upholding the giving of un23 See,

e.g., Beliak v. Plants, 84 Ariz. 211, 326 P.2d 36 (1958) ; Industrial Farm Home
Gas Co. v. McDonald, 355 S.W.2d 174 (Ark. 1962) ; Seney v. Trowbridge, 127 Conn.
284, 16 A.2d 573 (1940) ; Panaro v. Cullen, 185 A.2d 889 (Del. 1962) ; Hart v.
Jackson, 142 So. 2d 326 (Fla. App. 1962) ; Boatright v. Susebee, 108 Ga. App. 19,
132 S.E.2d 155 (1963) ; Turner v. Purdum, 77 Ida. 130, 289 P.2d 608 (1955);
Wolpert v. Weidbreder, 21 Ill.
App.2d. 486, 158 N.E.2d 421 (1959); Shane v.
Fields, 190 N.E.2d 195 (Ind. App. 1963) ;Schevers v.American Ry. Exp. Co., 195
Iowa 423, 192 N.W. 255 (1923); Employers' Mut. Cas. Co. v. Martin, 189 Kan.
498, 370 P.2d 110 (1962); Massie v. Salmon, 277 S.W.2d 49 '(Ky. 1955);
Schapiro v. Mayers, 160 Md. 208, 153 Atl. 27 (1931) ; Agranowitz v. Levine, 298
Mich. 18, 298 N.W. 388 (1941); Daly v. Springer, 244 Minn. 108, 69 N.W.2d 98
(1955) ; Leach v. Great Northern R.R., 139 Mont. 84, 360 P.2d 94 (1960) ; Horrocks
v. Rounds, 70 N.M. 73, 70 P.2d 799 (1962) ; Buchanan v. Smith, 5 App. Div. 2d.
950, 171 N.Y.S.2d 212 (1958) ; Reuter v. Olson, 79 N.D. 834, 59 N.W.2d 830
(1953) ; Simensky v. Zwyer, 40 Ohio App. 275, 178 N.E. 422 (1931) ; Wofford v.
Lewis, 377 P.2d 37 (Okla. 1962) ; Cordell v. Scott, 79 So. Dak. 316, 111 N.W.2d
594 (1961) ; Bourne v.Barlar, 17 Tenn. App. 375, 67 S.W.2d 751 (1933) ; Blanton
v. E. & L. Transport Co., 146 Tex. 377, 207 S.W.2d 368 (1948); Wellman v. Noble,
12 Utah 2d 350, 366 P.2d 701 (1961) ; Hoge v. Anderson, 200 Va. 364, 106 S.E.2d
121 (1958).
24 PROSSER, TORTS § 29, at 143 (3d ed. 1964):
An unavoidable accident is an occurrence which was not intended, and
which, under all the circumstances, could not have been foreseen or prevented by the exercise of reasonable precautions. (Emphasis added.)
See Piper v. Mayer, 145 Colo. 391, 394-95, 360 P.2d 433 (1961).
24 The jury was instructed on the one hand that the plaintiff cannot recover unless he
proves negligence, and on the other hand that the plaintiff cannot recover if his
injuries were the result of an unavoidable accident.
23 396 P.2d at 941 quoting from Fenton v. Aleshire, 393 P.2d 217 (Ore. 1964).
2

396 P.2d at 941.
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avoidable accident instructions.2 7 It was the overruling of this prece-

dent to which Justice Moore objected and to which he referred as
an act of "judicial legislation"' based on the court's "philosophical
notions of what the law should be.'"'2
In spite of Justice Moore's objections, the position taken by the
court finds increasing support in some jurisdictions" and, more important, is based on the sound reasoning of avoiding a "double instruction."
B.

IMPLIED WARRANTY OF WHOLESOMENESS AND FITNESS DOES
NOT ATTACH TO BLOOD TRANSFUSION.

The case of Sloneker v. St. Joseph's Hospital,"' tried in Colorado
Federal District Court, raised a question which has never been decided by the Colorado Supreme Court: whether an implied warranty
of wholesomeness and fitness attaches to hospital blood transfusions.

The court followed the much criticized"2 leading case of Perhnutter
v. Beth David Hospital,3 and answered the question in the nega-

tive. In Sloneker, the plaintiff was given a 'blood transfusion while
undergoing a medical operation at St. Joseph's Hospital in Denver.
As a result of a virus carried by the blood used in the transfusion,
27 Miller v. Brazel, 300 F.2d 283 (10th Cir. 1962)

(giving of the instruction was
proper) ; Hinkle v. Union Transfer Co., 229 F.2d 403 (10th Cir. 1955) (giving of
the instruction was proper) ; Daigle v. Prather, 152 Colo. 115, 380 P.2d 670 (1963)
(giving of the instruction was proper) ; Dugan v. Kuner-Empson Co., 149 Colo. 343,
369 P.2d 82 (1962) (giving of the instruction was proper); Piper v. Mayer, 145
Colo. 391, 360 P.2d 433 (1961) (under this fact situation, giving of instruction constituted grounds for reversal) ; Baker v. Williams, 144 Colo. 470, 357 P.2d 61 (1960)
(evidence did not warrant an instruction) ; Jacobson v. McGinness, 135 Colo. 357,
311 P.2d 696 (1957) (error to give instruction under these facts) ; Stephens v.
Lung, 133 Colo. 560, 298 P.2d 960 (1956) (giving of instruction was proper);
Union Pac. R.R. v. Shupe, 131 Colo. 271, 280 P.2d 1115 (1955) (failure to give instruction required reversal); Ridley v. Young, 127 Colo. 46, 253 P.2d 433 (1953)
(giving of instruction was proper) ; Maloney v. Jussel, 125 Colo. 125, 241 P.2d 862
(1952) (giving of instruction was proper); Goll v. Fowler, 124 Colo. 404, 238
P.2d 187 (1951) (giving of instruction proper but not under these facts) ; McBride
v. Woods, 124 Colo. 384, 238 P.2d 183 (1951) (giving of instruction proper but
not under these facts) ; lacino v. Brown, 121 Colo. 450, 217 P.2d 266 (1950) (giving of instruction was proper) ; Boulder Valley Coal Co. v. Jernberg, 118 Colo. 486,
197 P.2d 155 (1948) (giving instruction is proper but not under these facts).
It must be noted that although the instruction on unavoidable accident has received
sanction in Colorado, it could be used only in limited situations as discussed in
Piper, supra.
2 396 P.2d at 945.
29 Ibid.

30 See Socier v. Woodard, 264 Ala. 514, 88 So. 2d 783 (1956); Bridgeman v. Safeway
Stores, Inc., 53 Cal. 2d 443, 348 P.2d 696 (1960) (overruling about 65 earlier cases) ;
Butigan v. Yellow Cab Co., 49 Cal. 2d 652, 320 P.2d 500 (1958) ; Klesath v. McQueen, 312 S.W.2d 122 (Mo. 1958) ; Harding v. Hoffman, 158 Neb. 86, 62
N.W.2d 333 (1954); La Duke v. Lord, 97 N.H. 122, 83 A.2d 138 (1951); Fenton
v. Aleshire, 393 P.2d 217 (Ore. 1964) ; Larrow v. Martell, 92 Vt. 435, 104 Atl. 826
(1918); Van Matre v. Milwaukee Elec. R. & Transport Co., 268 Wis. 399, 67
N.W.2d 831 (1954).
3' 233 F. Supp. 105 (D. Colo. 1964).
32E.g., 69 HARV. L. REV. 391 (1955); 29 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 305 (1955); 103 U. PA.
L. REV.833 (1955).
33 308 N.Y. 100, 123 N.E.2d 792 (1954).
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the plaintiff contracted a disease known as serum hepatitus or
homologous serum jaundice. Recovery was sought, based on the
theory of negligence and on the theory of an implied warranty of
wholesomeness and fitness with respect to the blood. The district
court granted a motion to dismiss the breach of implied warranty
claim and ruled that trial must be had on the issue of negligence. In
so deciding, Judge Doyle wrote that:
[I]n a blood transfusion service is the predominant factor and
that the extra charge for the blood in no way indicates a sale but is
merely an incidental feature of the services rendered.34
Since the court could find no sale, it concluded that there was no
implied warranty. However, to say that a warranty is implied in a
sale is not to say that none is implied if there is no sale.
The reliance placed upon the distinction between a pure sale
and a sale which is merely incidental to a service is by no means a
recent judicial innovation. For example, at common law and in the
early decisions under the Uniform Sales Act' it was generally held
that a restaurant did not warrant the quality of the food it served
since the serving of the food was an "utterance" and no "sale" took
place. 8 The courts felt the customer entered a restaurant primarily
for the services it offered. Later decisions have generally rejected this
view, and followed instead the so-called Massachusetts-New York
rule37 that an implied warranty attaches to the food even without
a finding of a technical sale. However, this rule has not been applied
in any blood transfusion cases. The sale-service distinction has also
been discarded in some non-food cases, 8 including one which dealt
with a polio vaccination administered by a physician."
34 233 F. Supp. at 106.
35 Farnsworth, Implied Warranties ot Quality in Non-Sale Cases, 57 COLuM. L. REv.
653 (1957).
36 See cases cited at 1 WILLISTON, SALES § 242(b) (rev. ed. 1948), n. 5.
37

The leading case supporting this rule is Friend v. Childs Dining Hall Co., 231
Mass. 65, 120 N.E. 407 (1918). See DICKERSON, PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND THE
FOOD CONSUMER 157-80 (1951). Contra, Merrill v. Hodson, 88 Conn. 314, 91 Atd.

533 (1914) which is the leading case supporting the contrary Connecticut-New
Jersey rule. For a complete discussion of both rules see Annot., 7 A.L.R.2d 1027
(1949).
35
E.g., Aced v. Hobbs-Sesack Plumbing Co., 12 Cal. Rptr. 257, 360 P.2d 897 (1961)
(installation of a heating system held not even true sale of the materials installed,
but nevertheless a warranty attached) ; Carver v. Denn, 117 Utah 180, 214 P.2d 121
(1950) (air conditioner sold with installation included was warranted) ; Delco Auto
Supply Co. v. Tobin, 198 Misc. 601, 100 N.Y.S.2d 135 (Sup. Ct. 1950) (parts for
clutch warranted even though installed by mechanic).
396 Cal. Rptr. 320 (1960), where the court said:
In view of the established California rule that a consumer of a food
product may recover from the manufacturer upon implied warranty, is
there any reason to apply a different rule to the vaccine here involved?
We think not. The vaccine is intended for human consumption quite as
much as food. We see no reason to differentiate the policy considerations
requiring pure and wholesome food from those requiring pure and wholesome vaccine.
The fact that the entry is made by injection rather than ingestion in
no way alters the premise that each is for human consumption---each
enters the human system. (At 323.)
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The similarity between the English Sales of Goods Act and the
Uniform Sales Act" is so great as to suggest an examination of the
method by which the English courts have handled the sale-service
problem. English decisions have held that a warranty may be implied to the part of the transaction that is concerned with goods
furnished even though the service is the predominant factor in the
transaction and the sale only incidental." They will not, however,
extend the warranty to the labor or services involved in the transaction.
Perhaps the real basis for the findings of "no sale" in cases such
as Sloneker is a conscious or unconscious resolution of policy issues
rather than a technical definition of a "sale" as used in the Uniform
Sales Act. Evidence of this is found in Perlmutter, where the court
said:
The art of healing frequently calls for a balancing of risks and
dangers to a patient. Consequently, if injury results from the course
adopted, where no negligence or fault is present, liability should
not be imposed . ... 42
Such a statement ignores the real reason for implied warranties; i.e., to protect the consumer who cannot protect himself. In
line with this, the courts, in deciding cases involving fact situations
like the one in Sloneker, should consider: (1) the factual difficulty
in proving negligence in such cases; (2) the possibility that the
doctrine of charitable immunity will preclude recovery even if the
hospital is found negligent; (3) the availability of inexpensive liability insurance for hospitals; (4) the ability of the hospital to apportion the risk among the general public; (5) which party is best
able to suffer the loss (assuming both parties are innocent) while
recognizing that the patient has no choice but to rely on the hospital
(even persons eating food in restaurants are better able to detect
impurities); (6) the possibility that the imposition of strict liability on hospitals will promote discovery of more effective methods
of detecting the presence of virus in blood.
Another criticism can be made of the allegiance the courts have
shown to the use of the sale-service distinction as the test by which
40Section 14(1) of the English Sales of Goods Act is the same as § 15(1)

of the
Uniform Sales Act, which reads:
Where the buyer, expressly or by implication, makes known to the seller
the particular purpose for which the goods are required, and it appears
that the buyer relies on the seller's skill or judgment (whether he be the
grower or manufacturer or not) there is an implied warranty that the
goods shall be reasonably fit for such purpose.
41 Dodd v. Wilson, [1946] 2 All E.R. 691 (K.B.) (defendant vaccinated plaintiff's
cattle with defective vaccine) ; Watson v. Buckley, [19401 1 All E.R. 174 (K.B.
1939) (defendant used defective dye on plaintiff's hair); G. H. Myers & Co. v.
Brent Cross Serv. Co., £1934] 1 K.B. 46, 150 L.T.R. 96 (1933) (materials used by
defendant to repair plaintiff's automobile). See Note, 31 IND. L.J. 367 (1956).
42 123 N.E.2d at 795.
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to determine whether or not the "purchaser" is protected by an
implied warranty. This criticism is based on the analytical confusion
which will result from its continued use. For example, the same
policy considerations underlying the current findings of non-liability
in the case of blood tranfusion cases dictate a similar finding of nonliability in the case of blood banks. However, it would require
strained reasoning to rationalize non-liability on the grounds of no
sale, since blood banks generally offer no services to the patient,
but merely supply the hospital with the blood. 3
It is unfortunate that the Colorado Federal District Court chose
to follow the Perlmutter reasoning. Considering the historical development of the restaurant-food cases, and the English resolution of
the sale-service dilemma, it is submitted that the more modern approach would be to find hospitals strictly liable for the damages
caused by the transfusion of impure blood.
Richard M. Koon

43 However, this result was reached in Golez v. J. K. and Suzy L. Wadley Research

Institute and Blood Bank, 50 S.W.2d 573 (Tex. 1961).
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VIII. WILLS AND ESTATES
A.

CONTRACT TO MAKE A WILL

In Tarr v. Hicks,1 the testatrix entered into a contract with her
children and stepchildren to make a will devising her estate and
specific real property to them. The will, as construed,' was not in
accordance with the contract and the plaintiff's, successors to the
interests of a deceased son of the testatrix and the successors to the
interests of a deceased stepdaughter of the testatrix, sought to enforce distribution of the estate in accordance with the contract.
The defendant, daughter of testatrix, sought to prove by parol
evidence that there was no consideration flowing from the children
and stepchildren to support the testatrix's agreement to make the
will. It appeared from the authorities cited by the defendant that
she contended the agreement was a mere recital of consideration,
and as such could be explained by parol evidence. 6
The supreme court affirmed the trial court's determination
that parol evidence was inadmissible "to vary and wipe out essential
terms of a written contract."' The court has refused admission of
parol evidence to vary consideration when the contract was explicit,
the consideration expressed and definite, and such expression of
consideration contractual, going to the essence of the contract, 8 or
to prove that the consideration was wholly different from that described in the contract?
The court also considered the question "whether execution of
the agreement served to divest [the testatrix] of any title that she
1393 P.2d 557 (Colo. 1964).
2
in re Estate of Newby, 146 Colo. 296, 361 P.2d 622 (1961).
3 393 P.2d at 560. The only variation between the will and the contract was that in
the contract the testatrix was to give to her two children an individual one-half
of her estate and her five stepchildren the other undivided one-half of her estate.
By her will she gave each child an undivided one-fourth and to each stepchild an undivided one-tenth.
4 393 P.2d at 563.
5 In substance the agreement provided: that the children and stepchildren assign to
the testatrix all rights that they had to the estate of Newby, Sr.; that there be no
probate of his estate; that any advances received from Newby, Sr., by any of the
parties should be considered gifts; that no one of the parties shall have any claim
against any other by reason of such gifts or advancements; that the children and
stepchildren will, at all times, treat the testatrix with respect and consideration;
and that the children and stepchildren will not request any personal loans or advances from the testatrix.
6
Trustee Co. v. Bresnahan, 119 Colo. 311, 203 P.2d 499 (1949); Gibbons v.
Joseph Gibbons Consol. Min. & Mill Co., 37 Colo. 96, 86 Pac. 94 (1906); Fechheimer v. Trounstine, 15 Colo. 386, 24 Pac. 882 (1890). But see Hickman-Lunbeck
Grocery Co. v. Hager, 75 Colo. 554, 227 Pac. 829 (1924), (contract feature may
not be contradicted or varied by parol, in the absence of fraud or mistake).
7393 P.2d at 562.
8Grand Junction Gospel Tabernacle v. Orvis, 113 Colo. 408, 157 P.2d 619 (1945).
9
Collins v. Shaffer, 66 Colo. 84, 179 Pac. 152 (1919).
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had and to vest the portion so divested in the children and stepchildren.""
The court resolved this issue by relying on precedent from
other jurisdictions, citing In re Johnson's Estate" an Illinois decision,
and Harris v. Harris," a West Virginia decision. Reiterating language from both of these cases, the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed distribution of the property in conformity with the agreement, concluding that the agreement divested the testatrix of her fee
simple title and vested in the children and stepchildren an interest in the property. However, according to In re Johnson's Estate
this holding should be limited to contracts which devise specific
and designated property. 4
It is not clear whether the court in Tarr accepted or rejected
the theory that the testatrix held the legal title in trust for the
beneficiaries. However, the court in previous cases has acceped this
theory, 5 as have other jurisdictions"6 and some text writers. 7
The trust theory is commonly used in the case of a specifically
enforceable executory contract for the sale of land. It is asserted
that the vendor holds the legal title in trust for the vendee and
the vendee holds the equitable title and is a trustee of the purchase
money for the vendor. The trust theory finds its basis in the reasoning that because equity will decree specific performance and require the vendor to transfer his legal interest to the purchaser and
the purchaser to transfer the purchase price to the vendor, there
10 393 P.2d at 563.
11389 111.425, 59 N.E.2d 825 (1945).
12
130 W. Va. 100, 43 S.E.2d 225 (1947).
13"Where the contract is to devise specific and designated property, like a piece of
real estate, the equitable title vests in the beneficiaries, under the contract. Thereafter the testator holds the legal title in trust for their benefit." Harris v. Harris, 389
Ill. 425, 428, 59 N.E.2d 825, 826-27 '(1945). "After it [the contract] was made he
held the legal title to the real estate in trust for their benefit until his death . . .
By the contract, and at the time it was entered into, he effectively disposed of the
equitable title to the land ...." In re Johnson's Estate, 130 W. Va. 100, 107, 43
S.E.2d 225, 229 (1947).
14 In this case the court held that:
Where the contract is to bequeath a definite sum of money or property
of specific value, no title passes under the contract, but the beneficiaries
become creditors of the estate to that extent. Where there is a breach of the
contract to make the bequest, the remedy is a claim against the estate in the
nature of a claim for damages for such breach. 389 I11.
at 428, 59 N.E.2d
at 827.
15Western Motor Rebuilders, Inc. v. Carlson, 138 Colo. 404, 335 P.2d 272 (1959).
16Hood v. United States, 256 F.2d 522 (9th Cir. 1958), Maudre v. Humphreys, 83
W. Va. 307, 98 S.E. 259 (1919) ; Rhodes v. Meredith, 260 Ill.
138, 102 N.E. 1063
(1913) ; Breckwith v. Clark, 188 Fed. 171 (8th Cir. 1911) ; Estate of Dwyer, 159
Cal. 664, 115 Pac. 235 (1911) ; House v.Jackson, 24 Ore. 89, 32 Pac. 1027 (1893).
1'1 POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 105 (4th ed. 1918); 1 STORY, EQUITY
JURISPRUDENCE § 790 (12th ed. 1877).
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are two bare legal interests on one hand, and a beneficial equitable
interest on the other, and thus two trusts.18
This reasoning is somewhat tenuous in view of the Restatement, " and other commentators who express the opinion that the
relationship created is more nearly analogous to that of a mortgagor
and mortgagee, 0 and that "this is a loose, inaccurate use of the
word 'trust.'

"21

Although there are no Colorado cases with fact situations
similar to that in the present case, the West Virginia court stated
in Harris that a contract to make a will is "analogous, with respect
to the immediate transfer of the equitable title to property, to a
contract for the sale of land."' It follows that if such an analogy
is accurate, the Colorado Supreme Court could have reached the
same result utilizing its own precedent without reference to decisions of foreign jurisdictions. In Western Motor Rebuilders, Inc. v.
Carlson,3 the court considered the question whether the vendee
was subject to restrictive covenants formulated and recorded subsequent to payment of the consideration and to taking possession
of the land by the vendee. It held that "when payments are fully
made, the full equitable title vests in the vendee, and the vendor
retains the naked legal title in trust for him."24 In another action,
to establish the priority of liens against the assets of a bankrupt18BOGERT, TRUSTS & TRUSTEES § 18, at 118 (2d ed. 1965).
19RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), TRUSTS § 13 (1957), provides:
Trusts and Contract to ConveyA contract to convey property is not a trust, whether or not the contract
is specifically enforceable.
If the contract is specifically enforceable, the purchaser acquires an
equitable interest in the property, but the relation between the vendor and
purchaser, unlike that between trustee and beneficiary, is not a fiduciary
one; it is more nearly analogous to a mortgage.
20
BOGERT, op. cit. supra note 17, at 118; 1 SCOTT, TRUSTS § 13, at 133, 134 (2d ed.
1956) says:
As a consequence of the fact that a contract for the purchase and sale of
land is specifically enforceable, the purchaser is held to acquire an equitable
interest in the land before it is conveyed to him. But of course it is clear
enough that the vendor of land is in no real sense a trustee for the purchaser. It would be more nearly appropriate to speak of him as a mortgagee
since he may retain the title to the land as security for the unpaid purchase
price.
4 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 927, at 2604 (Rev. ed. 1936) states:
Because of the unconditional duty of each party, it is held that from the
formation of the contract, though it is not performable until a future day,
the purchaser is the owner in equity, and that the vendor holds the legal
title merely as security for the payment of the price; in other words, that
the relation is substantially that of mortgagor and mortgagee.
21 BOGERT, op. cit. supra note 17, at 118. For an adverse criticism of this use of trust
see Williston, The Risk of Loss After an Executory Contract of Sale in the Common
Law, 9 HARv. L. REV. 106, 117 (1895).
22 130 W. Va. at 109, 43 S.E.2d at 230.
23 138 Colo. 404, 335 P.2d 272 (1959).
2
4Id. at 414.
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vendee's estate, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in the
case of In re Ben Boldt, Jr., Floral Co.' stated:
A binding contract for the sale and purchase of land, under
which payments on the purchase price are to be made in the future,
vests an equitable title to the land in the purchaser from the date
of the execution of the contract.2
Therefore, using these two Colorado cases, the court could
have reached the same result.
B.

INHERITANCE TAX ON PROCEEDS OF LIFE INSURANCE POLICIES

In People v. Faricy," the Inheritance Tax Commissioner assessed an inheritance tax on the proceeds of four insurance policies
naming the surviving widow as beneficiary. As provided by the
terms of the collateral security agreement, the proceeds of the policies
were paid to the assigned who deducted the amount of the loan
and remitted the balance to the surviving widow. The Commissioner
contended the proceeds of the policies were subject to an inheritance tax2" bcause all the policies were assigned.
The Colorado Supreme Court held that the tax liability was not
warranted because in determining the deductions from the gross
estate,29 the indebtedness of the deceased to the assignee was not
included. The court concluded that the estate had paid an inheritance
tax inflated by an amount which should have been offset by the
indebtedness satisfied by the assigned proceeds.
The court distinguished this case from People v. Mason,3" in
which it had held taxable the proceeds of an insurance policy which
were applied to reduce the amount of the decedent's indebtedness
to a creditor-beneficiary. In determining the net value of the estate
subject to inheritance tax, the debt secured by the policies in the
principal case had not been claimed as a deducation, whereas in
Mason the debt was allowed as a deduction. Therefore the interpretation of the statute by the supreme court in Mason3 still appears
to be valid.
Richard E. Mitchell
- 37 F.2d 499 (10th Cir. 1930).
at 502.
27 395 P.2d 822 (Colo. 1964).
(1963) which establishes that: "Proceeds of in28CoLo. REV. STAT. § 138-3-9(1)
surance policies on the life of a decedent payable in such manner as to be subject
to the claims against his estate or to distribution as a part thereof shall be taxable."
2ld.

29

COLO. REV. STAT. § 138-3-16 (1963).
30 144 Colo. 151, 256 P.2d 257 (1960).
31 In that case the court held:

[I]t seems clear that the first paragraph [COLO. REV. STAT. § 138-3-9
(1963)] is intended to cover only those policies which are made payable
directly or indirectly to the estate. With respect to policies subject to claims
against the estate or to distribution as a part thereof, the exemption provision is inapplicable and such policies are taxable in the full amount thereof.
144 Colo. at 155.
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VIII. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
A.

COLORADO NOW EMPHASIZES THE RELATIVE NATURE OF THE
CLAIMANT'S AND
PLOYER'S

EMPLOYER'S WORK RATHER THAN THE EM-

CONTROL

OF

THE

CLAIMANT

IN

DISTINGUISHING

BETWEEN INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR AND EMPLOYEE.

In Brush Hay and Milling Company v. Small,1 an order by
the Industrial Commission denying workmen's compensation benefits on the ground that claimant was not an employee was set aside
by the trial court, which found that claimant was an employee. The
supreme court reversed, agreeing with the Commission that claimant was not an employee within the meaning of the Workmen's
Compensation Act.'
Claimant was an electrician, and also operated a store and
performed services for the general public. On occasion claimant
sold equipment to defendant, always at cost plus 10%0, and performed services for defendant, when required, for $3 per hour, which
was remitted after the completion of each job. Claimant was employed by defendant only when defendant's employees were unable
to handle the particular electrical work involved, which was once
or twice a month, for jobs lasting from two or three hours to two
or three days. Defendant's business was hauling and grinding feed;
when injured, the claimant was helping defendant's employees
remove an electric pump which was sold to defendant by claimant.
The problem faced by the court was deciding whether claimant
was an employee or an independent contractor. In making the
distinction the court discussed two tests, the first one being the
"control test." The court's analysis of this approach was basically
the same as has previously been used in Colorado.3 The control
test, employed by most courts,' includes, among others, the following elements: the right to control the details of the work, method of
payment, who furnishes tools or equipment, and right of termination
1 388
2

P.2d 84 (Colo. 1963).

COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 81-1-1 to 81-17-7 (1963).

3 388 P.2d 84.

See Industrial Comm'n v. Hammond, 77 Colo. 414, 236 Pac. 1006
(1925). The quotation by the court in the Brush Hay case is, in part, as follows:
Each case must be decided on its own facts ....
Among the factors more or
less controlling are: Does the workman give all or only a part of his time to
the work? ... Has the laborer or employee control of the details? Which may
employ, control, and discharge assistants? Which furnishes the necessary tools
and equipment? May either terminate the employment without liability to
the others? . . . Of these the most important . . . is the right of either to
terminate the relation without liability. Where such right exists, the workman
is usually a servant. Where it does not exist, he is usually a contractor. 388
P.2d at 87.
4 Note, The Employment Relation in Workmen's Compensation and Employer's Liability
Legislation, 10 U.C.L.A.L. Rav. 161, 169 (1962).
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of the relation.5 If the employer furnishes tools, controls details,
pays wages at regular intervals, and may fire without liability for
breach of contract, the employer-employee relation is indicated.
Colorado cases have previously emphasized the right of termination
of the relation element, deeming it decisive,' and equating it to
control so as to establish a master-servant relationship.7 Prior to
Brush, the control test was the test used in Colorado to determine
whether there was an employee-employer relation for workmen's
compensation purposes.
The second test discussed in Brush,' and most heavily relied on
by the court in this case, is the "relative nature of the work" test.
Prof. Larson prefers this formula,' and it has recently been adopted
by several other courts.10
5 1 LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW 843, 53 (1952); 99 C.J.S. Workmen's

Compensation § 92 (1958) ; Note, supra note 4, at 169, n. 30, citing RESTATEMENT
(SECOND), AGENCY § 220. Some recent cases applying the control test are: Scott v.
Rhyan, 78 Ariz. 80, 275 P.2d 891 (1954) ; State Compensation Ins. Fund v. Industrial
Acc. Comm'n, 124 Cal. App. 2d 1, 268 P.2d 40, 42 (1954) where the court said:
"the test of what constitutes independent service lies in the control exercise."; Graf
v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 234 Minn. 485, 49 N.W.2d 797 (1951) where the
court said that:
in determining whether the relationship is one of employee or independent
contractor, the most important factor is the right of the employer to control
the means and manner of performance. Other factors to be considered are
mode of payment, furnishing of materials or tools, control of the premises...
and the right of the employer to discharge the employee. 49 N.W.2d 801.
Klein v. Sunrise Bldg. Co., 7 App. Div. 2d 805, 180 N.Y.S.2d 885 (1958), the
court deeming both the control test and the "so-called relative nature of the work
test" (180 N.Y.S.2d at 887) principal factors in making the distinction; and Seals
v. Zollo, 205 Tenn. 463, 327 S.W.2d 41 '(1959) where the right to control was
deemed the primary consideration in making the employee-indopendent contractor
distinction.
6 Industrial Comm'n v. State Compensation Ins. Fund, 122 Colo. 721, 220 P.2d 721
(1950) ; Industrial Comm'n v. Moynihan, 94 Colo. 438, 32 P.2d 802 (1934), which
held that "Nothing in the terms of claimant's employment precluded either party
from terminating the relation without liability, and that is the controlling element."
(94 Colo. at 442) ; Industrial Comm'n v. Hammond, 77 Colo. 414, 236 Pac. 1006
(1925).
7 Industrial Comm'n v. Valley Chip & Supply Co., 133 Colo. 258, 293 P.2d 972
(1956) ; Industrial Comm'n v. Bonfils, 78 Colo. 306, 241 Pac. 735 (1928), which
said, "By virtue of its power to discharge, the company could, at any moment, direct
the minutest detail and method of the work." (241 Pac. at 736) ; .ARSON, op. Cit.
supra note 5, at § 44.35.
8
Brush Hay and Milling Co. v. Small, 154 Colo. - 388 P.2d 84, 87 (1963).
9 LARSON, op. cit. supra note 5, at § 43.50.
10
Boyd v. Crosby Lumber and Mfg. Co., 166 So. 2d 106 (Miss. 1964), where the court
held that, "there are two tests to be considered in analyzing an employee-independent
contractor question: (1) the control test; and (2) the relative nature of the work
test." (166 So. 2d at 110). The court, in applying both tests, came to the conclusion
that the exercise of control by employer (in spite of contract to the contrary) and
the fact that claimant was an integral part of employer's business, thus having no
independent business of his own, meant that claimant was an employee within the
workmen's compensation laws of Mississippi; Paly v. Lane Brush Co., 6 App. Div.
2d 50, 174 N.S.S.2d 205 (1958), where both tests were used; Parkinson v. Industrial
Commission, 110 Utah 309, 172 P.2d 136 (1946) where the relative nature test was
not discussed as such, but emphasis was placed on diversity of employer's and claimant's business and the claimant's independence (172 P.2d at 141).
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The essence of this test, as proposed by Larson," is the relativity of the character of the claimant's work or business and the
character of the employer's business. Considerations used in applying this test are, on one hand, the skill required of the employee
and the separate nature of his work from the nature of the employer's, and on the other hand, factors relating to the character of the
employer's business are whether the employee's work is a regular
part of the employer's business, how continuous it is, and its
duration." The greater the requirement of skill and the more separate the occupations, the stronger is the indication of an independent
contractor relation; continuous, regular, and extended use of the
claimant's services indicates an employer-employee relationship for
workmen's compensation purposes.
The control test is similar to the test used in the common law
of torts for distinguishing between employee and independent contractor, where the relevance of the distinction is whether or not
the employer is vicariously liable for the torts of a servant. The
relative nature test, however, has been suggested by Larson for use
in connection with workmen's compensation, 4 the purpose of which
is to compensate the employee for injuries suffered by him, and to
pass the burden of such compensation to the consumer as a cost of
business.
The court, in applying the tests, relied most heavily upon the
relative nature test. The court said:
.. . we attach significance to the following:
1. The nature of the service rendered . . . and its lack of any close
relationship with the business of Brush Hay. 2. Small rendered
services to Brush Hay for only a comparatively small part of his
total work month. 3. Small was "called in" . . . to do a "given
task" and not for general employment . . . . 4. Because of his
superior knowledge... Small controlled the details of his services.
5. Small . . . performed . . . by the use of his own tools ....
6. Only when the particular task was completed would Small bill
Brush Hay with Brush Hay then remitting in full .... 16
The first three considerations employed by the court are part of the
relative nature test, the latter three are elements of the control
11 LARSON, op. cit. supra note 5, at § 43.52.
121bid. Also see cases cited in 99 C.J.S. Vorkmen's Compensation § 94 (1958). These

cases are cited for use of the criteria proposed by Larson as elements of the relative
nature of the work test.
13 SEAVEY, LAW OF AGENCY § 84 (1964); RESTATEMENT (SECOND),
AGENCY § 220
(1958) ; LARSON, op. cit. supra note 5, at § 43.42.
14 LARSON, op. cit. supra note 5, at § 43.41.
15 1d. at §§ 43.42, 43.51.
'8 Brush Hay and Milling Co. v. Small, 388 P.2d 84, 87 to 88 (Colo. 1963).
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approach. Has the application of both tests achieved a result consistent with the Colorado Workmen's Compensation Act?
The Workmen's Compensation Act is to be liberally construed."t
Liberal construction of the Act would include extending its coverage;
broadening the definition of employee would be an extension of
coverage. The supreme court's previous use of the control test,
particularly emphasizing the right to terminate, was a narrow application of the act in comparison with the broadened view adopted
in the principal case. The court, in using both tests, has achieved
a highly liberal interpretation of the act without overruling its previous decisions.
In applying both tests, the court has fallen in line with those
cases which have applied the relative nature test.' The use of this
test is consistent with the purpose of the workmen's compensation
laws, which is to provide remedies where otherwise none might
exist."9
B. A

CLAIMANT WHO

Is

KILLED OR INJURED WHILE WORKING

FOR HIS EMPLOYER FOR LESS THAN THE USUAL WAGE RATE

Is

ENTITLED

To

COMPENSATION BASED ON HIS USUAL WAGES.

In State Compensation Insurance Fund v. Coleman,'° an award
for death of an employee was allowed by the Industrial Commission, affirmed by the district court, and, on writ of error brought
by the Insurance Fund, was affirmed by the supreme court. The
pertinent facts as stipulated were that claimant's husband was an
employee at the date of his death, was employed as an electrician
at $3.88 per hour, and was killed in an accident "arising out of and
within the course of his employment."'" When the accident
occurred, deceased was on a weekend trip to pick up equipment
belonging to his employer. It was agreed that he was to receive
expenses but not wages for making the trip, in accordance with the
17Rogers, Inc. v. Fishman, 388 P.2d 755 (Colo. 1964); Idarado Min. Co. v. Barnes,
148 Colo. 166, 365 P.2d 36 (1961); State Compensation Ins. Fund v. Howington,
133 Colo. 583, 298 P.2d 963 (1926).
8
1 See White Top and Safeway Cab. Co. v. Wright, 171 So. 2d 510 (Miss. 1965);
cases cited in note 10, supra; and Note, 10 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 161, 174 (1962).
19The Supreme Court of the United States has indicated that "employee," when used
in social legislation such as the National Labor Relations Act and the Social Security
Act, should be defined in accordance with elimination of the form which the laws
were passed to avoid. The court felt that the common law definition of employee as
used in master-servant law was inadequate. United States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704
(1947); N.L.R.B. v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111 (1944).
20392 P.2d 598 (Colo. 1964).
21

Id. at 599.
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practice regarding similar trips made by deceased on behalf of his
employer.
The Fund contended that deceased was performing a contract
for hire separate from his normal employment; and that the contract failed to provide for wages, so that compensation should have
been computed on the basis of a $10.00 per week minimum. 2
In holding as justified the referee's conclusion that no separate contract existed,' the court analogized the facts of the case
to the situation where an employee is injured en route to work
or while on a coffee break. Injuries occurring at such times have
been held compensable as arising out of and within the course of
employment'

and therefore, the court reasoned, decedent's death

was compensable. Here, however, it was stipulated that decedent's
death arose out of the course of his employment; the real question
was which employment the decedent was engaged in at the time
of the accident. The only discussion given by the court concerning
the existence of another contract of employment was as follows:
... but having stipulated that there was one employer, that the
accident arose out of and during the course of the employment,
that deceased drew wages of $155.20 per week . . . it is somewhat
difficult to vizualize [sic] the deceased as employed on another
job with no wages.''25 The possibility of duality of employment
22

CoLo. REV.

2Id.

STAT.

§ 81-11-3 (1963).

at 600.

2 The injuries occurring in these circumstances, however, must still have been con-

2

nected with the claimant's duties as an employee, as when one uses his own car to
perform a specific mission for an employer. Electric Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Industrial
Comm'n, 391 P.2d 677 (Colo. 1964) (A claimant who was "killing time" before
contacting his employer for work was not injured within his duties as employee.) ;
General Plant Protection Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 146 Colo. 191, 361 P.2d 138
(1961), which held that a director of advertising films, who was out of state on
location, and was killed while crossing the highway to his motel from a restaurant,
and who had declared he was going to work on the script at his motel was killed
as a result of hazards arising from and incident to his employment; Alexander Film
Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 136 Colo. 486, 319 P.2d 1074 (1957). See also 0. P.
Skaggs Co. v. Nixon, 101 Colo. 203, 72 P.2d 1102 (1937) ; Wells v. Cutter, 90 Colo.
111, 6 P.2d 459 (1931).
Larson says: "while admittedly the employment in the course of the journey
between his home and the factory, it is generally taken for granted that workmen's
compensation was not intended to protect him against all perils of that journey."
LARsoN, op. cit. supra note 5, at § 15.11. Injuries while journeying may be compensable if the journey is itself part of employee's work '(Id. at § 16). is made in
employer's vehicle (Id. at § 17), or the injury occurs while the employee is making
a trip for his own as well as employer's purpose, when someone else would have
had to perform the work if the employee had not (Id. at § 18.21). In this connection, Colorado has held that one who was allowed but not required to take work
home with him, and who had in fact taken work home with him, and was injured
going to work the next day, was not injured on a trip which was incident to his
employment, and therefore received no compensation. Industrial Comm'n v. Anderson,
69 Colo. 147, 169 Pac. 135 (1917).
State Compensation Ins. Fund v. Coleman, 392 P.2d at 600 (Colo. 1964).
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under a separate contract with the same employer was not discussed;
the essence of the opinion was a mere holding that the stipulation
that the injury arose out of the course of the employment was
justified.
The court, although failing to state adequate reasoning,
achieved the correct result in deciding that the accident causing
decedent's death arose out of and in the decedent's employment as an
electrician. When an employee suffers an accident while performing
a task not ordinarily within the course of his employment, but
which is done at the command of the employer, 6 or done by the
employee to enhance his value as such to his employer, 7 it is usually
held that the accident arose out of and in the course of the claimant's normal employment. In the Coleman case, deceased made the
trip at the instance of his employer, and it is probable that his reason
for making the trip without wages was connected with his employment as an electrician. The opinion in the principal case, however,
fails to apply any rules of law which determine whether or not a
separate contract of employment exists. The court did distinguish
the facts of the Coleman case from the situation where there are
two employers for whom separate kinds of work are being performed. 8 This is like distinguishing black from white, however,
Industrial Comm'n v. Stebbins, 102 Colo. 136, 78 P.2d 368 (1938), allowed recovery
when, at his boss's orders, a construction foreman was checking on the night watchman, and was killed in an automobile accident when he and wife were driving to the
town where the watchman resided. In Electric Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Industrial
Comm'n, 391 P.2d 677, 679 (Colo. 1965), the court noted that, "It has been held
that where an employee uses his own car, as here, to perform services for or at the
direction of his employer he remains in the course of his employment until he returns
home." See also Bundy v. Petroleum Products Co., 103 Kan. 40, 172 Pac. 1020,
1021 (1918), where it was held that:
[A) workman who has been engaged for a specific employment at a fixed
amount may recover from his employer compensation, based upon the earnings
of persons in that grade of service, for an injury received while working for
less wages in a different grade to which he had been assigned.
Teldhut v. Latham, 60 N.M. 87, 287 P.2d 615 (1953); Howell v. Kingston Tp.
School Dist., 106 Pa. Super 89, 161 At. 559 (1932) ; and Krier v. Dick's Linoleum
Shop, 78 S.D. 116, 98 N.W.2d 486 (1959).
27 "Where, however, the nature of the employee's act was known to and acquiesced in
by the employer and tended to prepare the employee for advancement in line with
the employer's custom, it may be held to have arisen out of the employment." Annot.
123 A.L.R. 1176 (1939). The issue before the Colorado court was in the course of
what employment did the accident happen. The court held that in fact there was
only one employment. In the following cases it was held that the accident arose out
of or in the course of the original, basic employment, although it might not have
been contended that there were several contracts of employment: see Williams v.
Central Flying Service, Inc., 236 Ark. 709, 368 S.W.2d 87 (1963); Chicago, Wilmington & Franklin Coal Co. v. Industrial Comm'n., 303 Il. 540, 135 N.E. 784
(1922) (where a trapper who wanted to be a driver was driving at the time of the
compensable accident in order to gain experience for his upcoming promotion to
driver, and such was customary) ; Morningstor v. Corning Bakery Co., 6 App. Div.2d
128, 176 N.Y.S.2d 388 (1958).
2s
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and is not helpful in establishing legal standards for deciding a
case with different facts.
C.

Loss OF BOTH CORRECTED AND UNCORRECTED VISION

Is Now

COMPENSABLE IN COLORADO.

In Rogers, Inc., v. Fishman,29 the supreme court on writ of
error affirmed a judgment of the district court which had approved
an award by the Industrial Commission allowing compensation for
loss of corrected vision. Claimant, before the injury, had almost
no vision in his left eye, until correction made it normal. Before
the accident, claimant's right eye was nearly blind, and the accident
caused the loss of all corrected vision in the left eye. After the loss
of vision of the right eye was sustained, normal vision was restored
in the right eye by corrective surgery.
The court held that an injury causing the loss of corrected vision
is compensable under the Colorado Workmen's Compensation Act.
The contention of the Fund, that the employer should not be
charged with a corrected loss because the employer is required to
pay for uncorrected losses without receiving credit for correction,30
was rejected by the court by distinguishing the principal case as a
different kind of case from cases which established that rule." The
court then said that liberal interpretation of the Workmen's Compensation Act required the holding that loss of vision meant loss
of corrected as well as uncorrected vision.32
The decision and reasoning of the court is consistent with that
2State

Compensation Ins. Fund v. Coleman, 392 P.2d 598, 600 (Colo. 1964).

29 388 P.2d 755 (Colo. 1964).

However, this rule had been followed in Colorado in Great American Indem. Co. v.
Industrial Comm'n, 114 Colo. 91, 162 P.2d 413 (1945); and in Jewell Collieries
Corp. v. Kenda, 110 Colo. 394, 134 P.2d 206 (1943). The court cited these cases
and distinguished them. The reasons which have been advanced for the failure to
take correction into account are that the remedial purpose of the Workmen's Compensation Act would be defeated by such a method of compensation, as restoration of
sight by means of glasses does not eliminate the handicap for which compensation
is supposed to be provided. (Great American Indemnity Co. v. Industrial Comm'n,
supra).
Other jurisdictions, however, are not in agreement on the question; those computing the correction contend that it is unrealistic to fail to take into account the
value of eyeglasses in removing the handicaps caused by reduction of vision. For a
discussion of those cases, see Annot. 142 A.L.R. 822 at 832 (1943), and annotations
thereby supplemented. Note, Workmen's Compensalion- Eye Injuries and Loss of
Vision, 35 N.C.L. REv. 443 (1957) contains a discussion of the rules in the various
jurisdictions.
31 388 P.2d 755, 756 (Colo. 1964).
32 Ibid. Many of the workmen's compensation cases in Colorado espouse and reaffirm
the rule that the Workmen's Compensation Act is to be liberally construed in awarding remedies thereunder. See cases cited in note 17, supra.
30
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in cases decided in other jurisdictions, 3 and does not conflict with
other Colorado cases dealing with loss of vision within workmen's
compensation law.34 The rule accepted in Colorado, that the Workmen's Compensation Act is to be liberally construed, should readily
be applied to all cases involving loss of vision, since loss of vision
handicaps one's industrial usefulness more severely than almost any
other single injury. Liberal allowance of claims for loss of vision
33 "[Alccording to most authorities, the extent of impairment of vision will be deter-

mined in view of the use of glasses . . . the extent of loss of vision due to an injury
may be computed on the basis of the pre-injury vision as corrected by glasses."
58 AM.JUR. Workmen's Compensation § 290 (1948). An analysis of some of the
authorities so holding reveals the liberality which prevails in making awards for loss
of vision. In Illinois, the fact that there is no statutory provision regarding the basis
of computation of loss of vision, the fact that the purpose of workmen's compensation is to compensate for financial loss to the employee due to reduction of his
industrial value, and the fact that corrected vision has industrial value required a
holding that compensation should be based on loss of corrected vision. Lambers v.
Industrial Commission, 411 II1. 593, 104 N.E.2d 789 (1952). Since the purpose of
the Iowa Workmen's Compensation Act is to reimburse the employee for injuries
suffered, it is not fair to omit the pre-injury correction of vision in computing the
extent of the loss. Whitney v. Rural Independent School Dist. No. 4, 232 Iowa 61,
4 N.W.2d 394 (1942). In Nebraska, a victim is compensated to the full extent of
his industrial loss caused by an industrial accident. The court recognized that one
having partial vision may have high industrial value, but has none when blind, and
held that when one loses his sight, compensation is not based on normal vision.
Ames v. Sanitay Dist., 140 Neb. 879, 2 N.W.2d 530 (1942). Corrected vision is
as valuable as normal vision and its loss should be compensated in order to fulfill
the liberal ends of the North Carolina workmen's compensation laws, when there
has been total loss of vision. Schrum v. Catawba Upholstering Co., 214 N.C. 353,
199 S.E. 385 (1938). This case is discussed in Comment, Eye Injuries and Loss
of Vision, 35 N.C.L. REv. 443 (1957), which recommends that computation on the
basis of corrected vision not be limited to total blindness situations, but should be
based on corrected vision both before and after the accident. Id. at 448.
In Reigle v. Sholly, 140 Pa. Super. 153, 14 A.2d 166 (1940) the court allowed
compensation for loss of a blind eye that could have been restored to sight through
an operation. The Virginia court imputed to the drawers of the Virginia Workmen's Compensation Act the common knowledge that corrected vision has industrial
value, and thereupon held that, since no provision was included in the act, corrected
rather than uncorrected vision should be used as the basis for compensation. Walsh
Const. Co. v. London, 195 Va. 810, 80 S.E.2d 524 (1954).
There is scant contrary authority, which is discussed in Comment, 35 N.C.L.
REv. 443, supra, and in Comment, 28 NOTRE DAME LAW. 152 (1952). It is interesting to note that Shrum v. Catawba Upholstering Co., supra, held that corrected
vision prior to accident was not used as a basis for computation of extent of loss
when complete blindness was not occasioned by the accident. However, cases which
have held that awards for loss of vision should be computed without consideration
of the effects of correction are cases in which vision was corrected after, but not
before, the accident. Allesandro Petrillo Co. v. Marioni, 33 Del. 99, 131 Atl. 164
(1925); Shaw v. Rosenthal, 112 Ind. App. 468, 42 N.E.2d 383 (1942); Parrott
Motor Co. v. Jolls, 168 Okla. 96, 31 P.2d 925 (1934); Pocahontas Fuel Co. v.
Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board, 118 W.Va. 565, 191 S.E. 49 (1937).
34 Colorado has been liberal in awarding compensation for loss of vision. As stated in
note 33, supra, post-accident correction of vision is not used as a basis for making
the awards. In Downs v. Industrial Comm'n, 109 Colo. 12, 121 P.2d 489 (1942)
which was cited by the court in the Fishman case (388 P.2d at 756), a claimant
suffered the enucleation of an eye the vision of which had previously been seriously
impaired, and was allowed the full amount for loss of an eye. When, after an accident, an injured employee may distinguish large objects and shadows, he is nevertheless entitled to compensation for total disability. Industrial Comm'n v. State Ins.
Compensation Fund, 71 Colo. 107, 203 Pac. 215 (1922). A holding contra to the
rule of the Fishman case would not be consistent with the humanitarian, protective,
and beneficient purposes of the Workmen's Compensation Act.
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would also be justified on the ground that only 104 weeks' wages
are allowed for the blindness of an eye,3" an award which seems
quite meager in view of its value to its owner and the exclusiveness
of workmen's compensation as a remedy.
D.

THERE

Is No

RECOVERY

FOR INJURIES CAUSED

By

RECRE-

ATIONAL ACTIVITIES

UNLESS THE ACTIVnES ARE REQUIRED
BENEFIT THE EMPLOYER.

By OR
The Colorado Supreme Court, in Murphey v. Marquez,"
reversed the decision of the district court which had approved an
award made by the Industrial Commission. The claimant's husband
had been accidentally killed by a blast from a shotgun which he
was removing from the roof of a building upon which he had been
working as a roofer. The shotgun belonged to the foreman, who
had brought it for the employees' use in shooting pigeons on their
own time, and at the time of the accident decedent was removing
the gun on the foreman's orders. The gun was neither needed nor
used in connection with the roofing business.
The court reasoned that the injury was not within the course
of employment because injuries occurring during recreational activities are compensable only when: [Quoting from LARSON, op. cit.
supra note 5, at § 221
(a) They occur on the premises during a . .. recreation period
as a regular incident of the employment; or (b) The employer, by
. ..requiring participation, or by making the activity part of the
services of an employee, brings the activity within the orbit of the
employment; or (c) The employer derives substantial direct benefit . . . beyond the intangible value of improvement in employee
health and morale that is common to all kinds of recreation ....37
In denying recovery, the court said there were no facts forming a
basis for application of these tests, and that any findings of the
Commission which could have justified their application were not
supported by the evidence. 8
There is some Colorado authority concerning the compensability of injuries occasioned by recreational activities. A discussion
of cases concerning injuries while participating in athletic activities
is found in Lindsay v. Public Service Co. of Colo.39 (cited by the
court in the instant case), 4 which strictly applied the "benefit to
35

COLO. REV. STAT. § 81-12-4 (1) (hh)'(1963).
P.2d 553 (Colo. 1964).

36 393

37id. at
38

556.

ibid.

39 146 Colo. 579, 362 P.2d 497 (1961).

40 Murphey v. Marquez, 393 P.2d 553 (Colo. 1964).
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employer" test as stated by Larson and adopted by the court, requiring actual direct benefit to the employer from the recreation. Other
Colorado cases do not indicate a liberal allowance of compensation
for injuries occurring during recreation where firearms are involved.4
There is no single test which is uniformly applied by courts
in other jurisdictions in determining the compensability of injuries
received during recreation. Usually, however, the injury must have
happened as a result of an activity beneficial to the employer, or
must have occurred on the premises as a result of a normal practice
incident to the employment.42 The decision of the court in the principal case was in line with holdings of other jurisdictions and prior
Colorado decisions, if the assumption made by the court, that the
accident occurred during a strictly recreational activity, was correct.
Shooting pigeons while on the job certainly does not benefit the
employer, nor is it the type of recreation which regularly occurs as
an incident of the roofing business.
There are facts, however, which would have justified a holding
that the deceased was not engaged in a recreational activity at the
time of the accident, but that he was doing an act arising out of his
employment. The gun was being removed on the foreman's orders
and was an act necessary to ending the day's work; furthermore, the
accident happened while the deceased was on the premises where
he had been ordered to work by the employer. Other courts, in
liberally construing workmen's compensation laws, have considered
41In Security State Bank of Sterling v. Propst, 99 Colo. 67, 59 P.2d 798 (1936), an
employee, a cashier at defendant bank, who, with the knowledge of the bank, carried
a pistol, shot himself while depositing a letter on his way to work. At this time,
the employee was bringing some out-of-town deposits with him as was his usual
practice. The death of employee was held compensable on the grounds that he was
doing something incidental to his work, with the knowledge and the acquiescence
of the bank. However, where an employee killed himself with a rifle which he was
carrying in order to shoot animals for dog food, and the rifle wasn't used in connection with his duties as a deputy water commissioner, the court denied compensation
stating that the accident did not arise out of the course of his employment. State
Compensation Ins. Fund v. Russell, 105 Colo. 274, 96 P.2d 846 (1939). When a
policeman was shot at a non-obligatory "turkey shoot," which he had participated in
at the encouragement of his employer, the supreme court refused to allow a deviation from the Commission's finding that the injury did not arise out of the claimant's employment. Industrial Comm'n v. Day, 107 Colo. 332, 111 P.2d 1061 (1941).
It is apparent that a substantial benefit must be received by the employer, or that the
work of the claimant must directly involve the handling of firearms, before the court
will deem a gunshot accident as one arising in or out of the course of employment.
4 Comment, Workmen's Compensation: Recreation of Employees, 15 OKLA. L. REV.
102, 105 (1962) ; Annot. 115 A.L.R. 992 (1938). In the case of Colsow v. Steele,
73 Idaho 348, 252 P.2d 1049 (1953), an employee was injured by a shot from the
pistol of a fellow employee. The foreman knew it was customary for the employee
to use the pistol for target pactice and did not object. The court reasoned that the
injury arose out of a risk customarily encountered by the employee at the location
where his employer required him to be, and was therefore compensable under a
liberal construction of the workmen's compensation laws.
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such circumstances in awarding compensation for gunshot injuries."
The court in the Marquez case should perhaps have given some
consideration to the possibility that the deceased was doing an act
which was disconnected with prior recreational use of the gun, so
that a liberal interpretation of the Workmen's Compensation Act
could have resulted in the allowance of an award.
E.

DEATH FROM

A

CAUSE LISTED

As

AN OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE

MAY BE COMPENSABLE UNDER THE COLORADO WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION ACT.

The supreme court, in Colorado Fuel & Iron Corp. v. Industrial
Commission," affirmed the district court's approval of an award
of workmen's compensation death benefits made by the Industrial
Commission. The decedent was suddenly killed by carbon monoxide
poisoning when he entered a confined area to perform a physical
task. Death by carbon monoxide poisoning is listed as an occupa45
tional disease under the Occupational Disease Disability Act
(ODDA) and recovery under this act is exclusive."
The court correctly rejected the contention of the employer
that the inclusion of carbon monoxide poisoning as a compensable
disease within the ODDA meant that a death by carbon monoxide
poisoning was compensable only under the ODDA, even when the
circumstances causing the death were such as to constitute an accident within the Workmen's Compensation Act. Instead, the court
4In

Joe Ready's Shell Station & Cafe v. Ready, 218 Miss. 80, 65 So. 2d 268 (1953),
the cout held that a gunshot injury arose out of claimant's employment when claimant, who did bookkeeping work at her home, was injured while removing a shotgun
from the couch on which she sat while doing her work. The presence of the gun
was deemed a risk to which claimant was exposed as a result of her employment,
reasoning that in removing the gun claimant did an act in furtherance of the work
which she had been hired to do. The court found claimant's home to be the "employment premises." Recovery was allowed a claimant who was shot by a shotgun that
was used in part for sport, and in part for protection. When shot, claimant was
performing his regular duties. The court said that claimant's possession of the gun
as a pastime was not material when he was shot while actually performing his regular
duties as an employee. Gallaher v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 77 S.W.2d 312
(Tex. Civ. App. 1934). Where a construction worker who was searching for a route
along which to construct a road through a timbered area was shot by a deer-hunter,
the court held the risk to be incident to his employment and allowed compensation.
Arnested v. McNicholas, 223 Mich. 488, 194 N.W. 514 (1923). In Boyce v.
Burleigh, 112 Neb. 509, 199 N.W. 785 (1924), claimant was shot accidentally by
a fellow employee who was handling his employer's shotgun against express instructions. The court awarded compensation because claimant was shot while performing
work while on the employer's premises.

4392

P.2d 174 (Colo. 1964).

4 COLO. RaV. STAT.

§ 81-18-9 (17)

(1963).

COLO. REv. STAT. § 81-18-8 (1963).
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discussed the definitions of "occupational disease' "" and "accident""
as previously formulated by Colorado, and re-affirmed the view that
an occupational disease is one which is slowly contracted as an incident of the type of work done by decedent, and that an accident
is an occurrence happening at a definite time and place from a
definite cause.'9 In holding that the mere inclusion of the medical
cause of decedent's death as a compensable disease within the ODDA
did not preclude recovery under the Workmen's Compensation Act
in a proper case, the supreme court adopted the general rule applied
by other jurisdictions. 0
Peter 1. Wiebe, Jr.

' Industrial Comm'n v. Ule, 97 Colo. 253, 48 P.2d 803 (1935); COLO. REV. STAT.

§ 81-18-10(1)(a) (1963).
Prouse v. Industrial Comm'n, 69 Colo. 382, 194 Pac. 625 (1921) was the only case
cited by the court, but there are others: See e.g., Hallenbeck v. Butler, 101 Colo. 486,
74 P.2d 708 (1937) ; Peer v. Industrial Comm'n, 94 Colo. 227, 29 P.2d 636 (1934).
When an employee was killed because of a sudden and excessive inhalation of gases
(which gases were normally inhaled in moderate amounts), the court in United
States Title & Guar. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 76 Colo. 241, 230 Pac. 624 (1924),
deemed the death of the employee compensable, saying the opposite conclusion would
obtain if the death were a result of the accumulated effects of the deceased's daily
breathing of the gases. When this case was decided, however, Colorado had no
ccupational disability disease act; the act was passed in 1945. Colo. Session Laws.
1945, Ch. 163, at 432.
69 Colorado Fuel & Iron Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 392 P.2d 174, 179 (Colo. 1964).
50 "[A] disease constitutes an accident within the meaning of the Act if it is traceable
to a definite time and place." Dunlap v. Industrial Comm'n, 90 Ariz. 3, 363 P.2d
600, 603 (1961) ; Sullivan's Case, 265 Mass. 497, 164 N.E. 457 (1929). In Industrial Comm'n v. Roth, 98 Ohio St. 34, 120 N.E. 172 (1918), the court deemed an
accidental inhalation of fumes an accident rather than an occupational disease. In
New York, a disease is a compensable accident within its workmen's compensation
laws when its inception is traceable to a single act, definite in time, and is catastrophic. Lerner v. Rump Bros., 241 N.Y. 153, 149 N.E. 334 (1925). In LARSON,
op. cit. supra note 5, at 37:30, it is said:
It is generally agreed . . . that any disease is compensable which follows as a
natural consequence of an injury which qualified independently as accidental.
. .T
Ihe second type of clear case is that in which the disease is the direct
result of some identifiable mishap. . . . In such cases . . . compensation is
almost invariably awarded without any serious hesitation because of the fact
that the injury takes the form of "disease."
For a general discussion of cases holding the inhalation of gases accidental injuries
rather than occupational diseases, see Annot. 90 ALR 619 (1934).
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Registration and Regulation of Brokers
and Dealers
By EZRA WEISS
Washington: Bureau of National Affairs, Inc., 1965.
Pp. xxviii, 363. $17.50.

At a time when both Securities and Exchange Commission
(S.E.C.) and congressional emphasis has been on amendments to
the regulations -of brokers and dealers, and to a general introspection
of the regulations involving the sale of securities, Mr. Weiss has
published a treatise which does credit to himself and is helpful to
both the legal and investment banking professions.
Mr. Weiss, counsel to the New York Regional Office of the
Securities and Exchange Commission, develops not only an erudite
discussion of his subject, but brings a wealth of practical experience
from his long service with the Securities and Exchange Commission.
The book is simplified into a number of parts and sections,
with detailed subheadings, making it relatively easy to obtain direct
reference to the subject matter desired. The registration of brokers
and dealers is treated in detail, thereby simplifying the preparation
of forms and understanding the qualifications necessary of brokers
and dealers. In addition, the financial requirements, bookkeeping
obligations, credit arrangements and similar special regulatory
requirements of brokers and dealers are detailed simply and with
excellent references. The statutes are well outlined and detailed
references are made to the special market study conducted by the
Securities and Exchange Commission and to a wealth of various
case law in the specific area. Perhaps one of the most significant
areas of this treatise is found in the sections setting forth the penalties for violations of the rules and detailing the enforcement proceedings which can be taken by the Commission. While no confidential or "inside" information is disclosed, Mr. Weiss sets forth
specifically and simply, for the benefit of those participating in any
administrative proceeding, some excellent hints and guidelines in
both defense and analysis of these proceedings.
Perhaps if there can be any general criticism of the book, it
would be that many areas are over-simplified. This is now a most
involved and specialized area of the security laws, and more detail
might have been helpful to the attorney.
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The practitioner, however, or even members of the investment
banking community, now with this treatise, supplemented with
Professor Loss's excellent work on "Securities Regulation," can
certainly be directed to some fundamental requirements and helpful
answers to knotty problems.
More and more it appears that specialized treatises will now
be written on the ever growing maze of complicated security regulations which are rapidly transcending upon both counsel and members of the investment fraternity. Mr. Weiss has demonstrated
ability to simplify some complicated issues in order to assist those
who practice in this field, and make their lot indeed easier. Certainly
for those that intend either forming a broker-dealer or representing
one, and those who desire a general knowledge of these operations,
this book is mandatory.
Sanford B. Hertz*

*Member, Colorado and Michigan Bars; A.B., Pennsylvania State University, 1952;
J.D., University of Michigan, 1955.

Statute Making
By

ARMAND

B.

COIGNE

Chicago: Commerce Clearing House, Inc., 1965. Pp. 293. $12.50
The book's preface announces a dual purpose: to educate persons without any knowledge of law in the business of statute-making,
and to function as a reference work for the lawyer. It is more successful in the former, and may be welcomed as a noble effort to
encompass all fifty state legislatures in a collective statement of
principles. A most frustrating task this must have been. Accuracy
requires mention of any significant departures from the norm, but
there are so many departures by various state legislatures that it is
hard to remember what the norm is. Nevertheless, and notwithstanding the disparities which occasion such difficulty, the book is a
workmanlike statement of the materials essential to a general understanding of legislative procedure. The old-standby, Robert's Rules
of Order, is not enough to guide one through the maze of legislative
procedure.
Aside from the book's value as a contribution to the general
literature, it is difficult to guess what the market will be for it. Few
persons require procedural details about all the state legislatures.
Most lobbyists and lawyers are concerned with the workings of their
own unique legislature, and can obtain locally a handbook with
answers more thorough and authoritative than can be achieved in
a 293-page work covering the entire national scene.
An illustration of the author's problem appears in the discussion of the question which perennially plagues lawyers and the courts
-Which
Document is the Law? The books says, "There is a substantial difference of opinion concerning the conclusiveness of the
enrolled act," and goes on to the next topic. To leave the matter
without at least a mention of the fact that many jurisdictions permit
the presumption of the enrolled bill's accuracy to be overcome by
journal entries to the contrary, is to say too little. The subject
reappears fifteen pages later, and the reader learns of the need to
check local authorities on the question. A footnote supplies a Virginia citation. Altogether, the chapter on the Effect and Validity
of Laws occupies six pages.
Readers in Massachusetts, Maine and Nebraska will find utility
in the twenty pages devoted specifically to those legislatures and
added by way of appendices.
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The book is generously equipped with tables which must have
required an immense amount of inquiry to assemble. One can learn,
for example, that in nineteen states the tenure of office in the lower
house equals that in the upper, raising in the reader's mind the
question, "Then why call them 'lower' and 'upper'?" Another disclosure to be found in the tables is the inordinate number of people
some states require to do their legislating. Connecticut has 280
members in its House alone. Rhode Island employs more legislators
than California.
Another set of tables, ingeniously cross-referenced, is abundant
with information about constitutional limitations on legislation. The
New England legislatures, it appears, can still grant a bill of divorcement, simply because the constitutions of these states have not been
amended to prohibit the practice.
It may be remarkable that there is as much uniformity as there
is, among fifty "states' rights" sovereignties. A legislator from one
state would feel at home observing the procedures of another, just
as he does in the national Congress or even the House of Commons;
but he could not risk participating in the actual chores without a
local rule-book.
The present book is a second edition, the first having been
issued in 1948. Presumably a third will be needed to inventory the
changes which are bound to accompany the reforms flowing from
the reapportionment decisions of the federal courts.
Yale Huffman*

*Instructor of Legislation, University of Denver College of Law.

Books Received
Edited by
Harry W. Jones. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc. 1965. Pp.
vii, 177. $3.95. An analysis, by seven of the nation's most distinguished experts in law and judicial administration, of the remedies
available to reduce court workloads, expedite the decision of cases,
and improve the process of judicial selection.
COURTS THE PUBLIC AND THE LAW EXPLOSION, THE.

Edited by Vern Countryman.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1965. Pp. xiv, 170. $5.00.
This volume is a compilation of papers given at a conference held
at the University of Chicago Law School, sponsored by the School
and the Anti-Defamation League. A thoroughgoing scrutiny is
made of the achievements in due process of the law during the past
ten years, in four basic areas-employment, education, public accommodation, and housing. The essential theme is the constitutional law
of race discrimination. The writers weigh the relative merits of the
exercise of legislative and judicial power, of government action, and
private litigation.
DISCiuMINATION AND THE LAW.

By Rex Mackey. London: W.H. Allen.
1965. Pp. 192. $25.00. A light-hearted work dedicated to dispelling
any notions that Irish law might be dull. Frequent references are
made to cases, both civil and criminal, by way of illustrating the
author's point.
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